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ABSTRACT
THE BEING OF ART AND THE ART OF BEING: HERMENEUTIC ONTOLOGY IN
GADAMER AND WOOLF
August 3, 2015
Overall, the point of this project is to plumb the affinities between Gadamer’s notion
of hermeneutic ontology and Virginia Woolf’s novels—how these affinities illuminate
and contribute to an improved understanding of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics
and Woolf’s novels. For their part, Gadamer and Woolf belong to a similar cultural and
historical milieu, each, in one way or another, a participant in the intellectual and artistic
movement known as Modernism. This movement arose in response to the encroaching
impersonality of scientific objectivity: both Woolf and Gadamer recognized the pitfalls of
this objectivity, as it necessarily discounts the interpretive opportunity and responsibility
of the individual. In Virginia Woolf’s novels, we witness an intensification and
enactment of one’s interpretive imperative. In their structure and thematics, we encounter
narratives that emphasize interpretive experiences and concepts—in them there is a heavy
accent on those experiences that are binding, those experiences that shape consciousness
and determine one’s interpretive horizon. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical outlook
is especially useful for an analysis of these novels because his philosophy concerns the
interpretation of day to day existence as it relates to the interpretation of a literary text.
iii

For its part, this philosophical framework hinges on the primacy of language—its
universality and our unconsciousness of it—our belongingness to art—its ability to
engage the meaningfulness of our perceptions and alter them too—and the dialogical
situation in which all language use occurs—every utterance belongs to an occasion, its
meaning only understandable as it relates to its context. Woolf’s novels, for their part,
highlight and emphasize these hermeneutic and ontological precepts. In these narratives,
we encounter characters who interpret their existence; this interpretive dynamic—and the
philosophical precepts that undergird them—are decisive for the significance and impact
of these novels; interpretation and meaning are, in fact, the primary subject matter. I will
argue that—as others have noted—a philosophical approach is useful for understanding
these novels in their full scope, that there is a philosophical undercurrent that runs
through these narratives, but that the philosophical scholarship on Woolf fails to fully
appreciate the hermeneutic and ontological underpinnings that are decisive for their
meaning. Instead of reading these novels through a lens of radical interpretation and
questionability, the present scholarship relies on static concepts such as world, self, and
reality. My argument is that these concepts are not static, that they are in movement as
the individual engages with language, with art, and with others. In many ways, these
novels are defined by this movement—how one’s understanding and horizon is shaped by
this engagement—and the consequences and implications therein. In relating Woolf’s
novels to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, the reader acquires an improved sense
for the reference of the words that populate her novels, words that determine the meaning
of a world and the characters who inhabit it: these narratives include characters who
strive to understand, who either fail or succeed based on their willingness to privilege and
iv

engage with experiences of language, of art, or dialogue with others. Now, in relating
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to Woolf’s novels, the reader encounters an
enactment of Gadamer’s philosophical outlook: interpretation is inescapable—whether
reading or living an average day, the world and its meaning are forever in motion and it is
up to the individual to respond in kind.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

There are many ways to interpret Virginia Woolf’s novels, but, up until now, no
one has chosen to organize his or her interpretive effort around Hans-Georg Gadamer’s
hermeneutic ontology. For its part, hermeneutic ontology concerns how people interpret
at all: the world is meaningless until it is presented. For Gadamer, the originary
presentation is language. Language is the means by which people acquire a world (Truth
and Method 440). Nevertheless, language is occasional: it belongs to an overall meaning
while never fully able to express that totality. People, then, are tuned to engage with
presentation, as a part of their/our linguisticality. We make and engage with art to enact
our interpretive project: artworks are always what they are meant to be, but that meaning
is inexhaustible. Undoubtedly, artworks do compel: through art we gain knowledge that
we would have in no other way. As examples of art that take place in language, Woolf’s
novels provoke the reader: what is language? What is art? What does it mean to be? The
answers, of course, are contained within the novels and are central to their interpretation;
some of them will be fleshed out, too, in the following pages.
In particular, I will be interpreting two of Woolf’s novels: Mrs. Dalloway, and To
the Lighthouse. For their part, these novels are lyrical texts that explore language, art, and
the wonder of being human. In all three, there is an interpenetration and codeterminacy:
1

as one’s relationship to language, art, or being changes, the other two morph also. In her
novels, she tells the stories of characters who are presented as people—but with an
emphasis on how the stories are told; the narrator takes center stage: the exact meaning or
nature of these characters is not known; all views and portraits are productive, and
lacking at the same time, in tension; who and what people are does vary, but each does
have an identity that depends on assertion—each has to be someone or something,
whoever or whatever it may be. Here the narrator describes and presents by way of
language; the identity of these characters depends on that description; the only way that
the reader knows these characters—the only way that they are anything at all. This
particular aspect of the narrative reminds the reader: we are by way of language. Of
course, Woolf’s novels are not just reminders of the indeterminacy of identity and the
neediness of language, they call attention to the text as text—the concept of text—and to
art as art—its concept too. That is, Woolf’s novels are about characters who interpret and
negotiate existence, but they are also about novels and how they can mean. Certainly,
Woolf plays with form; she makes a kind of argument: the meaning of a story depends
much more on its narrative posture than its action. These novels jar the reader: part of
their identity is to demand interpretive awareness; that is, the ubiquity of interpretation
and its vital importance.
Like Woolf, Gadamer recognizes that human being and interpretation are
inseparable. In his case, though, he is not an artist. He writes about art. As for Woolf,
because she is a novelist, her commentary on art or the novel is embedded in the text
itself: hers is not a direct commentary; instead she takes the path of inference. As an
instantiation of art, her novels create the terms of their identity: what they mean and how
2

they mean are determined by the particulars of each novel; each changes the identity of
the genre and the identity of art. This particular nature of art and the novel is considered
by Gadamer. The meaning of art and novels depends on what has come before: each new
artistic creation is in dialogue with the past; in the moment of creation, though, its aim is
to engage with the particulars of the present moment; to create something new; to gain
insight. So it is that change, openness, newness—all are part of the identity of art. But it
is not only art that Gadamer confronts: he also takes aim at the concept of language and
the idea of the human being as he or she relates to the world. Gadamer’s starting point is
the concept of text and its proper interpretation. He argues that a text is contemporaneous
with all of its readers and that part of its identity is to endure; texts stem from the need for
posterity, the urge to carve out a stance on the present moment that nevertheless remains
understandable and open to future application (“Text and Interpretation” 34).
Furthermore, texts are written because they assert themselves: the words are always the
same even if the meaning changes with the reader or the cultural moment. In texts, there
is a self-legitimacy and self-attestation. There is intentionality too: it is what it is meant to
be. The reader faces this dynamic of the text and wants to do it justice: he or she is
pushed to think about what the words mean; the reader is caught between two poles—that
of his or her own world and that of the text. When confronted with a literary text,
interpretation is inescapable. The meaning of the text, though, does not lie directly with
the text or with the reader, it lies somewhere in between. It lies in the basic function of
language, of the recognition of the true world.
The reader’s task is to recognize the world for what it is. Individuality demands
that the world be different for each person, but, at the same time, language is the product
3

of a shared context; in all cases, language is so intimately bound with what it means to be
human that any and all language is potentially understandable, for each manifestation is a
testimony of the human being’s relationship to the world. It is this relationship that the
concept of text provokes. A text stakes a claim and makes an assertion: this is what the
world means. Of course, a text too is an answer to a question and also makes its own
query to the reader (Gadamer, Truth and Method 367). This process never ends. So when
a reader faces a text, the reader is reminded of his or her own opinion of the world, for
the language of a text is always alien and different: the reader’s task is to make sense of
the world now that his or her horizon has been disrupted—a task of assimilation.
Indeed, Gadamer’s starting point for his philosophy is the proper interpretation of
texts, but his concerns are not straightforward. Like Woolf demonstrates in her novels,
Gadamer argues that human being, language, and art are part of the same fabric, each
impinging the one on the other (Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History
90). In order to properly interpret a literary text, it is first necessary to understand the role
of language in human being and the role of art in human being. In other words, the
literary text is not just an object; its meaning depends on language and history and
presentation—just like we do; something about how we understand the world and what it
means to us; we are implicated every time we read. This dynamic will guide my
dissertation as I move forward.
Before further entering into the particulars of this project, it is worth outlining the
pillars of this interpretive approach. To begin with, Virginia Woolf’s novels are literary
texts that engage the meaningfulness of the world. This meaning, though, depends on the
participation of the reader and his or her enactment of the text. The words are forever the
4

same, but their meaning will change with each reader. Each reader belongs to his or her
own world, and this world is perceived and understood within language. This is the case
for all people, in fact. This interaction between the individual and the world is primary,
decisive for all interpretation. Gadamer organizes his entire interpretive structure based
on this interaction. His interpretive approach might be summarized in the following
manner:
1) To be human is to have language. Before we even realize it, we already use and
understand language. The world is meaningful and reality is understandable
because of language.
2) More can always be said. As we live in language, and language is necessarily
meaningful and interpretive, we forever strive to reach a correspondence between
all that the world might be and all that we proclaim it to be. However, as we
describe the world, this act of description belongs to the occasion of its utterance;
the identity of the world becomes something else as it is described. The potential
meanings of the world forever outpace our engagement with these meanings.
3) All interpretation is perspectival. We always belong to a situation, and this
situation necessarily demands interpretation. In all, we interpret because each of
us brings a unique perspective and it is our task to account for this perspective, so
that we might approach a correspondence between the meaning of the world and
our understanding of this meaning. This effort, though, is always an
approximation, never completing itself.
4) All interpretation is dialogical. Texts provoke the reader: they demand that we
share in an overall meaning, a meaning which envelops both the reader and the
5

text. It is only within the context of this overall significance that the text has
meaning and the reader understands. When someone is about to read a text, he or
she cannot but anticipate its content, its meaning. It is only as an answer to a
question that the text can mean anything. At the same time, the text will
necessarily disrupt the presuppositions of the question, the text itself becoming
the questioner, forcing the reader to answer. This dialogue is made possible
because both the reader and the text belong to an overall meaning, with neither
possessing a monopoly on this meaning, each with an equal share. This sense of
an overall meaning is forever present, but the particulars change with the passage
of time.
5) The historicity of meaning. In general, possibility is shaped by the historical
moment. It is necessary to account for historical difference, to acknowledge one’s
historical moment and that of the text. In doing so, one might avoid anachronistic
falsehood. Time comprehends change: there is always difference but, at the same
time, this difference is shaped by a shared ontology—each of us has a world and it
is this belongingness that determines historical difference.
6) A fusion of horizons between text and reader. All interaction between text and
reader is a matter of mediating identity and difference: the worlds of the text and
reader are both the same and different. In the end, a new meaning emerges each
time a text is read, a meaning that accounts for this tension between sameness and
difference.

6

Overall, the point of this project is to plumb the affinities between Gadamer’s
notion of hermeneutic ontology and Virginia Woolf’s novels—how these affinities
illuminate and contribute to an improved understanding of Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics and Woolf’s novels. For their part, Gadamer and Woolf belong to a similar
cultural and historical milieu, each, in one way or another, a participant in the intellectual
and artistic movement known as Modernism. This movement arose in response to the
encroaching impersonality of scientific objectivity: both Woolf and Gadamer recognized
the pitfalls of this objectivity, as it necessarily discounts the interpretive opportunity and
responsibility of the individual. In Virginia Woolf’s novels, we witness an intensification
and enactment of one’s interpretive imperative. In their structure and thematics, we
encounter narratives that emphasize interpretive experiences and concepts—in them there
is a heavy accent on those experiences that are binding, those experiences that shape
consciousness and determine one’s interpretive horizon. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s
philosophical outlook is especially useful for an analysis of these novels because his
philosophy concerns the interpretation of day to day existence as it relates to the
interpretation of a literary text. For its part, this philosophical framework hinges on the
primacy of language—its universality and our unconsciousness of it—our belongingness
to art—its ability to engage the meaningfulness of our perceptions and alter them too—
and the dialogical situation in which all language use occurs—every utterance belongs to
an occasion, its meaning only understandable as it relates to its context. Woolf’s novels,
for their part, highlight and emphasize these hermeneutic and ontological precepts. In
these narratives, we encounter characters who interpret their existence; this interpretive
dynamic—and the philosophical precepts that undergird them—are decisive for the
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significance and impact of these novels; interpretation and meaning are, in fact, the
primary subject matter. I will argue that—as others have noted—a philosophical
approach is useful for understanding these novels in their full scope, that there is a
philosophical undercurrent that runs through these narratives, but that the philosophical
scholarship on Woolf fails to fully appreciate the hermeneutic and ontological
underpinnings that are decisive for their meaning. Instead of reading these novels through
a lens of radical interpretation and questionability, the present scholarship relies on static
concepts such as world, self, and reality. My argument is that these concepts are not
static, that they are in movement as the individual engages with language, with art, and
with others. In many ways, these novels are defined by this movement—how one’s
understanding and horizon is shaped by this engagement—and the consequences and
implications therein. In relating Woolf’s novels to Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics, the reader acquires an improved sense for the reference of the words that
populate her novels, words that determine the meaning of a world and the characters who
inhabit it: these narratives include characters who strive to understand, who either fail or
succeed based on their willingness to privilege and engage with experiences of language,
of art, or dialogue with others. Now, in relating Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to
Woolf’s novels, the reader encounters an enactment of Gadamer’s philosophical outlook:
interpretation is inescapable—whether reading or living an average day, the world and its
meaning are forever in motion and it is up to the individual to respond in kind.

Gadamer on Language
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As has already been mentioned, Gadamer’s starting point is the concept of text.
For him, the text is the hermeneutic object par excellence. A text demands that the reader
become aware of his or her relationship to language and to history; the words of a text
belong to a historical situation and are a result of history, too; these words confront the
reader, whose own situation is unique also. A text, then, makes a claim that the reader
cannot discount. Necessarily, the reader grows from this encounter: the texture of his or
her being has become more intricate, stronger. In this process there is a doubling back: as
the reader wonders about the meaning of the words in the text, he or she wonders about
the meaning of words in general, about their role in deciphering what the world means.
For Gadamer, “the midworld of language has proven itself to be the true dimension of
that which is given” (“Text and Interpretation” 29). A text transports the reader into this
mindset: that the world is only understandable when it is presented, when it comes into
language. The reader is reminded of his or her relationships, of his or her process, of
those conditions and situations that have yielded the self-presentation of being. The
reader is reminded to honor and privilege language, for there is no world unless it is
named: “To come into language does not mean that a second being is acquired. Rather,
what something presents itself as belongs to its own being” (Truth and Method 470).
When reading a text, the participant is drawn into this dynamic: the world appears
different every day, is different, but it is not necessarily alien and strange; it can be
appropriated, even understood—the world belongs to its presentation.
Each view, though, each presentation of the world, is always deficient, never
complete. For Gadamer, part of the identity of language is that it is occasional; it belongs
to the occasion, never able to fully name the whole, the unity; each particular instance is
9

new and different, contextualized by the whole, even changing it, but never complete and
entire:
But there is another dialectic of the word, which accords to
every word an inner dimension of multiplication: every
word breaks forth as if from a center and is related to a
whole, through which alone it is a word. Every word causes
the whole of language to which it belongs to resonate and
the whole world-view that underlies it to appear. Thus
every word, as the event of a moment, carries with it the
unsaid, to which it is related by responding and
summoning. The occasionality of human speech is not a
casual imperfection of its expressive power; it is, rather, the
logical expression of the living virtuality of speech that
brings a totality of meaning into play, without being able to
express it totally. All human speaking is finite in such a
way that there is laid up within it an infinity of meaning to
be explicated and laid out. That is why the hermeneutical
phenomenon also can be illuminated only in light of the
fundamental finitude of being, which is wholly verbal in
character (Truth and Method 454).
That is, we all have a vague sense of the world and its truth, and we are always moving
towards some sort of confirmation or complete understanding, but language is discursive
and situational: it unfolds through time and it changes with each new moment; because of
this, we only acquire an aspect or view of the way things are. This nature of language is
both productive and frustrating: it leads us to continuously search and try; it also means
that we will never reach our goal. Nevertheless, we engage with texts and language for
this very reason: as a reminder of our humanity and its potential.
Gadamer on Art and Literature
If language is the means by which we have a world, one wonders how art fits into
this estimation. Language is the original self-presentation of being; art takes notice of this
situation and reminds us that all meaning must first be presented; there is no
10

interpretation if there is no appearance. Gadamer states this dynamic directly: “The world
that appears in the play of presentation does not stand like a copy next to the real world,
but is that world in the heightened truth of its being” (Truth and Method 132). Language
is the originary presentation, but art mines this dynamic, playing with our natural
receptiveness to engage with presentation. So, when we encounter an artwork we are
reminded of ourselves; we are reminded that the world depends on its presentation. Each
presentation, though, is new and different and always intentional. An artwork is always
more than what we make of it—its interpretive possibilities are inexhaustible: yet all
artistic production “intend[s] what it produces to be what it is” (The Relevance of the
Beautiful 25). Because art is a self-enclosed, internally coherent world that hinges on its
self-fulfillment, the artistic product creates the terms of its own interpretation: the task of
the interpreter is to do justice to those terms.
Gadamer makes the argument that art is arresting: part of the nature of art is to
captivate; so much so that the participant forgets about him or herself, for a moment at
least. In that captivation, the participant notices nothing else but the appearance itself: “In
the apparent particularity of sensuous appearance, which we always attempt to relate to
the universal, there is something in our experience of the beautiful that arrests us and
compels us to dwell upon the individual appearance itself” (The Relevance of the
Beautiful 16). This concept of the beautiful is important to Gadamer’s hermeneutics. He
argues that beauty closes the gap between the appearance of something and its true
identity. Therefore, when we encounter beauty in art we encounter the thing for what it is
and nothing else. For this reason, because it allows us to encounter the world for what it
is, the experience of art signifies “an increase in being” (The Relevance of the Beautiful
11

15). Of course, like being, a work of art comprehends the fundamental tension between
revealment and concealedness. (“The Truth of the Work of Art” 107). We never fully
know the meaning of existence or of art, but we are always aware that there is this
tension. Part of the accomplishment of art is to face this tension and seek some sort of
resolution: “The only relevant thing is whether we encounter a spiritual and ordering
energy in the work […] a new order of unity in tension” (“Art and Imitation” 103). Art
encourages us to embrace the ambiguities, doubts and insights that we all experience,
giving us a sense for their complementary position in our lives.
For its part, literature and the poetic word are examples of art that depend on
language. In literature there is “a counterplay between the intended meaning and the selfpresentation of the language (Gadamer in Conversation 74). Unconsciousness of
language is our natural state: when we speak and converse it does not occur to us that we
are using language and that language is, or can be, undependable. When we speak, our
concern is to reach an agreement about matters of fact, to recognize the way things are.
And of course, when we read literature, there is a meaning that is conveyed through the
language; we want to understand this meaning and that is our main focus; but, in
literature, we become aware of the variability of language, of its indeterminacy and
fecundity—we notice that the language itself is in the foreground: the language is new
and different, creative too; this language describes a world heretofore unknown.
With this dynamic in mind, we can say that poetic language fulfills itself (“On the
Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 111-2). It does not seek any verification
outside of itself. Poetic language does not depend on anything else besides its
presentation. The poetic word is always about something but it is always about itself too:
12

it is about the accomplishment of language and its role in our life. Gadamer describes the
principal accomplishment of language in the following manner: “what the word evokes is
there” (“On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 113). Because of
language we have a world: the poetic word proves insightful because it challenges us to
recognize our own creative mandate—the world can be rich or bland, full or empty,
depending on its description.
Language provides the fundamental articulations that guide our understanding of
the world. Language is co-existent with our growth; our familiarity with the world too. It
is a process of ‘making ourselves at home’: “The word of the poet does not simply
continue this process […] Instead it stands over against this process like a mirror held up
to it. But what appears in the mirror is not the world, nor this or that thing in the world,
rather this nearness or familiarity itself in which we stand for a while” (“On the
Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 114-15). We enter into the poetic text
and we encounter language that, up to a point, describes the world as we know it, while at
the same time it illuminates the world in new and different ways; the words take on a
complete naturalness, as if they were always meant to be there, as if each word belonged
precisely to its place: there is nothing contrived about these words, just like our first
experience with language—everything belongs.
Gadamer on Dialogue
Dialogue is a useful concept for a variety of reasons. Overall, it will enable me to
bring together my cogitations on language and art: both concepts will now dwell in this
chapter, illuminated from several different angles. Also, of course, dialogue is central to
my interpretive project: I will be in dialogue with Virginia Woolf’s novels and dialogue
13

is a principal thematic concern in Woolf’s novels. According to Gadamer, interpretation
itself is defined by dialogue. In its entirety, dialogue is the source of language and art and
meaning. There is no such thing as an individual language: “Language is a we, in that we
are assigned our place in relation to each other, and in which the individual has no fixed
borders […] we all must overstep our own personal boundaries/limits of understanding to
understand” (Gadamer in Conversation 56). We are social creatures and all meaning
depends on that socialization: our relationships happen to be our greatest source of
fulfillment. Looking ahead to Woolf’s novels, we can certainly notice a heavy emphasis
placed on the limits and borders between people; people need each other and depend on
each other, each a source of conflict and resolution. As Gadamer says, in dialogue “world
is disclosed” (Truth and Method 443). In all cases, for every person, the mandate is to
recognize the world for what it is. Dialogue has its own energy; it sweeps the participants
along: each individual perspective is limited and temporary; in dialogue, though, we test
our understanding and our one-sidedness, now pushed to see the thing from another
angle. Dialogue yields insight. In dialogue, different aspects of the world appear.
Overall, language and meaning depend on dialogue: “Are we not always
answering when we venture a word, by which I mean are we not trying to respond to the
other, to the occasion, to the issue, to the causa” (“Culture and the Word” 5). Language
and meaning are defined by movement, change: the answers and questions always alter
because the hermeneutical situation consistently shifts. Virginia Woolf engages with this
dynamic in her fiction and it dominates the interpretation of texts, too. The hermeneutical
imagination hinges on the following point: “a sense of the questionableness of something
and what this requires of us” (Gadamer in Conversation 42). We ask questions of
14

something to open it up: it can either be this way or that way. Then we answer the
question and a new question appears: the answer, of course, has its own indeterminacy—
it too can go one way or another. This series of questions and answers leads to a path:
interpretation “implies pointing in a particular direction” (“Composition and
Interpretation” 68). What that direction is, or what it should be, is hard to say, but the
goal is to recognize the thing for what it is: of course, that thing is going to change
because we change. Nevertheless, sincere engagement with the object is the most
productive path towards truth:
The hermeneutical experience also has its own rigor: that of
uninterrupted listening. A thing does not present itself to
the hermeneutical experience without an effort special to it,
namely that of ‘being negative toward itself.’ A person who
is trying to understand a text has to keep something at a
distance—namely everything that suggests itself, on the
basis of his own prejudices, as the meaning expected—as
soon as it is rejected by the sense of the text itself (Truth
and Method 461).
This approach described here applies to the interpretation of texts and the interpretation
of existence as we experience the world. It is a kind of dialogue: here there is an
assertion, then there is a response; each assertion disrupts the horizon of the interpreter—
here he or she realizes that his or her expectations were not entirely accurate; here, then,
he or she adjusts expectations; his or her view is now in harmony with the presentation of
the world.
Literature Review
At this point, I would like to begin by looking at those studies that most closely
resemble my own. In this manner I might show how my own approach is part of a more
general discussion and prove that it provides insight to that discussion. That is, Mark
15

Hussey’s book The Singing of the Real World, and A.O. Frank’s book The Philosophy of
Virginia Woolf’s Fiction clearly indicate that Virginia Woolf’s novels and philosophy
belong together. The question, though, is what kind of philosophy and what kind of
analysis. Before going into a more detailed presentation of my own approach, I would
like to discuss these two works and by doing so, by way of contrast, my own approach.
Hussey’s study states his intent directly: “The primary focus of this study is
Woolf’s record of a ‘reality’ that she apprehended in the actual world, but that transcends
it” (xix). The key terms in this statement are reality, actual world, and transcendence.
Here, Hussey’s mistake is that he relies on terms that he allows to be static. He places
reality and the actual world on one side and transcendence on the other. Whereas, I
contend, reality and transcendence belong together—a statement supported by Woolf’s
novels, I would argue. In other words, one might say that reality includes its very
transcendence as part of its identity. How is this so? How can reality go beyond itself and
still be real? The answer has to do with language and art. That is, reality depends on its
being named and pictured—so, reality is provisional and in process. Reality, in and of
itself, is defined by change, a moving further and beyond, by transcendence of itself.
There is no way to avoid language and art, but the yield can be less or more, depending
on the degree of participation and adaptation to circumstance.
Hussey’s approach to Woolf’s writing also chooses to focus on such concepts as
knowledge, the self and being: “Virginia Woolf’s novels are concerned with knowledge
of others, and knowledge of the world. The question of the nature of the self is at the
heart of her thinking, and, I believe, is the dynamic of her fiction. Her novels uncover
what Georges Poulet has called ‘the essentially religious nature of human centrality’ […]
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Her point of departure is always a simple, but radical wonder in the face of being at all
(what Heidegger called Thaumazein)” (xv). His analysis is appropriate, but, once again, it
depends on static concepts that do not reflect the depth and searing insight of Woolf’s
thought. Her writing points to a need for a radical openness, an impulse to question
everything. To talk about knowledge or the self is useful, but derivative of being in and of
itself—the disclosure and withdrawal that point us toward ways of knowing and identity
construction. In my mind, Woolf challenges the usefulness and dependability of using
such concepts. To Hussey’s credit—and in support of my own argument—he does
recognize that Woolf’s thought does point to an ontological concern (the mystery and
wonder of being at all), but his own argument, up to a point, undermines this recognition.
In contrast with Hussey’s analysis, the goal of A.O. Frank’s study of Virginia
Woolf’s fiction is to provide the philosophical associations which Woolf’s fiction
provokes. Frank focuses on central ideas in Woolf’s novels and then elaborates on those
ideas as they manifest themselves in philosophy. Unlike mine, Frank’s project is not
defined by interpretation or hermeneutics as the central philosophical concept. She, of
course, does interpret the novels, but only inasmuch as her interpretations support the
philosophical concepts and vice versa. She mines the continental philosophical tradition
and even cites Gadamer as an inspiration, but ignores him when it comes time to actually
apply her interpretive framework. Overall, though, Frank’s effort does suggest that my
own ideas are not in isolation; rather, they belong to an extensive field which
acknowledges that philosophy and literature ask and answer similar questions; even
more, more specifically, that Gadamer and Woolf ask and answer similar questions: “The
aesthetic turn in modern philosophy as it is described by Gadamer in Truth and Method,
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whereby art offers an appropriate medium of understanding for problems that discursive,
methodical philosophy of the Socratic-Cartesian paradigm has failed to answer, offers a
position which comes much closer to a description of Woolf’s own intellectual stance”
(21-2). I agree with this statement, and my own project would be unnecessary if Frank
had chosen to analyze Woolf’s novels by way of Gadamer’s ideas, but she did not.
Up until now, it has not been very popular to link Gadamer and Woolf. Frank’s
study is an exception and so is Linda O’Neill’s article, “Gadamer meets Woolf in a Room
of One’s Own”. O’Neill wrote her article in the context of education, but it is still useful
to mention because it affirms the relevancy of my own study and also the importance of
language and art in human development. She says: “Woolf brings to life through
literature what Gadamer affirms through philosophical hermeneutics: that the primordial
lived experiences, in and outside of schools, cannot be understood without careful
attention to accessible traditions, embodied language, and potential transcendence in
pursuit of intellectual freedom and practical wisdom” (337). Here O’Neill suggests that
Woolf and Gadamer point in the same direction—that analysis and knowledge should
have “primordial lived experiences” as a starting point. Instead of relying on one-sizefits-all methods and constructions, one should recognize that these sort of approaches
stem from the same material that we all possess: in our relationships to each other, to
language, to art, and to the world. To interpret is to recognize the questionableness of
something and it is to share in the general ontological relationship of human being to the
world. By way of participation, different aspects of the thing itself appears. O’Neill
recognizes this emphasis that Gadamer and Woolf place on participation in tradition. In
participation, she would note, one can develop a greater sense of meaning: the truth of
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being in the world. And, of course, it is a meaning that is individualized, unique to one’s
particular history and place in the world.
Yes, a handful of critics have connected Virginia Woolf and Hans-Georg
Gadamer. Others, also, have noted a connection between Woolf and Gadamer’s teacher,
Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s life work was defined by a need to go beyond or to
destroy metaphysics. He did not believe that there was a static world—out there—which
was the real and true world and that all attempts at knowing or understanding were just
attempts at approximating or approaching this true reality. Rather, he argued that being
and understanding are co-existent; the world and the perception of it are co-existent; to
belong in the world is already to understand it. Humans understand something and are on
the way towards understanding more; furthermore, this understanding includes a
fundamental tension between disclosure and withdrawal: the world is on a swivel and its
meaning too. If this is the case, if reality itself is in flux, then interpretation takes on an
even greater role: that which is to be understood is to be questioned; to find the right
question is to participate in meaning. In her essay, “Heidegger in Woolf’s Clothing”,
Heidi Storl recognizes Heidegger’s impulse as seen in Woolf’s writing: “Virginia
Woolf’s work reveals a deep understanding of, as well as an appreciation for, sustained
meditation on that-which-is” (1). I agree with Storl’s estimation and would say that
literature is the ideal medium for just such a consideration. Literature takes place in
language and places language as the medium of its existence; the appearance of language
is its very truth—here there is no gap between what the language says and what it is.
However, the meaning of such language is indeterminate: interpretation is included in its

19

identity. Woolf’s novels play with this dynamic and present characters and storylines that
wrestle with it too: what is the world and how are we to understand it?
There are some other studies of Virginia Woolf and her fiction I would like to
examine. I have chosen to mention these studies because they recognize the philosophical
undertones of her work. In general, these studies focus on what is held in common
between people and what is constitutive of how people find that common ground—that
which shapes knowledge and understanding at all. Jane Duran’s article “Virginia Woolf,
Time, and the Real” is just one such example. She says: “Woolf’s writing forces us to
look closely at what is constitutive of the real in our lives. In this sense, Woolf’s novels
are philosophical. They pose questions driven by wonder, and they answer those
questions by depicting those very moments, few though they may be, when a striking
sense of the urgently real breaks through our ruminations, and makes itself felt in an
unmistakable way” (6). This article is useful for this proposal because it reinforces the
direction which I have chosen to take: she too says that Woolf’s novels are philosophical
and also that they examine reality. The real, of course, is hard to pin down but the merit
of this article lies in its suggestion that the real is something that happens to us. The real
and the true appear when people engage with the world; the world and its nature makes
itself felt precisely because we belong to it.
In Howard Harper’s book-length study, Between Language and Silence: The
Novels of Virginia Woolf, we see a similar focus, but with a greater emphasis on effort
and the role of the subject: here it is the subject’s task to find meaning, one that requires
tremendous effort and work. In this scene, the world is separate, waiting to be interpreted:
“Meaning is not something inherent, or at least self-evident, in the given world; rather, it
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is something to be discovered, achieved, wrested from the struggle with the protean,
phenomenal world. The discovery of transcendent meaning becomes the great mythic
theme of this drama of intentionality” (3). In this passage we get the flip-side of the coin:
instead of meaning as something that happens to us, it is something that we make happen.
This assertion is a half-truth. It is necessary to engage with the world and, at times, to be
stubborn in that engagement (to not give up), but we are only able to find new ways of
being and more coherent meaning because the world already means something to us; it is
not always a struggle, sometimes, instead, we glide, propelled by our own momentum,
the truth of the world and its self-disclosure deeply resonant.
Virginia Woolf and her novels promote the idea that there is no one fixed,
immovable world; the world to be understood is up for debate; to say that things are one
way or another is to accept the unquestioned assumptions that have led to subjugation and
inequality. Instead, Woolf aimed to present a world that varies, depending on perspective,
a world that is never truly, really known. Even Woolf’s narrators are unsure about the
world—all is conjecture, possibility, as James Hafley notes in his essay, “Virginia
Woolf’s Narrators and the ‘Art of Life’”: “Woolf’s narrators are creators and not
reporters real or supposed; they do not tell the stories as much as the stories tell them; it is
they who are the central drama, the central fiction. The abstract and general, the objective
and true, are in this art to be located only in the concrete, specific, subjective and
invented. Reality is invention […]” (31). That is, Woolf’s novels focus on the manner in
which the story is told—the attitude of the narrator towards the story; the content of any
story depends on the way it is told. By extension, one might say that reality depends on
how it is narrated.
21

Now, at this point, I would like to take my summary of Woolf studies in a new
direction. This direction is united by a thread that goes through them: what all people
share, what is held in common. Gillian Beer’s study, Virginia Woolf: The Common
Ground, is one such attempt. Although the following passage is specifically about
Woolf’s novel, The Waves, its tenor is accurate in its description of her novels as a whole:
Like the waves, the person and people come together, then
sink ‘into one of those silences which are now and again
broken by a few words, as if a fin rose in the wastes of
silence’. The pressure of ‘I’ and ‘we’ have here formed a
work at standing water, without tides. The Waves is dense
on the page, intensely verbal and articulate, but it searches
endlessly, through its rhythms of recounting, for a way of
giving utterance to all that is unpossessed by writing.
Virginia Woolf is not here creating simply an exploration
of individualism; she seeks what is held in common—and
as commonly lost (71-2).
To understand Beer’s point, it is worth mentioning this tension between I and We that
Beer discusses. This tension might be related to Gadamer’s concept of dialogue. In all
cases there is no completely autonomous I or self. The I is unique and individual but it is
also dependent on others. Growth depends on other people and so does language. It is this
tension that we hold in common and it is also our need for language, a need that is never
entirely satisfied. That is, Virginia Woolf gives voice to the feeling that our voice is
deficient; that the I is always searching for something that is never found.
So it is that Virginia Woolf presents characters who do not know, but still have an
idea. These characters recognize the mystery and accept it; they build on this mystery and
incorporate it into their sense of meaning. Eric Auerbach’s famous essay, “The Brown
Stocking”, recognizes as much: “And here, furthermore, one comes upon the order and
the interpretation of life which arises from life itself” (31). Life from life, a circular and
22

solipsistic way of thinking, but still true: here the aim is to avoid false thinking or to be
diligent in analysis; there is never a completely right way of thinking, but it can be
buoyed by uninterrupted listening and a willingness to ask questions. Through
participation, one might come closer to a sense of how things are. And, of course, all
people have this in common: the interpretation of life from life. Auerbach suggests that
Woolf contributes to understanding because her fiction spotlights random moments and
random thoughts—this is how people experience life: as a series of moments that
provoke thoughts that are not sequential or tied into a neat narrative; instead, the thoughts
appear and disappear, without our willing or doing. This is what it means to be human:
“The more numerous, varied, and simple the people are who appear as subjects of such
random moments, the more effectively must what they have in common shine forth” (33).
Instead of focusing on what is commonly thought to be big, Woolf privileges what is
commonly thought to be small. We all have perceptions of the world and these
perceptions are forever valid—they seize us before we even opt to honor them.
Central to my thesis is the idea that art is a part of life and life is a part of art; art
is always present, part of how we perceive and understand. This is a dynamic felt by
Woolf and one that she weaved into her novels. Critics, too, have noticed this situation.
Penelope Ingram’s article, “‘One Drifts Apart’: To the Lighthouse as Art of Response,” is
a strong example : “I see the relationship between art and life in To the Lighthouse as an
organic unity, in a relation of part to whole. Art is realized through life as life is realized
through art” (“‘One Drifts Apart’: To the Lighthouse as art of response” 4). Art demands
interpretation and it stakes a claim: despite all attempts to dismiss its validity, it remains
because presence is part of its identity—it is there, just like humans are here, a token of
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order and vision. To engage with art is to engage with life; it is to ask, who am I, what is
this, and how can it be?
Other essays approach these considerations also. Alice van Buren Kelley’s
collection, To the Lighthouse: The Marriage of Life and Art is just one example. This
study argues that artistic sensibility is vital to understanding and meaning. That is, the
artist is willing to go beyond accepted forms of thought; the artist asks what it is that
makes understanding and meaning possible in the first place; a sense for the basic
material that is molded into hard and fast reality and a willingness to remold that reality
into one that fits the individual. Van Buren Kelley states her position: “So life is not
chaotic, threatening, destructive, but ordered and whole, if only we can see it. If we can
uncover the pattern, reveal the balance that keeps all oppositions in equilibrium, we shall
see what the artist sees, and what is really there: the fact that life is a work of art” (74).
Through art, then, one can create the terms of one’s reality; one can see that paradox and
opposition and tension are part of being and instead of trying to ignore them one can
incorporate them into one’s understanding; no longer subversive and subterranean, now
included, now in balance.
Numerous critics have thought about Woolf’s work and have attempted to
interpret her novels; each has engaged with the texts and tried to put in words his or her
particular understanding: each critic has his or her own particular history, language, and
way of thinking; the novels, then, when interpreted, are restated, reassembled,
assimilated; a mediation occurs. Here there is a paradox: in order for the novel to remain
the same, to be itself, it must be put into a new language; a language that fits the
interpreter and resonates, so that the meaning is maximized; all approach an originary
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meaning, one that is stated and restated. It is this particular dynamic that Gadamer
explores in his philosophy—the nature of interpretation. His philosophy is multi-layered
and many-sided. Overall, it is based on two, complementary ideas, which exert a backpressure, the one on the other; when one changes, so does the other. First, and most
importantly, is human being’s relationship to the world; the world in and of itself means
something, is to be interpreted. The second idea is how to interpret a text: to consider the
identity of a text. When one confronts a text, there is a fixed meaning that nevertheless
varies depending on the interpreter. Here the reader is reminded of language; the role of
language in interpretation. Whatever a text means has to do with what the world means.
Although no critic has chosen to use Gadamer’s philosophical outlook to frame
his or her interpretation of literature, many critics have considered his philosophy, its
impact and implications. In fact, many critics have approached this idea that different and
new facets of the world appear when we engage with it. Jens Kertscher’s essay “‘We
Understand Differently, If We Understand at All’: Gadamer’s Ontology of Language
Reconsidered” is one such example. This essay hinges on the following point: “Rather
than a matter of grasping an objective meaning, understanding becomes, therefore, a
matter of the taking up of a meaning that has already been revealed” (149). Because we
have language, we always have a picture of the way things are, but the picture is always
and forever incomplete. However, the more we participate, the more we feel in tune with
the world, uniquely, and for us.
Gunter Figal’s analysis, “The Doing of the Thing Itself: Gadamer’s Hermeneutic
Ontology of Language” is another essay that presents similar themes. Here the reader is
reminded of the idea that language speaks us instead of we speak language. That is, by
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way of language, the world presents itself. The impulse to use language is the impetus to
be at one with the world, to belong. When we use language, there is always an
undercurrent of possibility—what is right and what is appropriate is never truly known,
but the language itself is nevertheless valid and legitimate in its own right; this legitimacy
leads to further clarification, to an openness for more, a foundation for asking questions
and gaining insight: “What already has been, for example a text, is as an event, because it
addresses one with a question. And the interpretation happens as the saying again and the
further saying of the said” (111). The need to use language is the need to answer a
question; all language both answers a question and asks a question: the world becomes,
simultaneously, both more understandable and more mysterious. Mystery, though,
becomes less antagonistic and less of a saboteur, acquiring an element of productivity, an
avenue to truth.
For its part, understanding is an important concept in Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics. Understanding is an idea that we all relate to in our own, individual way; it
is not a technical term; furthermore it is a term that allows for more technical, scientific
approaches to even be possible. In a way, Gadamer’s concept of understanding depends
on this sense of understanding—that it is non-technical and that all rely on understanding
and participate in understanding; however, Gadamer shapes an entire philosophical
outlook based on this very concept: understanding is primordial and it is valuable. To this
end, Jean Grondin has written an essay to clarify the concept: it is titled “Gadamer’s
Basic Understanding of Understanding”. In the essay, Grondin divides understanding into
several different categories: understanding can imply and relate rather variously. On the
other hand, Grondin also attempts to abstract and enfold the various categories into one
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overarching approach: “The understanding that he characterizes, following Heidegger, is
the ‘original form of the realization of our existence’” (36). To be is to understand; how,
of course, and in what way and to what end—these are considerations that demand
further clarification, a delicate ecosystem that also demands revision, adjustment and
readjustment.
Engagement, one might say, is the path to self-fulfillment. For Gadamer,
engagement inheres the notion of linguisticality, the need to put into words. Words are
the primordial and original way that any human being has a world. People forget about
words, though; part of why they mean so much has to do with the power of their very
presence; in the end, they can never be discarded or discounted—precisely because they
are forever forgotten. Words allow the world to appear and it is in their appearance that
the world is understandable; to submit to language, to commit and to enact—Grondin
highlights just such a notion as central in Gadamer’s thought: “The important idea for
Gadamer’s notion of interpretation and its inherent linguisticality is that the listener be
taken up by what he seeks to understand, that he responds, interprets, searches for words
or articulation and thus understands” (42). One might say that meaning is a wave that
carries the participant to new places; having arrived, then, the new is to be mediated by
what has come before; the means for doing this is language: now the world is different
but, if named, more understandable.
Because the seconds pass and the world is different with each one, because
language is never stable and meaning changes with each moment, individuals are
provoked and pushed to find a momentary stability: we speak, we write and the words are
a testimony. The words are a fortress, a defense against the void, nothingness. The
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appearance of words mediates a curious tension: on one side, they are never entirely
accurate (more can always be said); on the other, they are self-legitimating—their
appearance is their meaning. This tension leads to the idea that all language use is a kind
of translation and that the practice of translation helps the participant to become aware of
this dynamic. Translation reminds the interpreter that there is an original meaning; that
this meaning is related to the human being’s relationship to the world. This idea guides
John Sallis’ essay “The Hermeneutics of Translation”. This essay might be summarized
in the following manner: “Because the manifold of discourse as such is produced by
translation, each fold is a likeness or symbol of that back upon which it is folded. This
multiple folding, this manifold that translation produces in and as discourse as such, is the
originary complication” (68). Put in other words, one might say that any time language is
used it is a kind of translation. Each application of language, each particular situation, is
always different: up to that point, the words have appeared to describe something else—
now they are to be used (translated) for the new situation. Translation, as such, is a
hermeneutical guidepost, a reminder of the interpretive demand that we all experience
when pushed to use language.
Gadamer’s hermeneutics has to do with the concept of truth and it also has to do
with (what he calls) the human sciences as they contrast with natural sciences. Overall, in
general, the concept of science might be thought about as a kind of construction that
depends on methodology, rigor, discipline, constraint, and many other factors.
Furthermore, the natural sciences hinge on distanciation—so that the scientist’s
prejudices do not cloud his or her results. Many humanists decided to adopt this model
and study their object as if the object studied were a thing in and of itself, independent of
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the interpreter and his or her prejudices. Gadamer rejected this model, instead arguing
that the identity of the object belongs to and is part of the identity of the interpreter. The
two cannot be separated. He therefore chose to favor the model of participation, as
Weisheimer points out in his forward to Gadamer’s late collection, In Praise of Theory:
“The belonging endemic to the human sciences hardly proves that, not being susceptible
of method, these sciences are not rational—indeed not sciences. Quite the contrary, the
human sciences represent a kind of ‘reason incarnate in existence’, a kind of
knowledge—Gadamer calls it practical knowledge—that comes from participation rather
than distanciation” (ix). When studying philosophy or history or literature, the student
belongs to the thing studied: the object studied is articulated in language, something the
interpreter possesses also; the object studied takes place in history, something the
interpreter is a part of—the interpreter is conditioned by history to such an extent that the
historical object is filtered through the present moment. To recognize this
conditionedness can yield a greater sense of truth.
Indeed, the human sciences are essential for the revelation of truth. In his
introduction to the book, Gadamer in Conversation, Richard E. Palmer clarifies
Gadamer’s understanding of truth:
For Gadamer, following Heidegger, [the disclosure of
truth] is not a disclosure of some eternal, changeless
essence; rather, for Gadamer it yields an existential sense
that ‘this is the way things are’. In the presence of great art,
says Gadamer, one says to oneself, ‘so ist es!’ (yes, that’s
how things are!) […] The ontological word ‘is’ is deeply
implicated with truth. It is not an essentialist but an
existential truth; it is not an infinite but a finite, fallible
truth, emerging in an experiential, lived encounter (12).
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Once again, readers are led back to the ideas of participation and engagement. It is in
human being’s nature to understand and to have a world; to engage with art or language
is to experience an increase in being. It is in the encounter when the interpreter is put to
the test: his or her sense of truth, of the way things are, is put to the test; to pass the test,
the interpreter has no choice but to revise and incorporate; truth is dependent on this
revision, in fact.
In existence, unless something is presented the world is amorphous and
undefined. Until presented, there is nothing to interpret; once presented, we are drawn to
interpretation. What something means, though, belongs to that presentation; to engage
with presentation is to engage with life, with meaning. Ontologically, a presentation is the
outpouring of the thing itself; the appearance of the thing itself. In David E. Linge’s
introduction to Gadamer’s collection of essays, Philosophical Hermeneutics, we note this
dynamic: “Like the game, the text or artwork lives in its presentations. They are not alien
or secondary to it but are its very being, as possibilities that flow from it and are included
in it as facets of its own disclosure. The variety of performances or interpretations are not
simply subject variations of a meaning locked in subjectivity, but belong instead to the
ontological possibility of the work” (xxvi). It is common to think about a symphony or a
dramatic play as examples. A symphony is nothing unless it is presented. Every time it is
presented it is going to be different yet it is still going to be the same symphony; each
performance is an interpretation of the symphony. A text is a little different but it still has
the same basic identity. There are several ways of thinking about the presentation or
performance of a text. For one, a text can be read out loud; in that reading, the reader
infuses meaning into the text and it becomes alive; it will never be read or understood in
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that exact manner ever again; the performance belongs to the circumstance of the reading.
Silent reading is a little different, but still uncannily similar. Like everything else, the text
is nothing until it is experienced; in that experience the reader is challenged and pushed;
the language is necessarily different than that of the interpreter. The interpreter is faced
with the task of assimilating the meaning: to do this he or she must find a language that
fits his or her outlook and way of being. Overall, then, the performance or the
presentation is the only way that the world can appear meaningfully. In the presentation,
we are prompted to dwell on the appearance, to ask what the appearance means; for its
part, the meaning is both self-evident and self-legitimating and self-different at the same
time; each time the thing is presented or performed it is both different and the same.
In his book Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory Joel Weisheimer
approaches these considerations. In this book Weisheimer looks at the implications of
philosophical hermeneutics as they relate to literary theory. His basic argument is that
language should be looked at as an enactment of being: basically what the word says and
what the word is are one and the same; to engage with language is to know the world.
Weisheimer makes his point: “The world is as indivisible from its coming to language,
and the meaning of a word is as indivisible from its utterance, as is a symphony from its
performance and an image from the thing it reflects” (107). In literature we are reminded
that the world depends on its presentation, like a book depends on its being read; the
language in literature cannot be parsed—it has no exact meaning, the language falls back
upon itself; its appearance is its meaning. Furthermore, in each presentation, the thing
presented acquires a new identity; now it is seen differently, from a different angle; all
presentation is a kind of interpretation: “A picture is an interpretation of what it pictures”
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(109). For his part, Gadamer likes to use landscape art as an example. He notes that the
Swiss Alps were seen as menacing and even ugly until artists began to paint the Alps;
then, once they were pictured, they were seen as beautiful and majestic—they were seen
in a new way.
Gerald Bruns, in his essay “The Hermeneutical Anarchist: Phronesis, Rhetoric,
and the Experience of Art,” makes a similar point. He too argues that the only way for the
world to be understandable is for it to presented or performed: “Performance is not
something added to the work or a rendition or a version of it; it is the appearance of the
thing itself. The point to grasp is that the thing itself exists in no other way. Its mode of
appearance is its mode of being” (61). Bruns’ explanation of Gadamer’s philosophy hits
the mark; it is for this reason that Gadamer prioritizes art to such an extent. Of course,
Gadamer’s starting point is language, but art and language are intimately bound together:
in all cases the appearance of the world is irrefutable; the appearance is the truth.
For Gadamer, art is ordered and whole; in it there is a continuity that we do not
find in existence. We are drawn to art because it affords us the possibility of finding
order; this order makes the world understandable. In his introduction to Gadamer’s work,
The Relevance of the Beautiful, Robert Bernasconi notes this aspect of art: “The
challenge that Gadamer issues to the idea of art as a special magical realm is carried
through by showing the continuity between the world of art and our everyday world. ‘We
sublate (Aufheben) the discontinuous punctuality of experience (Erlebnis) in the
continuity of our existence (Dasein) (TM, 86)” (xvi). That is, part of the identity of art is
that it possesses continuity; if the parts do not relate to each other, then it is not art.
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Because of this, we look to art for answers and explanations, with insight as the ultimate
yield.
These considerations our approached by Nicholas Davey in his encyclopedic
entry in Key Writers on Art: 20th Century. He begins his summary with the following
heading, “What happens to us in the experience of art?” (130). By doing so, Davey
recognizes Gadamer’s philosophical claim—that art does not represent a static reality, it
“can transform actuality” (131). Art allows the world to appear meaningfully: “Art is no
longer subordinate to its conceptual subject but becomes a vehicle of its sensuous
appearance” (131). In this case, the subject matter is the world and human being’s
relationship to it and to others. Davey goes on: “Art does not cloak reality in appearance
but allows actuality to reveal itself more extensively” (132). Art is revelatory because it is
ordered and whole. In it there is closure and determinacy: “The indeterminacy of
existence means tolerating a world in which the things (subject matters) which concern
us—meaningfulness, goodness, love—remain uncertain in nature and outcome. The
capacity of art to draw unresolved threads of concern into a coherent determinate
pictorial or narrative structure allows a clearer vision of what in actuality remained
unclear […] Art often enables us to see clearly what we often only perceive indistinctly”
(132). However, the subject matter presented in art is never entirely finished. Each artistic
presentation leaves a space for further interpretation: “If a subject matter is always more
than can be said or depicted of it, then every time an artwork attempts an interpretation of
a Sache, a residual untranslatable space is opened between the subject matter and its
rendering. This space, since it involves a residual tension between what has and has not
yet been said or shown, is autopoietic in the sense that it drives the attempt of subsequent
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interpretations to close it” (135). Indeed, our interpretive project is never complete, but,
as we try, at least, we notice its contours.
Finally, I would like to talk about poetry and what has been said about Gadamer’s
emphasis on poetry. Gerald Bruns has something to say about this topic also. As an
introductory piece for Gadamer’s ruminations on the poetry of Paul Celan, Gadamer on
Celan: ‘Who Am I and Who Are You?’ and Other Essays, Bruns penned the essay, “The
Remembrance of Language: An Introduction to Gadamer’s Poetics”. In it he discusses
how Gadamer prioritizes one particular aspect of poetry: that it reminds us of the role of
language in our lives. Overall, we can never entirely account for the role of language in
our lives. It is impossible. Of course, linguistics, logic and other systems attempt to do so,
arguing that we can understand language for what it is. These attempts are useful, but
they do not have the last word: any and all attempts to step out of language take place in
language. Poetry reminds us that language allows the world to mean at all: “Rather it is
that poetry alters our relation to language. Poetry is an event […] in which language
interrupts our attempts to reduce it conceptually or instrumentally; it takes itself out of
our hands” (7). In poetry, the meaning of words acquires a new luster: the occasion that
prompts the poetic word is one of necessity; the writer needs the words to describe his or
her world; once accomplished, the world is seen in a new way.
Dialogue is an important concept for Gadamer and it is crucial for his
understanding of the poetic word. He argues that all language is the result of dialogue: in
dialogue language appears out of necessity. Language is the appearance of the world, but
it belongs neither to you nor to me; instead, it results from the need to recognize the
world for what it is. All intimacy and all relationships are productive and combustive,
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drawn towards this tremendous need, where something new appears, where insight is
gained. In poetry, too, there is always an ‘I’ and a ‘you’. The ‘I’ is the ‘I’ of the narrator,
the person prompted to use language; and the ‘you’ is the ‘you’ that understands, that
follows along, the ‘you’ every ‘I’ needs and wants. In the same essay, Bruns considers
this unique character of poetry: “But what matters for Gadamer is not the identity of the
‘I’ or the ‘you’ but the intimacy between them—an intimacy which is outside the
determinacy of meaning, or which is not an intimacy of knowing and being known but an
intimacy mediated by strangeness” (27). The impulse to write and read poetry has to do
with this need for intimacy, a need to connect: for the language of poetry pertains to who
and what we are; it is a language that means something and is understandable; yet it is
alien and different; to mediate between the two, to become what is different—that is the
appeal of poetry.
Mrs. Dalloway
Mrs. Dalloway is the story of several different people on a June day in London.
The titular character is, naturally, at the center but the other characters are essential to the
impact of the novel, providing a kind of context, a means of framing. That is, in many
ways, the book is about one London day in June. Each character gives the reader a sense
of the moment, of the meaning of that particular day and that particular place and
particular society. Some of the characters are more fleshed out and others barely have an
identity, but each character serves a purpose and informs the narrative. Some of the
characters serve as examples of the upper class in London and others are more
downtrodden. Some are men, and others women. For some, the war touched them deeply
and for others, just peripherally, nothing more than an inconvenience. Overall, nearly all
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of these characters are English, with Rezia as the principal exception. All were raised in
the same milieu, with varying degrees of homogeneity. These people were conditioned to
understand and think the same, to value the same things. Yet, at the same time, they are
different. In Mrs. Dalloway, Virginia Woolf explores this intermediate space. Overall,
then, this novel presents this June day in London as a series of moments which are
meaningful yet temporary, moments that change who we are and challenge who we are.
However, these are not just moments in time, they are also in space. The characters find
themselves in the street, in the park, in shops, at home; and they encounter people at these
places also. Each encounter—with people, with places—changes who we are. So, then,
one day, one moment—each is part of a larger context: each moment inheres what has
already taken place and contains within it an anticipation of the next moment. Our
relationships with people comprehend a similar dynamic. We relate to and understand
people based on our past relationships. Each new person is different—and should be
treated as such—but our expectations, our means for knowing somebody, depend on our
other relationships. Here, in this novel, the reader perceives a complex
interconnectedness.
This emphasis on interconnectedness can be directly related to Gadamer’s
philosophical hermeneutics, especially his preference for the concept of dialogue. As
Gadamer says, “language is a we” (Gadamer in Conversation 56). Generally, all of these
characters speak the same language and belong to the same history—yet, at the same
time, this commonality allows them to develop different ideas and different outlooks.
That is, they depend on their commonalities in order to be different. Because they have a
common ground, they are able to find a language that allows them to interpret and grow
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and discover. Clarissa, too, belongs to this particular London day. She is not especially
clever, but she is smart enough to privilege her relationships and to recognize the value
and reward of connecting with others. As readers, we get the following point:
relationships are productive—the yield is often surprising, unexpected and, often times,
insightful. Through our relationships we understand more.
Consider the main character, Clarissa Dalloway, for example. She is an upperclass English woman who has recently turned fifty two years old. By all appearances, she
is not a mouthpiece for transcendent meaning or deep insight, yet Woolf chooses to put
the spotlight on her, decides to reveal the depth and passion that characterizes her life.
Clarissa is, of course, in many ways, conventional. She has married a politician and has
no real worries other than hosting parties and fulfilling her role as a good socialite. She is
neither daring nor bold. Yet, she is still a person with thoughts and feelings that matter.
Her life is equal to the life of anybody else, rich or poor, man or woman. Thoughts,
concerns, perceptions: Clarissa experiences them all. Clarissa is alive and she is searching
for something. She wants to understand. To this end, Clarissa has built relationships and
engaged with others. Woolf presents her as a character who senses that relationships are
always more than we know them to be: stemming from the relationship itself, individuals
acquire the vocabulary and orientation to relate to others and to see the world a little more
clearly. For this reason, Clarissa fixates on her relationships and her past: neither can nor
should be discarded, both still crucial to her interpretive project. So, then, when Clarissa
returns home from her flower shopping expedition and goes to her attic bedroom, she
ruminates on what the bedroom means to her, for she sleeps separate from her husband,
Richard. This image of the bed reminds Clarissa that she has never entirely given her
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husband what he wants—or that she is incapable of giving it to him. She lacks something.
This something is not laid out in the open, rather it is something intangible; something
“central which permeated; something warm which broke up surfaces and rippled the cold
contact of man and woman, or of women together” (Mrs. Dalloway 32). It is something
that she senses when vulnerable, needy women come to her to confess, or seek
absolution, or comfort. Then, when these women come to her, she takes notice of the
obscure yet productive nature of relationships:
Only for a moment; but it was enough. It was a sudden
revelation, a tinge like a blush which one tried to check and
then, as it spread, one yielded to its expansion, and rushed
to the farthest verge and there quivered and felt the world
come closer, swollen with some astonishing significance,
some pressure of rapture, which split its thin skin and
gushed and poured with extraordinary alleviation over the
cracks and sores! Then, for that moment, she had seen an
illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner meaning
almost expressed. But the close withdrew; the hard
softened. It was over—the moment (32).
Here, Clarissa approaches a total meaning, one that comes from how she relates or
interacts with people; her main concern is to recognize things for what they are. Overall,
the point is that her sense for what she lacks, for that thing that she is missing, includes a
sense for meaning, a sense that has to do with the identity of relationships. Clarissa can
perceive this shortcoming: she is unable to give in completely, to yield to the influence of
the other. Woolf suggests that love is a difficult thing for Clarissa, but that Clarissa
knows it is still the only thing that matters.
To the Lighthouse
To the Lighthouse concerns the Ramsay family and the houseguests that visit
their summer home. The patriarch, Mr. Ramsay, is a philosopher on vacation from his
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lectures. The matriarch, Mrs. Ramsay, is, primarily, a mother of eight and wife, but she
also invests considerable energy in helping and influencing friends and family. There are
other characters in this fictive work, but—besides Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay—Lilly Briscoe
is the most important. In its structure, the book points toward a triangular relation among
these three characters. Certainly, the story focuses on the transaction that takes place
between husband and wife—sometimes dissonant, sometimes resonant, the marriage
creates the conditions for the identity and growth of the couple: both learn and understand
because of the difference and affinity of the other; each a source of support and a
challenge to the status quo. Lilly takes note of this relationship between Mr. and Mrs.
Ramsay—its essential nature—and is fascinated by it. Her feelings toward Mr. Ramsay
run hot and cold but she knows that she cannot easily dismiss him; for Lilly is enamored
with Mrs. Ramsay, a woman who has chosen Mr. Ramsay; he is demanding but because
he has such high standards he also is a source of insight—he challenges himself and
everybody else. Lilly is drawn toward this attitude but is also repulsed. Mr. Ramsay leans
toward doubt and precision while Mrs. Ramsay leans toward sympathy and hope. Each
needs the other, depends on the other, to compensate for limitations, to gain a more
complete picture. But it is not just the Ramsay couple and Lilly that negotiate; there are
other characters, too, who depend on the other, who both relish and reject their
companions. For this novel hinges on the space between people: each character makes a
claim that cannot be discounted; each is different, after all; each has something to say, the
words a challenge. When it comes to hate or love, emotion and feeling, there is a
necessary movement, a kind of dialectic: in Woolf’s imaginary world or in our daily
experience, these feelings only come because we care and each character too; each offers
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something; we feel communion or antipathy because we recognize an opportunity;
whether we hate or love, it is because the other challenges us and we can or cannot meet
the challenge. It is this dynamic that Woolf explores. When, for example, the Ramsay
family and their guests gather around the dinner table, the narrator describes the state of
mind of the different characters based on the reflection, the relationship, of the different
members around the table. Each character depends on the other, understands because of
the other, is because of the other. This dinner scene is exemplary of the narrative posture
of the entire novel: no character is presented in a vacuum—the identity of each character
swivels, depending on who judges.
In its overall structure, this novel presents its principal thematic concern—people
are mysterious and also understandable; no matter how frustrating, the frustration is
worth the reward. Gadamer suggests that people have different strategies for coming to
terms and each may be valid, depending on the level of attention and engagement;
depending, too, on the willingness to take risks. What is the payoff? What risks might
people take? To answer, let’s look at the tripartite structure of the novel that Woolf
creates. Divided into three parts, it consists of, first, The Window, then Time Passes, and
finally The Lighthouse. The Window takes place in one day. On this day, the Ramsays
discuss if they might go to the lighthouse the next day—a journey yearned for by their
youngest son, James. Mr. Ramsay says that there is no chance the weather will permit
such a sojourn, while Mrs. Ramsay says that it is possible, the weather difficult to predict.
It also includes Mrs. Ramsay sitting at a window with her son James, knitting and then
reading to him. But she is not just sitting, she is also modeling for Lilly, who happens to
be painting the scene. The day ends with the family and guests gathered around the
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dinner table and then, finally, a moment of intimacy between Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay. The
next section is Time Passes. In it, ten years fly by: here, we are reminded that time is
indefatigable; no matter our opinion, no matter what we think, time marches on. It does
not care about our wants and needs, hopes or desires, unfeeling and impersonal, its
dominion remains, forever and always. So people die. So things change: Mrs. Ramsay
dies, war happens—young men die in their prime. For Mr. Ramsay and Lilly, these are
life-changing events, but in the context of billions of years, just grains of sand—so
Woolf’s narrative presents these events. Then we reach the other side in the novel, ten
years later, another day in the life of the Ramsay family, on vacation once again, hosting
guests once again, once again a trip planned to the lighthouse, though this time without
Mrs. Ramsay who had died in the intervening years. In this section of the novel, the most
notable characters are Mr. Ramsay and his two children, James and Cam; Lilly Briscoe is
back also; she who had begun her painting ten years ago and now intends to finish it.
Lilly has unfinished business—her painting—and so too James and Mr. Ramsay—their
trip to the lighthouse. Although the day ten years ago was not particularly special, it
continues to be vital to these characters: James sitting with his mother, James hoping to
go to the lighthouse, Lilly thinking about Mrs. Ramsay, Lilly working on her painting,
Mr. Ramsay consorting with his family, connecting with his wife. That day remains,
framing this new day. So Lilly decides to finish her painting, so Mr. Ramsay and his
children depart for the lighthouse. Each accomplish their goal, in the end—an homage to
inspiration, to Mrs. Ramsay. For she unites these disparate characters. Yes, each reach
their goal and make the best of the situation. Although life has been hard and family life
strained, Mr. Ramsay does not concede, he fights on, fully aware that life does not stop
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and start at his convenience—adaptation or annihilation his only options. In the case of
Lilly, the intimate link between life and art commands attention. In her painting, Lilly’s
goal is to present what she has learned from the Ramsays. Lilly knows that in their
relationship there is a clue to a more complete understanding; that Mrs. Ramsay and her
relationships were genuine, in those relationships there were contained a kind of truth—
the world became more real. Lilly, then, paints because she wants to test herself and push
herself: the painting, after all, could be anything; it could be anything but it has to be
something; in her decisions she asserts a form on the world; the world has now taken
shape. Once complete, the painting will always be itself, the deposit of effort,
engagement and participation. For years, Lilly had contemplated this painting, had
contemplated Mrs. Ramsay and her family—how does this family, how does this painting
relate to the meaning of things?—its completion moving her a little bit closer to the
answer.
To explicitly link this novel and Gadamer, it is useful to return to this triangular
relationship between husband, wife and artist and the tripartite structure—one day, the
passage of ten years, then another day. In husband and wife we notice a good example of
dialogue; also, in the transaction between Lilly and Mrs. Ramsay. We are reminded of
Gadamer’s words: in dialogue, “‘world is disclosed’” (Truth and Method 443). Each
depends on the other for a starting point, for a sense of stability—standing on this level,
well-anchored platform, each can take risks, explore, well aware that, after jumping, each
will land on level ground. So, then, each has an interlocutor with whom he or she can ask
and answer questions; here, Gadamer’s words prove fitting: interpretation “implies
pointing in a particular direction” (“Composition and Interpretation” 68). Indeed, these
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characters interpret and explore new territory, exposing themselves to the new, to the
potential. Woolf’s perception of this is apparent in that Lilly, through her art, engages this
dynamic. She has always recognized the meaningful heft of this couple, of the family, of
Mrs. Ramsay and her son James: in all of them she can sense a clue to help her answer
her own enigmas. But, instead of passively ruminating on these implications, she actively
engages with them: she creates a painting that presents these interactions in visual
language. She tarries with this image, entertaining the unlimited possibilities, but she
eventually makes choices, commits herself to a structure. By doing so, she has put into
form what was previously shapeless: the day, the family, life—all have now been
interpreted. Once again, Gadamer’s philosophy resonates: “The world that appears in the
play of presentation does not stand like a copy next to the real world, but is that world in
the heightened truth of its being” (Truth and Method 132).
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CHAPTER 2
GADAMER ON LANGUAGE

As the topic is hermeneutic ontology, language is the appropriate starting point,
for language is the means by which human being interprets and understands itself and the
world: prior to any and all knowledge constructions, language, interpretation, and
meaning, indivisible in their aims and accomplishments. Language is always present and
to recognize its determinative influence is to avoid sabotage. When discounted, when the
world is objectified and nothing else, we become victims, the world now one thing and
just that; of course, language and its imaging of the world outpace any and all
objectification, but in discounting language we are too easily sidetracked. In objectifying
the world, one sees it from a point of view that has validity, but it is only valid as just
that—a viewpoint. There is more to the picture. To say that it is the whole picture is to
invite turmoil and subterfuge: the world and its meaning antagonistic or deficient, always
static, obstructing adjustment and revision, lacking attunement. There needs to be a
counterbalance. When the world is projected as an immobile entity there is no room for
imagination or insight: the world is always one thing and this means that we will never
meet it for what it is. In all cases, both negatively and positively, the matter is one of
degree. One can ignore language and its influence to a greater or lesser extent; so too one
can privilege language more or less. As language is something that we do not possess but
instead, more correctly, possesses us, using language is not a matter of conscious effort;
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instead, languages hinges more on engagement and participation. As one engages with
language, one learns to follow its trail: flush with hints and possibility, it is a constant
balancing act; with nothing certain, we latch onto potentiality and head down a path that
leads us in a direction that compels, legitimate because we have listened, but still
shrouded in darkness. This is the dynamic: whether or not we choose to recognize it as
such, language is our guide and our master; to come to terms with this situation is
fundamental because it improves our sense of balance; to truly understand things for what
they are there needs to be humility and maximum attention; the world and its meaning are
always changing and we need to keep up with this flux.
Language is imminently influential: part of the identity of language is that we
never can truly know it for what it is; we can never entirely account for its sway. As
Gadamer puts it, language intends content and never can be altogether self-reflexive:
“Language intends the other person and the other thing, and not itself. That means that
the covering over of language as language has its basis in language itself and accords
with the human experience of language” (“Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and
Language” 44). Language is determinative: any attempt to use language is already shaped
by language; to say otherwise is to stunt understanding and invite distortion. Language
always intends content and that content concerns matters of fact; what is; the way things
are; meaning; that we perceive something as something: “Language is not just one of
man’s possessions in the world; rather, on it depends the fact that man has a world at all”
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 440). So, then, methodologically speaking, language and
world are one and the same. The world and its understanding are primordial: from there,
having a sense for the meaning of the world, one can further define its identity and
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nature. To do so is natural but is also prey to abuse: things become settled and defined
and we too easily forget that the very definitions depend on the questions we ask; we
forget that identity can also be variable if our questioning is imaginative and incisive.
Sure, it is natural to construct objects, but the appropriate and correct application of this
construction hinges on the idea that these constructions do not have the final say. They
belong to an ontological background that shapes their identity and usefulness: “Our
verbal experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as
existing. That language and world are related in a fundamental way does not mean, then,
that world becomes the object of language. Rather, the object of knowledge and
statements is always already enclosed within the world horizon of language” (Gadamer,
Truth and Method 447).
Indeed, language is always already present. To listen to language and to use
language is our fundamental means of confronting ourselves and the world. It is the most
meaningful record that we have. With this element of language in mind, Gadamer makes
the following statement: “Being that can be understood is language. The hermeneutical
phenomenon here projects its own universality back onto the ontological constitution of
what is understood, determining it in a universal sense as language and determining its
own relation to beings as interpretation. Thus we speak not only of a language of art but
also of a language of nature—in short, of any language that things have” (Truth and
Method 470). Here, language and understanding fall back on one another: to understand
one needs language and to use language one has already understood—understanding
fulfills itself in the verbal act. Being, too, is part of this equation: Gadamer argues for the
non-distinction between interpretation, understanding, language and human being. We
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are always trying to understand and it is language that is the true medium for that
comprehension: when something has a language, it is understandable and lends itself to
further understanding.
Language and the world are inseparable; the appearance of language and its
interpretive content too; a subject matter is always in question, a process of elaboration
and identification. In language there is identity: something is what we proclaim it to be.
That identity, though, is provisional—the subject matter—whatever it may be—has
acquired a stability in language, but temporality and our discursiveness present the new
and unexpected: we return to language, at this point, to appropriate the moment—and
language grows in its connotations, complexity and power—its naming power not
diminished, but increased. Here there appears to be a contradiction: language stabilizes
the world yet also shapes it. How does Gadamer reconcile this tension? He places
language within the context of conversation: “we are endeavoring to approach the
mystery of language from the conversation that we ourselves are” (Truth and Method
370). All statements and assertions, all language use in general, have an addressee,
however definite or indefinite he or she may be. The point is that this language is
understandable and is presented in just that way: the difference and individuality of the
interlocutor requires that we accommodate our language, that it represent a point of
mutual contact and a mutual world, an accommodation of development. It is this dynamic
of dialogue, of addresser and addressee, that shapes the development of language: in the
very presence or anticipation of the other, in his or her look or his or her words, the
individual receives a challenge, a blow of awareness that the world is more than we know
it to be.
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This dynamic of dialogue is primary, over and above the consciousness of either
member in the conversation; language does not belong to either member—it instead lies
in the give and take, in the relation itself, a back and forth that never stops. That is,
language and conversation have their own spirit and energy, a kind of buoyancy that
envelops the interlocutors: “Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to
us. Thus we can say
that something was a good conversation or that it was ill-fated. All this shows that a
conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears
its own truth within it—i.e., that it allows something to ‘emerge’ which henceforth
exists” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 385). Certainly, one can confirm this statement by
recalling the emphasis that people place on personal relationships: the people in our lives
are our greatest source of fulfillment. Without them the world would shrink; so vital
precisely because each mediates this tension between stability and change. They occupy
an important place in our lives because we share something with them and also because
they compel—something in them demands that we take notice of their claim, a persistent
challenge to become more.
By locating language within the dynamic of dialogue, Gadamer transcends the
subjectivity that one typically associates with language—the I that understands and the
thing that is to be understood. In doing so, language acquires its true breadth—as a
medium in which truth occurs even when—or because—it is unexpected: neither member
knows where the conversation is going or what will come of it. This nature of language is
important: the world and its truth assert themselves in language but do not ever settle,
both provisional and in search of greater articulation. There is no final version: language
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is a provocation. This places language on firm ground: as the articulation of its identity
and meaningfulness, the world appears in language and becomes what it is—something
else and something more, incompletable in its completedness.
To further explain the priority placed on language as ontologically
determinative—prior to any subjective intention—Gadamer turns to the concept of play.
Play is useful because it is a structure that binds the player while enabling a kind of free
movement that is not tied down to any particular goal: it is “a form of restraint and
freedom at one and the same time” (Gadamer, “The Play of Art” 130). Gadamer contends
that play is pervasive and fundamental to how one interacts with the world: in our
embeddedness in the world we are already under way towards play. Our interactions with
the world are never entirely open—the world cannot be everything—and in everything
we do there is transformation: the world gains identity while still remaining open for
more. For Gadamer, language belongs to the world of play: “Play is the process that
bridges the gap between a not yet semantically articulated form of communication and
word communication. Play appears to me to be a type of pre-linguistic dialogue. It is
already in the play of the infant with its own fingers and movements, and especially in
the play that includes others” (“Boundaries of Language” 14). Language is a kind of play
in which the movements of the players (the interlocutors) are determined by the play
itself (the conversation), a never-ending back and forth:
When do we speak of play and what is implied when we
do? Surely the first thing is the to and fro of constantly
repeated movement—we only have to think of certain
expressions like ‘the play of light’ and the ‘play of the
waves’ where we have such a constant coming and going, a
movement that is not tied down to any goal. Clearly what
characterizes this movement back and forth is that neither
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pole of the movement represents the goal in which it would
come to rest (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 22).
As in play, in a dialogue the words spoken are determined by the subject matter, a
movement that takes place in language, a movement that never rests
This back and forth action—unbound and self-propulsive—helps explain why
Gadamer would say that language and understanding are an event of being and not a
willful act of consciousness: “Understanding too cannot be grasped as a simple activity of
the consciousness that understands, but is itself a mode of the event of being. To put it in
purely formal terms, the primacy that language and understanding have in Heidegger’s
thought indicates the priority of the ‘relation’ over against its relational members—the I
who understands and that which is understood” (“On the Problem of Self-Understanding”
50). Language bounces back and forth between two interlocutors like a ping pong ball;
as it does, the truth of the subject matter asserts itself. This dialogue and movement does
not necessarily need to take place between people directly speaking with one another. It
also happens when we read texts. In texts there is an I that understands and something to
be understood. When someone reads a text there is language that refers to something,
something that both the writer and reader share: a common world. As the world appears
in language, the reader is provoked: the content of the words are understandable yet they
are new and different; the reader asks questions and the text volleys back answers; the
text asks questions and the reader answers; the meaning of the words and the meaning of
the world in concert.
In any dialogue, whether between two people who speak to each other or between
a reader and a text, the shared content, the disputed content, is the meaning of the world.
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This meaning does not lie in any one person. It lies in the anticipation of the other and the
response of the other. The temptation to use language is the temptation to address
someone—so that the world is understood and so that it can be further understood: “To
speak means to speak to someone. The word should be the right word” (Gadamer, “Man
and Language” 65). Put in different terms, the desire to use language is a desire for more:
the world does not belong to any single person, so it is only by way of question and
response that we approach the true nature of the world, a being that we all vaguely
understand but can never entirely possess. In our orientation to the world we have a
diffuse sense for the nature of things, but because language is infinite and variable, there
is never a final answer; in language the world is defined but it is a definition that belongs
to a larger context, the context depending on the definition and the definition depending
on the context: “Communication takes place when the other person takes part in what is
imparted to him—and in such a way that he does not, as it were, only receive in part what
is communicated, but shares in this knowledge of the whole matter that is fully possessed
by both of them” (Gadamer, “The Play of Art” 128). In language use, then, one is pushed
to modulate and recalibrate: as the world is defined in language the very act demands
reassessment, for in the effort one recognizes truth, an irrefutable event that includes
possibility within itself.
As two interlocutors converse—whether it is a conversation between a reader and
a text or face to face—the meaning of the world is disclosed. In this interaction, there is
an impulse that is out of the control of either member: the subject matter asserts itself and
both are pushed to respond. But why are we pushed to respond? What is the
accomplishment of language? Essentially, one can say that the world changes as it is
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named and its meaning too. Language appears because it is our way of confronting the
world and recognizing it for what it is: “To come into language does not mean that a
second being is acquired. Rather, what something presents itself as belongs to its own
being” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 457). Here, language comprehends simply
everything, everything that has a name. Something only has meaning when it is there to
be evaluated and something can only be evaluated when it is there in the first place.
Language is our way of entering into the concrete and the definite. The world is diffuse
and self-concealing, but in its appearance in language it is there and it is distinct.
Language clears a path and points in a direction. Yes, there is an unrestricted freedom in
language, but the possibilities of expression are limited by the current moment:
everything is not possible at any time. A path has already been cleared and we cannot go
backwards.
The world already means something and it is only by engaging with that meaning
can one coax it into something more. As one reads or listens, the complexity and the
connotations gain in power. Each new moment is different, thereby demanding new
expression; this new articulation changes how one experiences the moment too: “A
person who speaks […] is so oriented toward the particularity of what he is perceiving
that everything he says acquires a share in the particularity of the circumstances he is
sharing” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 427). The articulation of the subject matter—
whether narrow or broad or in-between—alters its very identity: it is now something
definite and understandable—it is what it is—yet in the naming there remains a residual
space, an opening for further clarification. In their articulation, we know things as they
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are, but those things are never settled, for as they are named the very things shift,
belonging themselves to the situation.
Of course, there are innumerable ways of expressing this idea that the world
changes as it is named; we belong to the world and the world belongs to us: the world
provokes us to respond and as we do so it morphs into something else. The very identity
of things depends on one’s engagement: “We are simply following an internal necessity
of the thing itself if we go beyond the idea of the object and the objectivity of
understanding toward the idea that subject and object belong together” (Gadamer, Truth
and Method 457). To recognize this oft-concealed nature of language is to parry with the
verifiable and the provable; language and its use has its own truth, one that shapes our
assertions and one’s attempts to prove them. We are reminded of this aspect of
language—as an event in which there is no difference between the idea presented and the
presentation of the idea—every time we are stopped short and notice the limits of our
understanding: every time we realize that we do not know and never will; language and
its truth cannot be proven, for it is the medium that shapes the questions we ask and the
world we perceive.
Language is ever-present and it is our means of understanding. The world has
meaning because of language—but how does language work exactly? Why is it so
powerful? What happens when a word is spoken? Gadamer points to language’s
evocative capacity: “The universal nature of all speech—namely, the fact that what the
word evokes is there” (“On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 113). It is
a curious paradox: language allows us to commune with the world yet in language use we
also acquire a distance from the world. When we ignore language we notice how the
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world impinges on us, as if we lost all ability to shape our future; something overwhelms
us because it is unidentified—we cannot see it for what it is. In language, though, the
world comes to appearance—it is there for all of us, together; it is not idiosyncratic and
particular. As something shared, we receive reassurance by way of language: we trust its
possible accomplishment. Language has been vetted, acquiring a body and a presence
that coincides with the thing itself: “In the end, the true being of things becomes
accessible precisely in their linguistic appearance” (Gadamer, “The Nature of Things and
the Language of Things” 77). As we cannot be everywhere at once, nor can we travel to
the past or the future, language allows us to engage with everything that is not
immediately present: “Speech can present something, place it before us as it is, even
when it is not present” (Gadamer, “Boundaries of Language” 10). In this
accomplishment, we overcome our provincialism and acquire a sense for the context of
our being.
This distance is important because it promotes contemplation: the thing is there as
it is; we can therefore take it at its word and work out the implications therein. Gadamer
puts it this way: “[I]n naming, things are proclaimed to be what they are for us. It is
correct that one recollects them in naming and that endows contemplation” (“Towards a
Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 26). In language there is recognition and
affirmation: “In taking up a distance, the word achieves two things for us: recognition of
oneself in another, and recognition along with others of what has been affirmed by
everyone” (Gadamer, “Culture and the Word” 10). Indeed, language is the product of a
shared world—in it, the definite and the real and the true. To engage with language is to
enter into a process of understanding, to confront the world as it is: “Learning to speak
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does not mean learning to use a pre-existent tool for designating something somehow
already familiar to us; it means acquiring a familiarity and acquaintance with the world
itself and how it confronts us” (Gadamer, “Man and Language” 63). In this confrontation
there is recognition—something appears and in this appearance we approach the idea.
In language we confront the world and recognize it for what it is: the world and its
appearance are one and the same. But what appears? For language is always changing,
always variable, never self-same. Language is an attempt to work out the context of one’s
very being. In language one has a sense for a general idea and as the language is used that
general idea changes. In articulation, language is shaping one’s sense for the possible: as
it is articulated the world gains in presence and body, but this new awareness is
provisional, the context having changed. Language itself is interpretive, meaningful:
“Language […] consists in delun (revealing), in making the real states of affairs manifest.
That means that we do not merely point to something but also recognize it for what it is.
Now this, clearly, is the life-world of language: it is itself an interpretation of the lifeworld” (Gadamer, “The Expressive Force of Language: On the Function of Rhetoric in
Gaining Knowledge” 128). The implications of this statement are clear: language can be
a guide. If one listens to language and uses language and accepts its force and power and
influence, then the world might mean something that truly matters; things might be
understandable—instead of alienation, communion.
But it is, indeed, very tempting to see the world as a collection of objects that are
meant for consumption and control, or—at the least—verification. In this verifiability
there is comfort but there is also potential for abuse. When one downplays the role of
interpretation in existence then one becomes subject to a world that terrorizes precisely
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because it cannot change: either we will never truly know it or we think we do and it will
disappoint, fraudulent. As we pay attention to language we are reminded that it is the
ultimate mediator: “Is the given not in fact the result of an interpretation? It is
interpretation that performs the never fully complete mediation between man and world,
and to this extent the fact that we understand something as something is the sole actual
immediacy and givenness” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 30). What things are,
then, depends on interpretation; interpretation depends on language; one interprets
because one has language and one has language because one interprets. In other words:
“Language is the universal medium in which understanding occurs. Understanding
occurs in interpreting” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 390). For this reason, one does not
really feel that one has understood something until one has verbally expressed the idea: it
is nothing until it is there to be understood; the expression itself is the understanding; the
verbal expression of understanding belongs to the thing being understood: “The verbal
explicitness that understanding achieves through interpretation does not create a second
sense apart from that which is understood and interpreted” (Gadamer, Truth and Method
399). The verbal act is interpretation manifest, each—interpretation and the verbal act—
impossible without the other.
As one searches for the right word and the right expression one is reminded of the
essential rightness, appropriateness, and correctness of language. In his or her experience
one is prompted to search for words that fit the moment—one has an undeniable feeling
that the right word is out there—precisely because one lives in words and these words
truly are a testimony of one’s engagement with the world, the world and word indivisible;
when one finds the right word the world is at rest:
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[I]n the utilization of the linguistic interpretation of the
world that finally comes about, something of the
productivity of our beginnings remains alive. We are all
acquainted with this, for instance, in the attempt to
translate, in practical life or in literature or wherever; that
is, we are familiar with the strange, uncomfortable, and
tortuous feeling we have as long as we do not have the right
word. When we have found the right expression […], when
we are certain that we have it, then it ‘stands’, then
something has come to a ‘stand’. […] What I am describing
is the mode of the whole human experience of the world. I
call this experience hermeneutical, for the process we are
describing is repeated continually throughout our familiar
experience. There is always a world already interpreted,
already organized in its basic relations, into which
experience steps as something new, upsetting what has led
our expectations and undergoing reorganization itself in the
upheaval (Gadamer, “The Universality of the
Hermeneutical Problem” 15).
Human experience is hermeneutical, oriented towards meaning and interpretation: the
unconsciousness that is part of our beginnings never abandons us. Just as when we first
begin to grow up in a language and things acquire expression in our day to day life, this
process continues throughout our life. As we grow, the world does acquire a stability, but
we also encounter the new and the unexpected; we are pushed to modify and readjust; the
words we use confront these changes, but in that confrontation the words are no longer
the same: the words bloom and fade—some fall into disuse, others appear unexpectedly
and others acquire new shades of meaning as they are combined to fit the new situation.
As we look backwards and forwards, one can see how Gadamer could place “the
whole human experience of the world” within the context of linguisticality. To
summarize: language is the given—one cannot think without language nor is there
meaning without language. Language, for its part, does not belong to any one person: its
appearance depends on the addresser and the addressee, but belonging to neither. And
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what appears in language is no different than the thing itself, the thing described; the
thing only has identity in language. As this is the case, then language can make things
appear even when we are not there, enabling us to acquire a distance from the world and
see it for what it is. So, then, as we use language we see things for what they are, but, at
the same time, the reference and the referent only acquire a temporary stability, for the
passage of time pushes for more. The primary emphasis placed on interpretation becomes
evident: language is already an interpretation but that interpretation is necessarily
deficient, describing the world of the past and not of the present moment.
Language has already accomplished much of our interpretive work. As we listen
to language and use it this interpretive work is harnessed so that it fits the new situation;
language is combined so that the world becomes more meaningful; the interpretive work
of language is flexible, capable of unexpected combinations:
If a person transfers an expression from one thing to the
other, he has in mind something that is common to both of
them; but this in no way needs to be generic universality.
Rather, he is following his widening experience, which
looks for similarities, whether in the appearance of things
or in their significance for us. The genius of verbal
consciousness consists in being able to express these
similarities. This is its fundamental metaphorical nature,
and it is important to see that to regard the metaphorical use
of a word as not its real sense is the prejudice of a theory of
logic that is alien to language (Gadamer, Truth and Method
428).
Gadamer emphasizes the fundamental metaphoricity of language. All language and all
meaning depend on each other; a hall of mirrors, as the angle of the reflection changes so
too the image; as the words are combined the meaning of each word shifts—but only
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because of how the words are combined and their reference: these combinations lead to
an ever-widening understanding of possibility and possibility of understanding.
This is a circular argument—and intentionally so. In the realm of language and
understanding, there is no first principal: “The hermeneutic circle says that in the domain
of understanding there can be absolutely no derivation of one from the other, so that there
the logical fallacy of circularity does not represent a mistake in procedure, but the most
appropriate description of the structure of understanding” (Gadamer, “Text and
Interpretation” 30). In other words, that which we understand depends on our
understanding and our understanding depends on that which we understand. Each attempt
to understand is accidental, occasional and finite, yet language itself belongs to an overall
context that envelops anything and everything we do: that we have language at all shapes
what we do with language in the particular moment. Our fundamental linguisticality is
bound to our sense of the possible: there is a push to inhabit the space that language
opens up, but that space can never entirely be filled, as it shifts and expands with our
movement. As language appears, then, we acquire a more definite sense for our place,
bound by what has been said, and an even greater sense for what has not been said—all
that might be said in order to correctly understand everything. This is a never-ending
process, for we will never correctly understand everything; we are bound to the moment
and finite; in this sense, everything said is a provocation for more:
“But there is another dialectic of the word, which accords
to every word an inner dimension of multiplication: every
word breaks forth as if from a center and is related to a
whole, through which alone it is a word. Every word causes
the whole of language to which it belongs to resonate and
the whole world-view that underlies it to appear. Thus
every word, as the event of a moment, carries with it the
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unsaid, to which it is related by responding and
summoning. The occasionality of human speech is not a
casual imperfection of its expressive power; it is, rather, the
logical expression of the living virtuality of speech that
brings a totality of meaning into play, without being able to
express it totally. All human speaking is finite in such a
way that there is laid up within it an infinity of meaning to
be explicated and laid out. That is why the hermeneutical
phenomenon also can be illuminated only in light of the
fundamental finitude of being, which is wholly verbal in
character” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 454).
Language mediates the infinite and the finite. Language is finite because it is in a process
of development, changing as it is applied to each moment. It is infinite because what we
mean to say is never entirely exhausted in we what actually say: more can always be said
and there are infinite ways to express what we mean. Gadamer puts it this way: “Now the
true nature of speaking is such that what is meant constantly goes beyond what is said”
(“Reflections on My Philosophical Journey” 52). With each expression, a claim is
made—this is how things are—but such a claim does not exhaust the potential for future
claims: the very identity of future assertions depends on what has come before—
possibility is now something else.
We are always trying to find the right words—so that what we mean to say and
what we actually say are one and the same. This is—for the sake of freedom—
impossible. Otherwise we would have nothing to work towards—the matter would be
settled, and then what? Instead, one’s sense for the possible changes as one engages with
the concrete. The use of language itself is a means of gaining insight: one’s sense for the
way things are and how they appear are united. Each articulation, then, is manifest: but
there is never one approach—each attempt has its merits and its deficiencies, pointing in
a direction that carves out a space but also seals up a concurrent opening: “Self-bestowal
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and self-withdrawal—such a dialectic of uncovering and withdrawal seems to hold sway
in the mystery of language” (Gadamer, “From Word to Concept: The Task of
Hermeneutics as Philosophy” 139). For this reason, we make conjectures, test out
possibilities and play with language: we never know what will be revealed. Each attempt
brings the world to language in a new and unique way: “For man language is variable not
only in the sense that there are foreign languages that one can learn but also variable in
itself, for it contains various possibilities for saying the same thing” (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 442). There are other ways of describing this dynamic—that the world is more
understandable when one engages with it, yet this understanding is directional; it leads us
on a path that reveals truth but obscures insights that we might have gained otherwise. To
understand that we are pointed in a direction and what this entails of us can assist us in
our attempt to illuminate the truth and value of that orientation:
“Explicating the whole of meaning towards which
understanding is directed forces us to make interpretive
conjectures and take them back again. The self-cancellation
of the interpretation makes it possible for the thing itself—
the meaning of the text—to assert itself. The movement of
the interpretation is dialectical […because] the word that
interpretively fits the meaning of the text expresses the
whole of this meaning—i.e., allows an infinity of meaning
to be represented within it in a finite way” (Gadamer, Truth
and Method 461).
In this commentary, Gadamer points to the idea that the interpretive word should include
everything that is not said in what is said and should be understood as such. By keeping
in mind possibility—the whole of meaning—then the interpretation can place itself on
firm ground: where it does not fit into this overarching context, it does not belong; it only
means anything because of its placement within the context. Of course, here Gadamer is
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speaking of the interpretation of texts, but the division between the interpretation of texts
and interpretation in general is not really a division: the interpretation of texts is
fundamentally related to interpretation of experience and vice versa—we engage with
texts because they are foundational to our interpretive project.
We can never, of course, completely articulate this entirety, this whole—instead it
envelops us and surrounds us: “It is a way of language that holds itself open to the whole
of being. […] Totality is never an object but rather a world-horizon which encloses us
and within which we live our lives” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My Philosophical
Journey” 37). Any attempt to engage with meaning, to understand, is an entry into the
particular, the concrete, the moment. In all cases, it is a mediation between unity and
difference: “Being is visible not only as the one but also, and just as originally, as the
other and as the multiplicity of differences, and as the identity and difference that comes
into language” (Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 44). It is
a mediation that is never complete. The task of language is to put into words the manner
in which things fit together and how things are connected. But it is also the nature of
language that those connections vary, including the very meaning of the words, as the
words are applied to the situation. Once again, careful consideration of this back and
forth can yield hermeneutical fruit: “Hermeneutics has the task of revealing a totality of
meanings in all its relations. The individuality of the sense intended corresponds to the
totality of definitions” (Truth and Method 467).
As we experience the passage of time, we encounter the new and unexpected. We
try to interpret the moment, but there are so many possibilities, with no guarantee as to
which is right. Somehow, though, we have a sense for what might work and we try to
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follow that scent, making sure that the conditions are right, with no distractions and an
adequate level of volume, that we are tuned to the right frequency, a message worth our
maximum attention. Then, when we feel we have listened, we make a statement that
interpretively fits—or so we hope: the only verification that is possible depends on the
very means of that which is being verified. Always, though, we have to commit: “To be
this and not that constitutes the determinacy of all beings” (Gadamer, Truth and Method
442). With each manifestation, there is no return. Sure one can revise and amend, but
every new assertion depends on what has been said before: the very shape of possibility
morphs. We are not in a position to reject the hermeneutical situation to which we
belong: we can only move forward. To incorporate our situation, to recognize that we
belong to it, promotes clarity, a diminishing of distortion. We see things as provisional
and recognize them as such—instead of flawed, enabling: so that our individuality
matters, so that our viewpoint provides insight, capable of inspiring. Each view has its
own truth: “The infinite perfectibility of the human experience of the world means that,
whatever language we use, we never succeed in seeing anything but an ever more
extended aspect, a ‘view’ of the world” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 444).
Language and its use point us in a direction: one that is valid but also one that
requires that we recognize it as just that—an interpretation and not the final word.
Through language, one can expand and extend one’s horizon: one’s possibilities of
knowledge and understanding can and do grow. How is language able to accomplish this
expansion? Here, Gadamer’s words prove helpful: “Where the word fulfills itself and
becomes language, we must take it at its word” (“From Word to Concept: The Task of
Hermeneutics as Philosophy 139). That is, when the word means something, when we
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enter into the discourse and forget about how something is said and only have before us
the content of what is said, when the words refer backwards and forwards, self-verifying
and self-legitimating, then the word is entirely convincing and altogether valid. This
nature of the word—that it is self-verifying—is of special note. A word, as a genuine
expression of meaning, can never be false. It is there as a word and this presence is
irrefutable: the appearance of the word and its meaning are one and the same. Gadamer
puts it this way: “It would no longer be a word if it could be false as a word. A discourse
formed of words can be false or true only if its expressed opinion concerning a state of
affairs is in question” (“On the Truth of the Word” 135). The word, language in and of
itself, is what allows for things to be true or false in the first place. Words and one’s
impulse to use them inhere a legitimacy that cannot be refuted: before one can challenge
the sovereignty of language, it has already asserted its influence.
There are other ways of talking about this situation: for example, by way of the
metaphysics of light and of the beautiful. Light is important because it allows what is
there to be seen. Without it, all would be indistinguishable. Words contain within them a
similar quality, allowing what is there to be understood—to be what it is: “The light that
causes everything to emerge in such a way that it is evident and comprehensible in itself
is the light of the word” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 478). So, until the words are used
to name the thing, the thing has no identity, undefined and incomprehensible; once
named, it is itself, truly what it is. Now, the concept of the beautiful is important for
similar reasons: in beauty there is radiance—the idea of the beautiful belongs to the
appearance of beauty, emanating. In the appearance of the thing in words, there is a
similar sensation of emanation and radiance: the distance between the idea of the thing
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and its appearance is dissolved. There is no difference between the words and what is
said in the words: “All coming into language […] has about it something of this quality
of self-attestation […] In using words what is given to the senses is not put at our
disposal as an individual case of the universal; it is itself made present in what is said—
just as the idea of the beautiful is present in what is beautiful” (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 483). The very attempt to describe one’s perceptions and one’s sense for the
meaning of those perceptions belong together. Words are there to say something and
whatever they say will be put to task, with no choice but to define and contrast
themselves based on other words. The words acquire a validity when they are challenged
but remain strong; they are not empty, capable of expressing something that matters: “To
be a word means to be saying […] In order to find those words that are the most saying
from among the infinite variety of possible words, we must remember what truly
characterizes ‘a word’: that it stands and one stands by it. This clearly already implies
that the word lays claim to an enduring validity through what it says or sayingly does”
(Gadamer, “On the Truth of the Word” 138-9).
Now, up until now I have been focusing on language as it appears in conversation.
But, as I have already mentioned, there is more to consider. Texts are important too: the
identity of texts depends on the identity of language and the identity of language depends
on the identity of texts. As we look at the nature of texts, we will see that much of what
has been discussed will now appear with greater clarity. Texts intensify and emphasize
understanding and the identity of language. In texts the character of language appears in
bold relief, the nature of language more noticeable because there is nothing but language
in texts. In texts, there are advantages and there are challenges; they have a definite
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identity, are repeatable, and are entirely intentional—the writer is aware that the reader
has nothing but the text to understand what is there. Indeed, part of the identity of
language is that in its development the words become fixed, the meaning of each word
shared, more and more there. The script, for its part, is the culmination and intensification
of this fixation—the words, then, immutable: “How the words are developed that one
needs, and one learns the correct words, and so learns how one learns things, that is not
conscious learning and practicing. Nevertheless this process of linguistic exchange
accomplishes the solidification of the use of language. To that extent the fixation by
means of script is anticipated in the developmental history of every language” (Gadamer,
“Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 33). The movement towards script
is a movement towards interpretation. It is a recognition that the words mean something
and that such a meaning should be preserved. By doing so the words make a claim: these
words matter and will always matter, their very meaning dependent on nothing but
themselves. Gadamer describes this nature of the text: “The verbal expression of what is
meant in the text must be constructed in such a way that, without any help of voice and
gesture, the text articulates itself and actually ‘presents’ what is meant by it. […] This
distinctive feature of writing enables and limits the text to the pure transmission of sense”
(“The Eminent Text and Its Truth” 5). In a text, the reader is forced to confront this
claim: if the words are intentionally there and will forever be there, then the reader has
the responsibility to do the words justice; however, the exact meaning of the text is
always different for each reader and every time someone reads; to listen to the text and
understand it for what it is, the reader will interpret each time, for the hermeneutical
situation demands adjustment.
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Part of the identity of a text is that it demands interpretation. It is the task of the
writer to recognize this dynamic and to construct the text in such a manner that the
meaning is clear and understandable. The text should be identifiable and repeatable—the
meaning should reside in the text and nowhere else; the text should be a witness to
itself—but precisely because the text is so transparent, the reader notices his or her
interpretive responsibility to an even greater degree: the words are understandable and
they are there, but their exact meaning is still disputable. Here the writer pushes the
reader to understand something—what is there in the text—but the very meaning of the
words are not stagnant—the reader completes the meaning, a completion that changes as
the process takes place. The writer has a double task: to be as transparent as possible in
presenting the ambiguity, fecundity and dynamism of language. Here, Gadamer’s words
are helpful:
What prescribes to all reifications in writing their task is
precisely that this thing being announced should be
understood. The printed text should fix the original
announcement […] in such a way that its sense is
unequivocally understandable […] The task of
interpretation always poses itself when the meaning content
of the printed word is disputable and it is a matter of
attaining the correct understanding of what is being
announced […] Accordingly, we must say that a text is not
simply a given object but a phase in the execution of the
communicative event (“Text and Interpretation” 35).
The words need to be presented in such a way that they are understandable yet
incomplete; the reader has no choice but to interpret, to bring his or her own perspective
and horizon to the interaction: when something is read, the words are the same yet
different for every reader. It is the writer’s task to recognize this dynamic and to include
all possible interpretations within the very identity of the text: the text includes potential
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interpretations within itself and is presented in this manner. In writing, there is
anticipation: “Writing is more than a repetition in print of something spoken. To be sure,
everything that is fixed in writing refers back to what was originally said, but it must
equally as much look forward; for all that is said is already directed towards
understanding and includes the other in itself” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 34).
All writing includes the reader within itself: its purpose is to guide and lead the
reader. In the concept of text there is an intimate connection between writer and reader:
both comprehend understanding and interpretation. The text is so vital because it
demands that the individual include the other within itself. When reading a text, each is
forced to ponder the meaning of words: the meaning is different for the writer and the
reader yet there is a point of contact; the world as it appears in language is in a process of
transition. By way of text, the reader engages with this movement—the meaning
understandable but also questionable: “Only on the basis of the concept of interpretation
does the concept of the text come to constitute a central concept in the structure of
linguisticality; indeed, what characterized the concept of text is that it presents itself only
in connection with interpretation and from the point of view of interpretation, as the
authentic given that is to be understood” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 30). That
is, we use language to interpret and understand the world but we rarely become aware of
this interpretive process: language already includes interpretation within itself. But when
confronted with a text, where there is nothing but language and that language is
permanent, we are prompted to consider how we understand and interpret in the first
place: the text resounds only when the words already mean something, when they truly
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matter. Writing, reading, and the text are “[a] fruitful model for all experience”
(Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 34).
In the same breath, one might talk about the book of nature and “[t]he readability
of the world” (Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 34).
Reading is a fruitful model because the words only mean something when the reader
anticipates the meaning and follows through with this anticipation as he or she reads.
That is, the anticipation of content and the act of reading are one and the same yet also
include adjustment and revision within the very same act. In the same way, in our
experiences we expect things to be a certain way and these expectations shape the very
identity of the experiences while also undergoing revision as our expectations are
thwarted. For this very reason, we place such a heavy emphasis on texts and the act of
reading—as an enactment and intensification of our interpretive process—from reading
we learn lessons. Gadamer notes that reading aloud highlights the true nature of reading:
“Reading aloud demonstrates quite clearly, I think, that reading is a completion-ofmeaning which is one’s own and is fulfilled within itself in the same act of fulfillment”
(“Reflections on My Philosophical Journey” 51). Reading is such a dynamic process that
it is impossible to parse the different elements that form it: the meaning of the text, one’s
own meaning, anticipation and realization—all feed off each other and grow from one
another.
As one interprets and as one lives, one understands to a greater or lesser degree.
Yes, we already understand, but to what to extent one can harness this understanding and
enact its truth depends on one’s level of attention and one’s willingness to listen even
when one does not know—to move further and beyond. As one reads, he or she is
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reminded and drawn into this dynamic of knowing and not knowing. For something to
mean anything at all, it already has to mean something; but this does not suggest that
meaning is ever exhausted—it is a process that takes place in phases; when something is
understood, more is to be understood: “What we call reading means to read with
understanding. So reading itself is already an interpretation of what is meant. And thus
reading is the basic structure to all carrying out, all realization, of meaning. […] It
therefore also holds that for the text about to be read, the reader who gives the work its
full presentness will experience an increase in being” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My
Philosophical Journey” 53). This idea that the reader experiences an increase in being is
central. As we read a text, its various words and sentences respond to one another and
combine and re-combine, a process of regression and progression: the possibilities of
meaning fluctuate, moving towards harmony, never entirely reaching it, demanding that
the reader participate and keep the words in balance—each moment, each word, a task in
itself. The attentive reader, then, makes this effort and in doing so becomes more—more
able, more aware, more understanding, of his or her burden and what this entails: that we
project our world and respond to our world, its meaning both a question and an answer.
The text, for its part, can make such a demand because it is removed from all
contingencies. It is pure meaning, pure sense. For this reason, the reader knows that the
text could have something to say: its potential truth cannot be refuted. The reader’s aim,
then, is to engage with this potential—to confirm and expand what is known:
Thus, precisely because it entirely detaches the sense of
what is said from the person saying it, the written word
makes the understanding reader the arbiter of its claim to
truth. The reader experiences what is addressed to him and
what he understands in all its validity. What he understands
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is always more than an unfamiliar opinion: it is always
possible truth. This is what emerges from detaching what is
spoken from the speaker and from the permanence that
writing bestows (Gadamer, Truth and Method 396).
Sure, the text may not necessarily be true but the reader does not know until the text has
been read and even then truth is not verifiable or provable. It is the reader’s job to make
his or her own conclusions: to test hypotheses and find resonance. Where there is
inspiration, the text has succeeded.
As a text is always possible truth and truth is variable, occasional and of the
moment, then its permanence is of special importance: the reader can always return to the
text. Here are Gadamer’s words on the subject: “A text is not to be understood as an
expression of life but with respect to what it says. Writing is the abstract ideality of
language. Hence the meaning of something written is fundamentally identifiable and
repeatable” (Truth and Method 392). The text has a definite identity and this places
demands on the reader. The text should be understood with respect to what it says but the
content of these words only counts when the reader brings them into his or her own
viewpoint and own understanding, when the identity of the words remains valid while
still occupying a position of change and difference; where the reader respects the words
by asking what they mean: “When one brings a text to speak through reading, even if
such reading be without any audible articulation, one takes up the meaning that resides in
the line of meaning that the text has and builds it into the universe of meaning which the
reader himself or herself has already opened up” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My
Philosophical Journey” 52).
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As has been alluded to throughout this discussion, the reader finds him or herself
in a kind of dialogue with the text. The text has something definite and precise to say, yet
the exact meaning depends on the horizon of the reader. Each word means differently for
each person. What the text has to say, exactly, depends on the questions that the reader
poses to the text:
To understand a text is to come to understand oneself in a
kind of dialogue. This contention is confirmed by the fact
that the concrete dealing with a text yields understanding
only when what is said in the text begins to find expression
in the interpreter’s own language. Interpretation belongs to
the essential unity of understanding. One must take up into
himself what is said in such a fashion that it speaks and
finds an answer in the words of his own language
(Gadamer, “On the Problem of Self-Understanding” 57).
The text answers and subsequently poses more questions—the answers leading to new,
previously unconsidered consequences and implications. Only when the words truly
mean something and only when they truly provoke will the reader incorporate the
meaning of the text into his or her understanding: here the context of being and language
shape both the reader and the text. What is being said and why does it matter? The
answer is always a personal one, depending on the circumstances of the individual, meant
to be weighed, thought through, a journey of excursion and return.
Yes, something is shared by the two partners, the text and the reader. In this case
it is a common subject matter. Here the writer has articulated the subject matter, has
attempted to place it within a context and make it real. The presence and body of the text,
then, entrances the reader: the words matter and the reader responds because they apply
to his or her own life—the words illuminate and enlighten, unique and personal yet
belonging to a shared world: “Only through [the interpreter] are the written marks
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changed back into meaning. Nevertheless, in being changed back by understanding, the
subject matter of which the text speaks itself finds expression. It is like a real
conversation in that the common subject matter is what binds the two partners, the text
and the interpreter, to each other” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 389). We really are
bound by a common subject matter, but it is a subject matter that is questionable. We are
pushed to interpret texts because their resonance and implications are variable. Texts
themselves are defined by their complexity, their overarching structure that is selflegitimating, each word supporting every other; as we encounter texts, there is clarity and
obfuscation—the message is right there, but the implications are infinite: “We find the
hermeneutical relationship involved in our concept of text whenever we encounter
resistance to our primordial assumption of the meaningfulness of the given” (Gadamer,
“Text and Interpretation” 31). Indeed, when we do not know, we ask questions—in them,
a world of hope and doubt.
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CHAPTER 3
GADAMER ON ART AND LITERATURE

As we enter into this discussion of art and literature, it is first necessary to
reestablish the identity of language, for its nature is decisive. Language is the means by
which we have a world. As we grow up in the world, language appears: in language,
things become what they are; without language, things have no identity, meaningless.
The only way we know the world, though, is as something; before we ever question the
names of things and their meaning, the linguisticality of the world has already asserted
itself: something has already been understood. Nevertheless, identity and meaning do
evolve, for each are up for debate. That is, the temptation to use language is an urge to
understand more: in each utterance, the words become more concrete, the referent more
and more defined, but also exposed to the individuality of the other. Here, the interlocutor
or addressee demands an accommodation—that the language mediates the difference of
each. In this mediation there is reassurance—these words are meaningful and they matter,
in them inspiration and provocation: in this process, too, the words gain in presence and
body—more and more real, more and more true. This movement never ends. The passage
of time requires change and so does the individuality of each and everyone. As the world
is articulated, some things are brought to the fore and others remain in the background. It
is a constant effort to find the right balance: to include all that we do not know right along
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with what we do know and to be understood as such. Art, for its part, belongs to this
process of understanding.
In art, something-comes-to-being. That is, in art, something is presented as
something and is understood as such; identity, presentation, performance and
representation conflate—become one. What is presented, though, belongs to itself yet is
different. In other words, in the attempt to foreground presentation and representation,
meaning, coherence, balance, and unity have already asserted themselves, for they belong
to the nature of the world and our perception of it; yet, each performance, each encounter
with art is accidental, of the moment, necessarily unique. As time passes, loose ends,
uncertainty and incoherence arise unchecked—and unavoidably so—but we are
concurrently equipped to confront these challenges. Art is a part of this effort. So, then,
art appears and we engage with it because it promotes a greater sense of balance—things
are in order, at least temporarily. But it is not only because coherence is part of its
identity that art is so central to our interpretive project, its importance also lies in the fact
that the artwork is different each time it is presented, yet it is the same. The artwork
places demands on the participant. The meaning of the artwork belongs to itself, yet it is
also mediated by all who experience the artwork. In each encounter, the artwork asks
questions of the participant and the participant asks questions of the artwork. In this back
and forth, a movement of integration occurs. Mediated by the present moment and all
who participate, the artwork must change to remain itself—in this there is interpretive
gold: a challenge to adapt that belongs to one’s very concept of understanding and truth.
Definitively, language is the starting point, as meaning and the world cannot be
separated, but what we see and what we understand is not static. Our hermeneutic
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responsibility can never be denied. In art, there is an echoing of this linguisticality: a
representation of the world is presented and in this presentation we are reminded of the
(possible) representation(s) of the world. With each artwork, then, representation is the
main topic and theme. As we make and engage with artworks we are confronted with
how we perceive and understand. Artworks only mean anything because they belong to
our experience of the world: so tantalizing, so seductive, so true—because they reflect
our engagement with the world and each other—in this, greater awareness. As an artwork
is a self-enclosed whole that admits no outside verification, we turn to art as a means of
understanding our own lives, for we aim to make our lives just like that—as self-enclosed
wholes in which all of the parts fit together. Of course, such a task is never entirely
possible but to say so does not deny the essential orientation towards integration. For an
artwork demands that we relate its content to our own lives, and in the process we see
what otherwise may have remained dim:
Language signifies memory. Mnemosyne is, however, the
mother of all the muses and so the patron of art. Art—
whether picture, word, sound, song, or whatever its origin
was or its present social function may be—means, in the
final analysis, a way of confronting ourselves in which we
become mindful of ourselves. In word as in picture, in
petroglyph as in the song, and still in the refined and
mediated forms of later literature, the world as a whole—
the whole of our world experience—has become present.
And even the most silent forms of modern painting, which
radiate a brooding silence, evoke in us the ‘you are that.’
Such an experience of the whole, in which we confront
ourselves, occurs through the continual new-awakening of
the echoing of art. In this lies the actual distinguishing
characteristic of humans (Gadamer, Hans-Georg Gadamer
on Education, Poetry, and History 90).
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When we encounter art we are reminded of how we perceive and what we perceive and
how we understand and what we understand; the answers, though, are never certain and
torturously ephemeral, but the artwork is solid and there, a token of stability and insight,
an anchor amid the flow of time.
Compellingly, Gadamer contends that it is through the echoing of art that we
recognize things for what they are. Of course, it is hard to parse cause and effect, but
certainly the picturing of the world does change its identity. Each time the world is
presented in art, it is no longer the same, now something new. In this context, Gadamer
discusses the ontological valence of the picture: “In it we can see without any doubt that a
picture is not a copy of a copied being, but is in ontological communion with what is
copied. It is clear from this example that art, as a whole and in a universal sense,
increases the picturability of being. Word and image are not mere imitative illustrations
but allow what they present to be for the first time fully what it is” (Truth and Method
137). To say that we would not know the world without art is an unwieldy contention, but
to say that the world is more understandable, more true and more compelling as a result
of art seems justified. Each time the world is (re)presented more and more of its layers
and nuances are revealed. Each time the world is (re)presented differently, we see it and
understand it from a unique angle, as itself and as something more. Part of art’s
responsibility is to prompt us to see and understand creatively; the thing represented—the
content—might be the same in several different artworks, but the way it is presented
constitutes the value and truth of the artwork: “the picture itself is what is meant insofar
as the important thing is how the thing represented is presented in it” (Gadamer, Truth
and Method 134). In an artwork there is a dynamic interaction between the content and
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the manner in which it is presented: the aim, in all cases, is to present the subject matter
in a way that reveals its truth, so that we know it for what it is. Of course, something can
be presented in many different ways, but each successful presentation already belongs to
the identity of the content:
That the picture has its own reality means the reverse for
what is pictured, namely that it comes to presentation in the
representation. It presents itself there. It does not follow
that it is dependent on this particular representation in order
to appear. It can also present itself as what it is in other
ways. But if it presents itself in this way, this is no longer
any incidental event but belongs to its own being. Every
such presentation is an ontological event and occupies the
same ontological level as what is represented. By being
presented it experiences, as it were, an increase in being.
The content of the picture itself is defined as an emanation
of the original (Gadamer, Truth and Method 135).
In this statement, certainly, we can discern the value of art and the impetus to engage
with art. In the experience, the participant becomes more because the world becomes
more. In each encounter, different aspects of the world spring forth.
In its representation in art, then, the world is seen differently and is recognized for
what it is. But this recognition is not static; part of the identity of art is that it conceals
itself as it reveals itself; its depths are unfathomable: what people recognize and what
they understand includes ambiguity within itself. Something is presented that cannot be
denied, but belonging to the very identity of the artwork is its own variability: it means
something but what it means includes difference within itself—in each encounter, the
participant must interpret. In this context, Gadamer discusses the concept of play.
Play is essential to Gadamer’s hermeneutic ontology. In his exposition of art and
language, Gadamer emphasizes play because play envelops the players and shapes the
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movements of the players. Before making any conscious choices, play has already
asserted itself: “Here the primacy of play over the consciousness of the player is
fundamentally acknowledged […]. Play clearly represents an order in which the to-andfro motion of play follows of itself. It is part of play that the movement is not only
without goal or purpose but also without effort. It happens, as it were, by itself”
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 105). Once the participants commit to the play, the
movements and decisions of the players belong to the nature of the play and constitute
the self-presentation of the play. In this respect, the identity of the play is of utmost
importance, for once someone has committed to the play, then the play itself is decisive
and not the player: “The players are not the subjects of play; instead play merely reaches
presentation (Darstellung) through the players” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 103).
According to Gadamer, art is a kind of play. In art there is a movement back and
forth between the artwork and anyone who experiences the artwork. The artwork, in fact,
is created in anticipation of the person who experiences it. Each time the play of art takes
place, it reaches presentation. But why is art a kind of play? Why does it demand this
never-ending movement? Art is a kind of play because play is regulated movement; it is
not just unfettered movement; it is free movement within a binding structure: “The
function of the representation of play is ultimately to establish, not just any movement
whatsoever, but rather the movement of play determined in a specific way. In the end,
play is thus the self-representation of its own movement” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the
Beautiful 23). Art, then, is a kind of play because the movement between the artwork and
the participant is a kind of regulated movement; the artwork makes demands and the
participant is drawn to respect those demands. The artwork has its own structure that is
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binding, yet belonging to this structure is variability. What is understood changes with
each encounter, yet it is still the same artwork:
We started from the position that the work of art is play—
i.e., that its actual being cannot be detached from its
presentation and that in this presentation the unity and
identity of a structure emerge. To be dependent on selfpresentation belongs to what it is. This means that however
much it is transformed and distorted in being presented, it
still remains itself. This constitutes the obligation of every
presentation: that it contain a relation to the structure itself
and submit itself to the criterion of correctness that derives
from it (Gadamer, Truth and Method 120).
The artwork has an identity. It is itself. But what is presented in the artwork is a content
that includes our understanding of the world and our perception of it. Something is
presented. The thing that is presented is there and it is intended: “‘Acting as if’ seems a
particular possibility wherever the activity in question is simply a case of instinctual
behavior, but one that ‘intends’ something” (“The Play of Art” 124-5). Something is
intended and it is a representation, but the meaning and identity of the representation does
not belong to anybody; what is there, exactly, is the subject of the play, for what we
understand and recognize is never self-same, always different.
Indeed, play is a kind of structure that determines the movements of the players,
but the movements, as such, are variable and free within this structure. The creation of an
artwork, then, is a kind of play: a structure is created that determines the movements of
the participants but the structure includes variability within itself. It is only in the
performance, the experience, that the artwork is present at all; in each encounter, the aim
is to engage with the artwork so that it remains the same and to do this the performance
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has no choice but to adapt to the present situation. Each encounter with art is an attempt
to allow it to be what it is:
I call this change, in which human play comes to its true
consummation in being art, transformation into structure.
Only through this change does play achieve ideality, so that
it can be intended and understood as play. Only now does it
emerge as detached from the representing activity of the
players and consist in the pure appearance (Erscheinung) of
what they are playing. As such, the play—even the
unforeseen elements of improvisation—is in principle
repeatable and hence permanent (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 110).
This concept of transformation into structure is important because it is only as a structure
that the artwork has an identity. The only way that anybody can access an artwork is
through its performance and each performance is different; nevertheless, all participants
have a sense for the identity of the artwork: the play is an attempt to bring to appearance
the structure of the artwork, an attempt that can never be more than an approximation.
Yes, an artwork is a structure. It is not something that can be planned and created
on a step by step, methodical basis. It is something that has its own unity and grows out
of itself. With this in mind, certain elements can be added or taken away, and it can still
remain itself. All performance and engagement with this structure is an attempt to realize
its ideality, when it is at its most coherent and most self-legitimating. Gadamer describes
this organic aspect of structure, or “Gebilde”, in the following manner:
The general meaning of ‘Gebilde’ suggests something not
understood from the vantage point of a preplanned finished
state one knows in advance but rather something that has
developed its own pattern from within and thus is perhaps
to be grasped in further formations [Bildung]. To
understand this idea is, in itself, an important task. The task
is to build up and establish what a Gebilde [shaped form,
structure] is; to construe something that is not
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‘constructed’—and that means that all efforts at
construction are withdrawn (“Text and Interpretation” 49).
This concept of structure, then, privileges attentiveness and process. It is in the
engagement and participation that the structure emerges; our fundamental orientation to
meaning shapes this engagement, a back and forth process that strives for unity and
coherence.
As we engage with art we engage with a structure—and this structure
fundamentally inheres insight because something emerges that we would not have
noticed otherwise. Something emerges that is understandable and complete: what once
was inchoate is now entire—all of the parts fit together. The structure is the only
measure—it depends on itself to validate itself. In the artwork everything belongs and
everything is in balance. There is no incongruence: everything appears as if it had no
choice but to be there. All that appears in the artwork is what is meant; the appearance
and the idea are one: “Thus the concept of transformation characterizes the independent
and superior mode of being of what we called structure. From this viewpoint ‘reality’ is
defined as what is untransformed, and art as the raising up (Aufhebung) of this reality
into its truth” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 112). Art allows us to see things for what
they are. Something is identified as what it is and this identification is legitimate because
it belongs to a context that depends on nothing but itself, a context that has emerged out
of itself:
Transformation into structure is not simply transposition
into another world. Certainly the play takes place in
another, closed world. But inasmuch as it is a structure, it
is, so to speak, its own measure and measures itself by
nothing outside it. […] It no longer permits of any
comparison with reality as the secret measure of all
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verisimilitude. It is raised above all such comparison—and
hence also above the question whether it is all real—
because a superior truth speaks from it (Gadamer, Truth
and Method 111-2).
As the artwork is so coherent and so understandable—as the idea and the
appearance merge into one—the artwork yields insight—we relate the meaning of the
artwork to the meaning of life: “The transformation is a transformation into the true. It is
not enchantment in the sense of a bewitchment that waits for the redeeming word that
will transform things back to what they were; rather, it is itself redemption and
transformation into true being. In being presented in play, what is emerges. It produces
and brings to light what is otherwise constantly hidden and withdrawn” (Gadamer, Truth
and Method 112). In art something is presented and we dwell on that appearance: we ask
what it means and why it is there. We are prompted to enter into the artwork more and
more profoundly. In doing so, we do not reach a final answer and then discard the
question. We continue to ask questions and in the questioning the complexity and depth
of the artwork—its very meaning and identity—demand that we consider and take into
account all of the contributing variables, a slew of factors that stem from one’s
experience of the world, an accounting and confrontation that would not happen if it were
not for the artwork.
Art echoes one’s experience of the world and it is in this echoing that one
understands more and better; in art, the world appears as we would not otherwise have
seen it. For this reason, art is everywhere and it is unavoidable. Art belongs to our very
process of understanding the world; we are tuned to engage with it. But some people
choose to seek it out and engage with it in a conscientious manner. In doing so, there is
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even greater yield, a more acute sense of communion, a clearer path to truth. It is the
case, in fact, that art reminds us of our plight: that time passes inexorably, that we appear
out of nowhere and belong to a world not of our choosing—all of this shapes us and
determines our actions. Before we make any decisions, the possibility of that decision has
already been molded. To come to terms with this lack of control and to harness the
influence that we do have belongs to our experience of art. Our engagement with art is
like this: something is there that places demands; we are not free to see or understand
whatever we choose; yet there is freedom and necessarily so—in order for the artwork to
be what it is, it must be adapted to the current hemeneutical situation. In the encounter
with the artwork, there is a reflexive movement: one’s place in the world and one’s
interpretation of the world is the whole that envelops each and every one of us; at the
same time, the artwork is its own whole, undeniable in its presence. There is, then, a back
and forth movement between the interpretation of experience and the interpretation of the
artwork. In this movement, one relates the whole of one’s experience to the artwork and
one relates the whole of the artwork to one’s experience: “Amidst the variety of art, this
same message of the whole addresses us over and over again. Indeed, this seems to
provide a more precise answer concerning the significance of art and beauty. This means
that in any encounter with art, it is not the particular, but rather the totality of the
experienceable world, man’s ontological place in it, and above all his finitude before that
which transcends him, that is brought to experience” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the
Beautiful 32-3). In art there is a contemporaneity and a timelessness because it, in fact,
engages those experiences that shape our sense of time and our historicality. An artwork
belongs to a cultural moment and is a testimony of that moment. However, it is precisely
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this sense that the artwork is a part of history that is timeless and universal. In all
encounter with artwork, then, the participant is reminded of history and change. Yet, in
the mediation between the past and the present, the participant takes note of a meaning
that belongs to both: the past belongs to the present and the present belongs to the past.
Furthermore, the experience of art is one that takes place through time. As one actively
engages with an artwork, the significance and meaning of each moment is uncertain; yet
the parts do fit together to make a meaningful whole, however indeterminate the meaning
may be. This construal requires active participation, a restless back and forth energy; an
action that never entirely settles but does approach completion, even if it never gets there.
These experiences of time are important and are reflected in how we experience time in
our daily lives.
The work of art is useful because it is a whole that strives for completion; a sense
of fulfillment that we aim for in each performance and each encounter, a whole that we
can never entirely enact; nevertheless, it is in the attempt, in the possibility, that we attain
insight. For in each performance there is a possibility of correctness that shapes the
experience; some aspects might be ignored and others might be emphasized, but it is only
the identity of the artwork that places such constrictions; its identity belongs to the
performance, which necessarily is filtered through the present moment, shaping the
performance. It is this striving for correctness that constitutes the appeal of art. For in the
attempt to respect the artwork, we also learn to respect and engage with the identity of
our very existence:
In as much as the verse and art are themselves such a
whole, they incorporate us in themselves. They are,
philosophically speaking, reflections in themselves. We are
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ourselves encompassed by the whole, which we are and
which is in us; but not encompassed in such a manner that
the whole would be present for us as the whole. We
encounter it rather as the totality and vastness, wherein
everything is, only through adhering to what has been
allotted us, ie., the nómos, whatever it may be (Gadamer,
Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History
91).
By way of art, we come to realize that each moment is new and makes its own demands:
like we do with artwork, we do with life—we place each moment within a larger context,
a dynamic interaction that requires attention, engagement and participation. We will
never exactly know this larger context for what it truly is because of the nature of change,
but to acknowledge that it is there and that each new moment requires revision has its
own value, for then we know to pay attention and participate, then we have a better sense
for our place in the world.
When we engage with a work of art, it imposes its own structure on the
participants, a structure that is only present in the performance. Each performance is
different, but, at the same time, the only way that anyone can experience the artwork is
through performance. All performances are necessarily deficient—they do not reach
ideality; but it is not incidental to the work of art that it depends on performance—it is
part of what it is: “The artistic experience is constituted precisely by the fact that we do
not distinguish between the particular way the work is realized and the identity of the
work itself. That is not only true of the performing arts and the mediation or reproduction
that they imply. It is always true that the work as such speaks to us in an individual way
as the same work, even in repeated and different encounters with it” (Gadamer, The
Relevance of the Beautiful 29). It is of special importance that the work is always the
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same even as the performances vary. This means that each performance belongs to the
identity of the artwork; the identity of the artwork includes difference within itself; each
possible interpretation and performance constitute the identity of the work playing itself
out. It is in the performance that the artwork achieves absolute presence, a presence that
places demands on the participant in which he or she tries to square the performance with
the true identity of the artwork; here, though, the performance is all there is—it is only
through its performance that the artwork has an identity. This is the special nature of art
as play: “Play is structure—this means that despite its dependence on being played it is a
meaningful whole which can be repeatedly presented as such and the significance of
which can be understood. But structure is also play, because—despite this theoretical
unity—it achieves its full being only each time it is played. That both sides of the
question belong together is what we have to emphasize against the abstraction of
aesthetic differentiation” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 116). As we look at the different
mediums in which art can manifest itself, we notice the different ways that each artwork
can be performed. Each medium is different, each demanding a different kind of
performance. Theater is one example. In theater, each performance is in service of the
artwork: so that the performance corresponds most fully with the identity of the work.
That identity, of course, never completes itself; in the performance the artwork is never
entirely what we imagine it might be. Furthermore, the audience, the actors, the playwright—all have an equal share in the identity and meaning of the play. In the case of the
play-wright, he or she has written a play that is a guide for the production of the play: it is
only in the performance that the play becomes what it is. In the case of the actors, they
are given the task of embodying the play, so that it becomes something definite for
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anybody who experiences it. Here, the actors succeed when the distinction between the
presentation and the thing presented is a non-distinction: the actors’ only job is to allow
the play to be understood for what it is. In this case, the play is presented for an audience:
“openness toward the spectator is part of the closedness of the play. The audience only
completes what the play as such is” (Gadamer, Truth and method 109). The play is meant
for an audience: the identity of the play belongs to the participation of the audience, a
situation where neither the actors nor the audience enjoy priority; instead, all who
participate have the same burden and opportunity: to engage with the artwork so that it
becomes itself. In the experience of the artwork, there is something that lies in between
for all who experience it, unpossessed and awaiting appropriation: it is the task of each to
accommodate the meaning of the artwork with the meaning of one’s own experience.
This challenge alters with each encounter because the meaning of an artwork is
inexhaustible: it includes difference within itself.
As an example, I would like to highlight Ibsen’s drama, The Lady from the Sea.
Although written to be performed, his work is widely considered to be literature, also
meant to be read. Now, when I read this work there is an interpretive demand that is
undeniable. Written in the late nineteenth century, his work is a pre-cursor of Woolf’s,
inaugurating many of the themes that come to dominate Modernism. In it, Ibsen
examines free will, existential determination, and the institution of marriage. As Ibsen
sees it, marriage was a poisoned and corrupt institution. As a result, both men and women
suffer and human being is stunted. Overall, marriage comprehends our economic, social
and existential imperative. At the time, many women had to marry in order to survive: it
was not a matter of choice but of necessity. Consequently, many marriages were initiated
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on a slippery foundation: the union turns out to be less than the sum of its parts, each
party diminished instead of exalted. In his play, Ibsen emphasizes free will and the
continuity and coherence that we all strive for in meaningful existence. To slur over one’s
past or deny the value of one’s history leads to fragmentation, frustration and confusion.
One’s past should be acknowledged and confronted: only in this manner can one move
forward and grow. And it is only in the context of one’s past that the decision to marry or
not makes sense. Now, I am only able to interpret this play as such because I identify and
recognize what it is like to have a personal story, what it is like to interact with people,
what it is like to fuse my hopes and dreams with those of another. Of course, the
historical and material conditions have changed considerably, but it also true that my
personal context includes an awareness of this difference. Despite this difference, people
then as now found fulfillment in their relationships and in marriage. In reading this play, I
get a better sense for the dynamics of this union and the effort and actions required for it
to yield personal fulfillment.
Theater is an example of a reproductive art where performance is foregrounded,
but all artworks are made to be performed. This is the case even for the plastic arts or the
literary arts. Even a painting hinges on performance. When someone looks at a painting,
it is an experience that occurs through time: a scanning process takes place. A painting is
made to be viewed, and in this viewing something is understood, but that something is
not the final answer; we return to the painting because there is something in it that
compels, the nuances and relations in movement. Pablo Picasso’s Guernica is an example
of a painting that emphasizes this sense of movement. Of course, we experience this
kinetic energy with all paintings, but, to a considerable degree, the subject matter of
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Guernica is this movement itself. Fiero describes the Cubist image in these terms: “The
Cubist image, conceived as if one were moving around, above, and below the subject and
even perceiving it from within, appropriated the fourth dimension—time itself” (6: 6).
Produced in response to the bombing of the Spanish town Guernica, “the world’s first
aerial bombardment of a civilian target”, Picasso’s aim was to represent the horror of this
event. But, instead of representing it realistically, Picasso chose to represent it as a Cubist
image. In many ways, Picasso’s Cubism is a refutation of the impersonality of violent
technology. Each image can be seen from several different viewpoints and requires a
scanning process that never completes itself. As one scans, the nuances and relations shift
and change. It emphasizes the variability of the perceiving consciousness, the
inexhaustibility of perception: the perception of each individual is of value and worth,
contributing to our collective sense of truth and meaning.
Overall, the painter has created the painting because it provides answers but also
because it asks questions; queries and responses that depend on each encounter, forever
vibrant:
A dialectic of question and answer does not here come to a
stop. On the contrary, the work of art distinguishes itself in
that one never completely understands it. That is to say,
when one approaches it questioningly, one never obtains a
final answer that one now ‘knows.’ Nor does one take from
it relevant information, and that takes care of that! One can
never fully harvest that which resides in an artwork so that
it is, so to speak, consumed. Apprehending a poetic work,
whether it comes to us through the real ear or only through
a reader listening with an inner ear, presents itself basically
as a circular movement in which answers strike back as
questions and provoke new answers. This is what moves us
to tarry with a work of art, of whatever kind it may be. To
be tarrying [Verweilen] is clearly the distinguishing mark of
the experience of art. An artwork is never exhausted. It
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never becomes empty” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My
Philosophical Journey” 43-4).
An artwork is created with the experience in mind, one in which the participant
encounters something that is true and understandable, yet variable and of the moment: a
reflexive movement occurs—in order to understand what is there, the participant has no
choice but to relate this new present to past experience. It is part of the identity of the
artwork that the participant should feel challenged and also feel the need to face the
challenge.
Once created, the artwork belongs to no one, not even the artist—he or she
confronts the artwork just like anyone else: as something that reveals itself in its
abundance but also reposes in itself; the artwork has its own special identity that is
autonomous and self-sufficient; the artwork is meant to be performed and in the
performance it is both different and the same each time. This is part of its identity, in
fact—that it encounters each participant as a thing that changes the participant: the
artwork is always created in anticipation of the performance. The artwork only has an
identity when it is performed: “The concept of play was introduced precisely to show that
everyone involved in play is a participant. It should also be true of the play of art that
there is in principle no radical separation between the work of art and the person who
experiences it” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 28). The work of art is created
in anticipation of its experience and this experience mandates that the participant
recognize what it is that is being presented. In order to understand what is being
presented, the participant looks at his or her own life, relates what appears in the artwork
to his or her own understanding and experience. In this, there is a horizon of possibility
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that envelops and surrounds the participant: the artwork belongs to this horizon and asks
that the participant reassess his or her place in the horizon because it has presented
something that has never even been considered; once seen, the participant feels the urge
to integrate. In this context, Gadamer’s words prove apt: “The play of art as appearance is
played out between us. The one takes the creation simply as a creation, just as the other
does. Communication takes place when the other person takes part in what is imparted to
him—and in such a way that he does not, as it were, only receive in part what is
communicated to him, but shares in this knowledge of the whole matter that is fully
possessed by both of them” (“The Play of Art” 128). Yes, in art something is presented
that appears and we relate this appearance to absolutely everything; everything, in fact,
has an appearance. To come to terms with the appearance of everything, to try to square
appearance with truth—this is the nature of hermeneutic ontology.
The artist, then, creates an artwork so that all who experience it participates in the
same effort: so that one might see and understand the world for what it is. Like an
artwork, the world, too, has an identity and we each feel the need to commune with this
identity. Art belongs to this process of fulfillment:
What gives the work its identity as a work? What makes
this what we call a hermeneutic identity? Obviously, this
further formation means that its identity consists precisely
in there being something to ‘understand,’ that it asks to be
understood in what it ‘says’ or ‘intends.’ The work issues a
challenge which expects to be met. It requires an answer—
an answer that can only be given by someone who accepted
the challenge. And that must be his own, and given
actively. The participant belongs to the play (Gadamer, The
Relevance of the Beautiful 49).
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The artwork issues a challenge and we are drawn to this challenge because, instead of
engaging with the diffuse gauze of an undifferentiated world, we encounter something
that is definite, concrete, and complete. Yet, because the artwork never reveals all of its
answers, because it must be performed to be at all, the work changes with each encounter.
This meeting with difference is appealing because of our own experience of time: change
is unavoidable and we are better off if we face it, if we too are fluid. It is a trial of
adaptation and integration: “It is a question, therefore, of allowing what is to be. But this
‘letting be’ does not mean the repetition of something we already know. We let the past
be for us as we are now, not by repeated experience of it, but through an encounter with
it” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 49). The artwork is different for each
person who experiences it and in each moment that one encounters it. In all, the artwork
paves its own path, but it depends on the participant to follow the guideposts and to be
able to read them; in order to do so, the participant has to accommodate his or her outlook
and language in such a manner that he or she might decipher the hieroglyphics of the
artwork. Yet, the artwork is created in such a way that it anticipates difference: it is made
to be understood uniquely, depending on who encounters it—even as it remains itself.
Gadamer puts it this way: “All artistic creation challenges each of us to listen to the
language in which the work of art speaks and to make it our own. It remains true in every
case that a shared or potentially shared achievement is at issue” (The Relevance of the
Beautiful 39). The artist creates the artwork to be experienced, but it is not until this
happens that the artwork is what it is supposed to be. In this encounter, the participant is
changed and the artwork is more truly itself, a means of mediation.
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The artwork is meant to be experienced and because of this the artwork includes
the other within itself. In the same manner, the participant chooses to experience the
artwork so that he or she might do the same—encounter the other so that he or she is
more oneself. As one grows in the world, one tries to find one’s place in it and to
understand it; it is an anxious question with no final answer, but there are moments of
illumination and continuity. Art contributes to this effort:
Self-understanding always occurs through understanding
something other than the self, and includes the unity and
integrity of the other. Since we meet the artwork in the
world and encounter a world in the individual artwork, the
work of art is not some alien universe in which we are
magically transported for a time. Rather, we learn to
understand ourselves in and through it, and this means that
we sublate (aufheben) the discontinuity and atomism of
isolated experiences in the continuity of our own existence
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 83).
An artwork is always new and different, yet its materials are the same as those that
belong to one’s interpretive effort; the artwork is immediately accessible, requiring no
effort other than a willingness to pay attention; in this encounter the world appears
transformed and this transformation is so compelling and so true that we relate it to our
own world, so that it too might be understood for what it is.
An artwork is created in anticipation of its performance and each performance
strives to present the artwork as it is. But what is the content of the artwork? Why does it
belong to our understanding of the world? Well, up to now the answer has been alluded
to, but it has not been mentioned explicitly: that an artwork presents something as
something and is understood as such. Whatever is presented is intentional and is
presented as appearance: “Mimetic imitation […] does not intend to be ‘believed,’ but to
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be understood as imitation. Such imitation is not feigned, is not false show, but on the
contrary clearly a ‘true’ showing, ‘true’ as a show. It is perceived just as it is intended,
namely as show, appearance” (Gadamer, “The Play of Art” 127-8). In an artwork
something is presented and that something is what it is meant to be. As we follow this
line of thought, we might notice that something can only be presented when one knows
what it is: in the artwork, something is there as one knows it to be. As one creates an
artwork or encounters an artwork, the raw materials that we use to interpret the world are
transferred into the artwork and, in this transference, these materials are removed from
their contingent circumstances and we acquire a knowledge of the essence: “The concept
of imitation can be used to describe the play of art only if one keeps in mind the cognitive
import of imitation. The thing presented is there (Das Dargestellte ist da). That is the
situation basic to imitation. When a person imitates something, he allows what he knows
to exist and to exist in the way that he knows it” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 113). In art
something is presented as we know it to be—anybody who encounters the artwork will
then recognize what is represented; in the representation, the thing is presented as it is
understood; nevertheless, what is understood, precisely, is part of the play, up for debate,
agile.
Art is a path into the true because in it there is no difference between the
representation and the thing represented; the representation is the only available way for
the thing to be understood; the thing is there as we know it: “the work of art does not
simply refer to something, because what it refers to is actually there. We could say that
the work of art signifies an increase in being” (The Relevance of the Beautiful 35). The
work of art does not point away from itself; the reference is included within itself: to
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engage with the representation, one already knows that which is represented. In other
words, as one engages with representation, the thing represented is already there in the
representation, for one would not be able to represent it if one did not know it: “With
regard to knowledge of the true, the being of the representation is more than the being of
the thing represented” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 114). Yes, the representation is
paramount and shapes how we encounter the thing represented, but, in the same breath,
the thing represented is encountered as it is because we recognize it in the representation:
“For there is no doubt that the essence of imitation consists precisely in the recognition of
the represented in the representation” (Gadamer, “Art and Imitation” 99). In other words,
in an artwork, something is always presented as something; the content depends on the
presentation and the presentation depends on the content. What, exactly, is represented,
though, can vary widely. In its most abstract sense, one can represent the relations
between things, their order: “This talk of imitation obviously derives from the fact that
the universe itself, the vault of the heavens, and the tonal harmonies we hear, can all be
represented in a miraculous way by numerical ratios, especially those between even
numbers. […] Mimesis reveals the miracle of order that we call the kosmos” (Gadamer,
“Art and Imitation” 101). For in our experience of the world, we encounter order all
around us; it is only natural that we would represent this feeling of order in an artwork;
here, an artwork reconciles the relations of things, a correspondence that we sense and
strive for, incomplete and temporary yet flush with potential.
When something is represented it is made present; this means that it is there to be
encountered and in the confrontation one wonders what it is, exactly, that is there. One
wants to recognize the thing that is there: “Recognition confirms and bears witness to the
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fact that mimetic behavior makes something present” (Gadamer, “Art and Imitation” 98).
Recognition is very important. When one recognizes something, one understands the
thing for what it is:
When I recognize someone or something, what I see is
freed from the contingency of this or that moment of time.
It is part of the process of recognition that we see things in
terms of what is permanent and essential in them,
unencumbered by the contingent circumstances in which
they were seen before and are seen again. This is what
constitutes recognition and contributes to the joy we take in
imitation. For what imitation reveals is precisely the real
essence of the thing” (Gadamer, Art and Imitation 99).
Put simply, in art something is represented so that it might be recognized. What is
represented is entirely intentional and is meant to be dwelt upon; it is meant to be seen
and considered; the representation is meant to matter because it is all that is there: “What
is shown is, so to speak, elicited from the flux of manifold reality. Only what is shown is
intended and nothing else. As intended, it is held in view, and thus elevated to a kind of
ideality. It is no longer just this or that thing that we can see, but it is now shown and
designated as something. An act of identification and, consequently, of recognition
occurs whenever we see what it is that we are being shown” (“The Play of Art” 129). An
artwork allows for unlimited freedom: it can be anything. But an artwork is never
everything. The artist has to make choices and in doing so he or she commits to a certain
way of understanding and a certain way of seeing. Nevertheless, it is also the artist’s
prerogative to situate his or her artwork within this paradigm of limitless possibility: by
presenting a defined artwork with details, the artist provokes the participant to relate the
specific identity of the artwork to the truth of art and all that it entails. In order for this to
happen, the participant has no other option than to enter even further into the artwork: it
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is only in the details that the universal appears. An artist presents something that is
there—and this something is the only measure. It is the participant’s responsibility to
engage with what is there and to recognize what is there.
In an artwork something is presented that is intentional, meaningful, and
universally relatable. The participant is able to see what is there because each artwork
includes the other within itself: it is an attempt to go beyond the individual and identify
those experiences that we all share. The more one engages with art, the more one grasps
our commonalities. When something is shared, it is no longer idiosyncratic: one now
trusts it for what it is. In this activity, there is an experience of growing familiarity: “The
joy of recognition is rather the joy of knowing more than is already familiar. In
recognition what we know emerges, as if illuminated, from all the contingent and
variable circumstances that condition it; it is grasped in its essence. It is known as
something” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 113). In our experience of the world, there is a
rush of phenomena that we can never entirely trap: there is just too much to process;
however, some of it does acquire meaning and some of it is understood, if not
completely. In our perception, the world is already understood, at least up to a point. Art
is a part of this process: “Recognition always implies that we have come to know
something more authentically than we were able to do when caught up in our first
encounter with it. Recognition elicits the permanent from the transient. It is the proper
function of […] art in general to accomplish this” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the
Beautiful 47). In art, our experiences of the world are reflected: in order to understand
what is there in the artwork, we indubitably relate it to our own lives. In this action, the
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contingent elements are removed, no longer depending on the individual situation, now
part of a structure that relies on nothing but itself and therefore cannot be false.
An artwork is an avenue to truth because it depends on nothing but itself. It is its
own self-enclosed world that creates the terms of its own existence. In an artwork, we
recognize the way things are because our own experience of the world is similar: it too is
a self-enclosed whole that admits no outside verification. Gadamer describes this
character of art in a similar fashion: “art is present whenever a work succeeds in elevating
what it is or represents to a new configuration, a new world of its own in miniature, a new
order of unity in tension” (“Art and Imitation” 103). We turn to art because it is
permanent while still including change within itself: the work of art demands that its
experience take place through time and in this undertaking the participant strives to allow
the artwork to be what it is; it is an attempt that is always an approximation; the artwork
makes a normative claim and we are beholden to this claim, but the exact parameters are
never clear and they fluctuate with the passage of time. This balancing act, this mediation
between the permanent and the transient, this attempt to accommodate identity and
difference—all of this is part of our experience of the world. In art, we get the chance to
engage with particulars; instead of something diffuse, we encounter something concrete:
it is there and it is intentional and it is self-sufficient. An artwork is self-sufficient when
everything belongs, everything is in its right place and in its right order: its truth cannot
be refuted. The world of the artwork and the world of lived experience conflate.
In the same breath, Gadamer discusses the symbolic character of art. To discuss
the symbolic is similar to discussing the role of recognition in art. Yet, discussing the
symbolic can provide its own clues and can yield a more nuanced picture of the nature of
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art. In all cases, the point of art is to recognize the way things are and to become more
familiar with the nature of the world; when something is recognized, it is understood for
what it is; by engaging with art, one’s overall experience of the world is related to the
particulars of the artwork, which, by nature, is complete and entire, with no loose ends.
When we experience art, this feeling of completeness is transferred to one’s own
understanding. For a second, the world, in all of its complexity, is unified:
For our experience of the symbolic in general, the
particular represents itself as a fragment of being that
promises to complete and make whole whatever
corresponds to it. Or, indeed, the symbol is that other
fragment that has always been sought in order to complete
and make whole our own fragmentary life. […t]he
experience of the beautiful, and particularly the beautiful in
art, is the invocation of a potentially whole and holy order
of things, wherever it may be found (The Relevance of the
Beautiful 32).
We turn to art in order to find meaning, so that the different, distinct elements of life
might fit together. As we live with art, its truth asserts itself, a declaration that is
undeniable and overwhelming; in the experience, we gain insight that we would not gain
in any other way. That is, the meaning of the artwork is included within itself, yet that
very meaning is only understandable when related to the matrix of possible meanings;
furthermore, one could say that the artwork changes the contours of possibility, for it
presents something that had, up to that instant, not been considered or recognized:
We typically encounter art as a unique manifestation of
truth whose particularity cannot be surpassed. The
significance of the symbol and the symbolic lay in this
paradoxical kind of reference that embodies and even
vouchsafes its meaning. Art is only encountered in a form
that resists pure conceptualization. Great art shakes us
because we are always unprepared and defenseless when
exposed to the overpowering impact of a compelling work.
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Thus the essence of the symbolic lies precisely in the fact
that it is not related to an ultimate meaning that could be
recuperated in intellectual terms. The symbol preserves its
meaning within itself (Gadamer, The Relevance of the
Beautiful 37).
By being there at all, the artwork is an impetus for further explanation, for one can never
exhaust the particularity of each individual artwork; the artwork both refers to something
else and includes its reference within itself.
Art is a medium of truth, insight and meaning that is unique and irreplaceable. It
is capable of all of these accomplishments because we are tuned to engage with art—it is
a part of who we are and how we understand: art and being necessarily belong together,
each reflecting the other. So when Gadamer says that art “resists pure conceptualization,”
this statement should also be applicable to human being. If one thinks about how we
understand, then it is easy enough to defend this position: for it is true that everything
cannot be understood; when some things are brought to our attention, others are left in the
background, unavoidably so. Here, Gadamer’s words prove useful: “precisely what is
exhibited in the work of art ought to constitute the essence of Being itself. The conflict
between revealment and concealment is not the truth of the work of art alone, but the
truth of every being, for as unconcealedness, truth is always such an opposition of
revealment and concealment. The two belong necessarily together” (“The Truth of the
Work of Art” 107). An artwork does present something, but what it is exactly can never
be completely determined. In this manner, we are asked to balance and unify, to identify
the artwork while admitting that this identity is variable and in flux; in each encounter,
the meaning of the artwork shifts because each constituent component only matters as
each relates the one to the other, a constellation of meaning that is dynamic and fluid; the
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experience becomes an exercise in revision and unification. In art, there is an
indeterminacy that is part of its definition, requiring that the participant interpret:
something is there, but that thing includes difference within itself. Life is not so different.
In life, we are not sure about the meaning of things either. Yes, truth asserts itself, but as
we come to know more, the mystery of things also becomes more apparent:
“interpretation seems to be a genuine determination of existence rather than an activity or
intention” (Gadamer, “Composition and Interpretation” 71). In all cases, interpretation is
a part of existence and we engage with art to equip ourselves in this effort.
We can never know everything: we already know something and this orientation
determines the questions we ask and all that we might consider. In this, we are bound to a
moment and a situation. The act of interpretation is a working-out, a consideration of all
those factors and elements that are determinative; it is an incompletable process and one
with no final answer, for those things that shape our questions and the very act of
interpretation can never be entirely accounted for. This is the case for the interpretation of
existence and of art. The final truth, the root cause, the source—these will never be
grasped: our blind spots, our incessant movement, this whirl that envelops us—these
ensure our need for interpretation; this search for balance requires our attention, effort
and engagement. As we consider the different elements—of all that is—we come to
recognize and understand, a coherence and meaning assert themselves and the relations
are further understood in all of their complexity and nuance: in all, the world becomes
more. Yet, as the world becomes more the true complexity and mystery of things
becomes more noticeable also. For as we understand more, we become more aware of
everything that we do not understand. With any assertion, the world is pictured at a
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certain angle: more can and needs to be said in order to account for the one-sidedness of
each statement. The meaning of life, then, or of art, is never final. As we engage with life
and art, the entire structure—the overall meaning—alters as we enter further into the
structure: the whole changes with the parts and the parts change with the whole. In each
moment, the meaning is new:
To be sure, correct knowledge is made possible by the
openness of the there. The beings that come forth out of
unconcealedness present themselves for that which
preserves them. Nevertheless, it is not an arbitrary act of
revealing, an act of theft, by which something is torn out of
concealedness. Rather, this is all made possible only by the
fact that revealment and concealedness are an event of
Being itself. To understand this fact helps us in our
understanding of the nature of the work of art. There is
clearly a tension between the emergence and the sheltering
that constitute the Being of the work itself. […] Its truth is
not constituted simply by laying bare its meaning, but
rather by the unfathomableness and depth of its meaning
(Gadamer, “The Truth of the Work of Art” 107).
In life and in art the act of interpretation is required. In each case, the meaning shifts as
we know more and differently. Art demands interpretation and it is part of its identity that
it changes—becomes itself—as we change.
The interaction between the participant and the artwork is dynamic; related to this
dynamism and contributing to it is the manner in which the participant experiences the
artwork: instead of moving in one direction until reaching the end, instead of consuming
the artwork so that all of its riches are acquired, the artwork requires that the participant
encounter it on its own, autonomous time. Concerning the temporal dimension of art,
Gadamer has this to say: “the work of art is […] determined by its own temporal structure
rather than by the quantifiable duration of its existence through time” (The Relevance of
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the Beautiful 43). In its occurence, the artwork has its own time, one that contrasts with
our pragmatic, practical notion of time: instead of going forward, we tarry. In this case,
the artwork suspends our usual sense of time: in the interaction, there is no time other
than that of the artwork. The ideal feeling of time in the artwork is never quantifiable;
instead, it depends on the structure of the artwork, an attempt to allow the artwork to be
what it is at its most ideal; for our experience of time depends on rhythm and contrast;
here, once again, it is a question of the relation of parts to whole and whole to parts. The
proper tempo, then, depends on context: it is only within the context of the whole that the
proper time can be found. This account of time has two parts: for one, there is the tempo
of the performance, and for the other, the suspension of temporal duration. The two
cannot be parsed. The point here is that the proper tempo depends on the relation of one
moment to all of the other moments within the artwork; a sense for this relation, though,
depends on a willingness to go backwards and forwards, a recognition that these relations
are not fixed, changing in the experience itself. That is, in order to find the tempo
appropriate to the artwork, one must first experience the artwork as a whole, an
experience that is recursive and anticipatory; in this activity, there is a suspension of
durationality and directionality. The more one dwells with the artwork, then, the more it
reveals of itself:
The temporal dimension that is bound up with art is, in fact,
fundamental. In this tarrying the contrast with the merely
pragmatic realms of understanding becomes clear. The
Weile [the ‘while’ in Verweilen, tarrying] has this very
temporal structure—a temporal structure of being moved,
which one cannot describe merely as duration, because
duration means only further movement in a single
direction. This is not what is determinative in the
experience of art. In it we tarry, we remain with the art
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structure [Kunstgebilde], which as a whole then becomes
ever richer and more diverse. The volume increases
infinitely—and for this reason we learn from the work of
art how to tarry (Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation 77).
Through the autonomous temporality of the artwork, we learn that meaning cannot be
consumed and discarded, nor is there a final answer that we might someday capture;
instead, meaning appears in the interaction: the more we occupy the structure the more its
truth appears, the more we get a sense for the component parts and their relations. In the
experience of art and, more specifically, in the act of tarrying we gather that meaning is
inexhaustible and infinitely complex; with each new moment it becomes something else
and it is our task to account for this—an act of intent that slips between our fingers but
still leaves a trace, renewal and prophecy in tandem.
This temporal experience of art is universal. It applies to all mediums of art. But
the specific concern of this project is literature and its identity. When one reads literature,
one tarries; the connotations and complexity of meaning in movement also, always
demanding more of the reader. But literature is not exactly the same as art either; it is
different in that language is the root and measure of literature; of course, art depends on
language, too, for art is always an experience of meaning, but other art forms are one step
removed from language. Therefore, according to Gadamer, literature occupies a special
and privileged position in the pantheon of the arts: instead of engaging perception which
then leads to an experience of (in)determinate meaning, literature engages our
linguisticality—in it we confront the reference and discourse contained within
language—all that language can accomplish. That is, through our linguisticality we
proclaim the identity of the world: something comes to being that was never before and
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the world becomes something else as it is described. Literature depends directly on this
linguisticality and art too, but art is a result of how we understand the world and define it;
literature clears the way for art and is a model for it too: “Heidegger asserts that the
essence of art is poeticizing. What he means is that the nature of art does not consist in
transforming something that is already formed or in copying something that is already in
Being. Rather, art is the projection by which something new comes forth as true. The
essence of the event of truth that is present in the work of art is that ‘it opens up an open
place’” (Gadamer, “The Truth of the Work of Art” 108-9). The commonality between
poetry and art is undeniable. Poetry serves as a model for art because it transforms the
world: our sense for the identity of the world depends on language and poetry engages
this process of definition. Art is like poetry in that it too transforms its subject; even if its
medium is not language, it is on its way to language: both art and poetry present
something as something, but the exact meaning is never certain; one returns to the
artwork again and again, aware that its truth is new each time.
All that has been said about art up to this point also applies to literature. But it is
also true that literature belongs to a special category. It belongs to the domain of
language. Literature lies at the intersection of art and language. At this point, then, it is
worth returning to our analysis of language and what it means that we have language. Put
simply, it is impossible to separate meaning from language or understanding from
language. That is, we grow up and acquire a language and this is not a conscious effort:
before we even notice, the names of things have staked their claim. This is our
relationship to language, then: it is unconscious and we are oriented to the content of the
discourse instead of the details of grammar or syntax; as we use language, we only notice
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the meaning. The literary work of art engages this aspect of our linguisticality—that in
language we come to know the world as it is:
When we grow up in a language, the world is brought close
to us and comes to acquire a certain stability. Language
always furnishes the fundamental articulations that guide
our understanding of the world. It belongs to the nature of
familiarity with the world that whenever we exchange
words with one another, we share the world. The word of
the poet does not simply continue this process of
Einhausung, or ‘making ourselves at home.’ Instead it
stands over against this process like a mirror held up to it.
But what appears in the mirror is not the world, nor this or
that thing in the world, but rather this nearness or
familiarity in which we stand for a while. This standing and
this nearness find permanence in the language of literature
and, most perfectly, in the poem (Gadamer, “On the
Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 115).
Literature is able to promote awareness and insight because it depends on nothing but
language. When confronted with a poem or a novel, the reader comprehends that
language is all that there is and this pushes the reader to wonder about the identity of
language. Why is language so captivating? How is it so self-reliant? A reflexive action
occurs: the reader wonders about the meaning of the words in a poem and subsequently
relates those words to their meaning in life. Here the reader becomes aware that the world
changes as his or her ability to describe it changes; the meaning of the poem depends on
language and the meaning of life depends on language: in each, there is no other measure;
in engaging with a poem, we engage with it as a coherent whole and attempt to
understand some overall meaning—the same too with life. In life, language is decisive,
but it has already asserted its dominion before we even notice—the world has already
been born.
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The literary work of art means something that matters, but the exact meaning is
ambiguous and many-sided; the words vanish into their meaning, but reappear because
the meaning includes difference; here we have no option but to return to the words. In the
literary work of art each word is unique and irreplaceable, the overall meaning and effect
depending on the combination of words, with each word contributing; if one word were
substituted, the text would be something else: “In poetry, there is no longer a gap within
the act of meaning: what becomes represented in language bears witness to more than
mere linguistic mastery. An enigmatic form of the non-distinction between what is said
and how it is said gives to art it specific unity and facility and so, too, its own manner of
being true” (Gadamer, “The Eminent Text and Its Truth” 10). Each word, then, is vital:
each carries its own unique meaning, so unique that we notice how the meaning depends
on nothing but itself. We notice that each word bears its own fruit, its own insight, each
word reveals something different: in a literary text each word guarantees its own validity.
In a literary text language depends on nothing but itself and it is this aspect of its
identity that is most decisive for this discussion. A literary text engages our
linguisticality—that we have language at all. In a literary text we take notice of how we
typically use language: we normally use language to express an idea, while still aware
that the same idea can be expressed any number of different ways. Language in a literary
text, though, is different. In it, each word resists being taken up into a discourse with a
straightforward meaning; in this process, we are reminded of the potential
accomplishments of language: language, in and of itself, can shape how we understand.
We are reminded of this influence when we encounter literary works of art: “In this kind
of text language emerges in its full autonomy. Here language just stands for itself; it
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brings itself to stand before us, whereas normally its words are taken over by the
intention in the speech and then after being used are just left behind” (Gadamer,
“Reflections on my Philosophical Journey” 39). Here, Gadamer’s argument depends on
the contrast between how we typically use language (where the meaning is
straightforward and seemingly unambiguous) and the status of language as it exists in the
literary work of art (where the language resists a straightforward meaning, each word in
play with the other, the final meaning never settled). In the literary work of art, each word
carves out a space for itself. In language, there is an orientation to meaning and naming
that cannot be escaped: as each word appears, the possibility of every other word is
shaped; there is a natural progression, an inescapable coherence that shapes both the
reader and writer—both strive for the feeling that each word fits, the parts and the whole
in harmony. Gadamer expresses this idea in the following manner:
In a literary work, a peculiar tension is generated between
the directedness to meaning inherent in discourse and the
self-presentation inherent in its appearance. Every part of
speech, every member, every individual word that submits
to the unity of meaning in the sentence, represents in itself
also a kind of unity of meaning insofar as through its
meaning something meant is evoked. So far as the word
issues forth from the play within its own unity and does not
function merely as a means of conveying the meaning of
the discourse as a whole [Redesinn], to that extent the
multiplicity of meaning within the word’s own naming
power is allowed to unfold (“Text and Interpretation” 43).
A literary work needs nothing but words and this self-legitimation highlights the
accomplishments of words and how we use them. A literary work of art is so important
and compelling because, as Gadamer says, “what the word evokes is there” (“On the
Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 113). Each word, then, has its own weight
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and body and presence, demanding to be accounted for. The more the words are valued,
the more impactful the literary work of art: as each word is respected, the reader is
seduced. With the appearance of the first word, a direction has been chosen, and every
other word depends on this beginning. The success of the literary artwork, then, depends
on this interplay of words, the ability of the words to relate to one another, so that each
word is magnified, felt, only there because of the exact combination: “a word becomes a
poetic word […] because of the power of ‘realization’” (“On the Contribution of Poetry
to the Search for Truth” 112). A poetic word hinges on the fact that it relies on other
words. It is only when the appropriate combination is brought together that the words
truly shine and are most truly themselves; it is only in this context that the connotations
and complexities of words are at their most productive. Furthermore, it is in literature that
the evocative character of language is at its most potent. In literature, we are seduced by
the words and the world they create; this world, though, can be new and different, the
words themselves the only measure; if they belong, then the world they picture has
become what it is.
Yes, the literary work of art depends on nothing but our own experience of
language and this event of language cannot be separated from our contact with the world.
When we engage with a poem we grapple with the names of things and what it means
that things have names. In being named, the world has already been identified for what it
is: a poem takes advantage of this situation, using these words that we all know, mining
our familiarity with the world, and asks us to reconsider what this familiarity means.
Based on this familiarity, we define the world as it is and test and verify its nature. But
any perception, any positing at all, has already been shaped by language—in the
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questions asked, there is still mystery. Poetry takes notice of this aspect of language and
runs with it. It recognizes that the words are alive and pushes to invigorate them with
possibility. In this case the only legitimation required is the corroboration of other words:
“It is a saying that says so completely what it is that we do not need to add anything
beyond what is said in order to accept it in its reality as language. The word of the poet is
autonomous in the sense that it is self-fulfilling. The poetic word is thus a statement in
that it bears witness to itself and does not admit anything that might verify it” (Gadamer,
“On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 110). To the extent that the
words belong, there is insight. Here the words are combined in new and different ways,
yet their aim is to express a meaning that is understandable and coherent. Although the
words might be unexpected or surprising, they still matter because they congeal to make
a completed whole. And this completed whole is a kind of mirror held up to the
(in)completed whole of our experience in life, the one reflecting the other. In both, the
world is alive and so are its words, nothing verifiable, everything there to be created, all
in search of fulfillment.
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CHAPTER 4
GADAMER ON DIALOGUE

Up to this point I have discussed the roles of language, art and literature in
hermeneutic ontology. Implicit in these concepts and central to their understanding is the
concept of dialogue. In each—whether in language, art or literature—a dialogue takes
place. It might be between two people or between a person and an artwork or a person
and a text. Whatever the case, a mediation occurs and something new comes to be. In all,
it is a matter of negotiating the polarities of familiarity and strangeness: there is always a
point of contact, a shared world; yet, at the same time, we, each of us, are individuals,
particular, different and unique. As each person engages with meaning, that meaning
acquires more nuance, in that the meaning applied to the situation adjusts to the moment
and alters the very situation itself. The mutual world is the subject matter, up for debate,
and this world is dynamic. Each dialogue is an opportunity, a chance to confront the
moment and assimilate, an occasion to test one’s presuppositions and sort out the true
ones from the false. We are all caught in a situation and it is impossible to step outside
one’s situation, but in encountering the other we might see our circumstance with greater
clarity, even if it will always remain a partial view. And in understanding our own point
of view we might interpret better, for we belong to that which we interpret; we are
participants in the meaning of the world.
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In a dialogue our commonality is the topic, a world to which we each belong—
one that we know intuitively. The world already means something to us and it is this
significance that shapes how and what we understand. Before we are even aware of it the
world and its meaning has already been born. It is the linguistically constituted world that
is brought into play when in dialogue. Each participant belongs to a shared world and it is
only on the basis of this belongingness that the world might be further differentiated.
Dialogue rests on a common understanding that includes difference within itself. As it is
the same world that seeks further definition, both members submit to its truth, with
neither member in possession of it entirely. Each person has his or her particular horizon
and is unable to see beyond it. It is this very horizon that determines what we think and
know. But this means that it is impossible to know what we know. As a way of testing
our horizons and expanding our horizons, as a means of breaking up our narrowness and
bias, we enter into dialogue. In doing so our horizon is put to the test: in dialogue it is the
law of the subject matter that gains ascendancy. Neither member of the dialogue is in
control; both parties submit to the dialogue and no one knows the potential result. The
orientation to meaning is so great that the dialogical participants are possessed by it. As
each are drawn to the same truth without being able to express it in its totality, both are in
a process of movement towards fulfillment, even if it is never entirely attainable. The
means of doing so is dialogue. Dialogue is necessarily hermeneutical: the world is
interpreted and becomes what it is. The truth of the subject matter asserts itself and seeks
further clarification: “The nature of the hermeneutical experience is not that something is
outside and desires admission. Rather, we are possessed by something and precisely by
means of it we are opened up for the new, the different, the true” (Gadamer, “The
113

Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 9). In dialogue each member is possessed by
the commonality of the world, a belongingness that strives for transcendence. As we
cannot escape our orientation to meaning, dialogue inheres a loss of self-possession and
self-control:
The basic constitution of the game, to be filled with its
spirit—the spirit of buoyancy, freedom and the joy of
success—and to fulfill him who is playing, is structurally
related to the constitution of the dialogue in which
language is a reality. When one enters into dialogue with
another person and then is carried along further by the
dialogue, it is no longer the will of the individual person,
holding itself back or exposing itself, that is determinative.
Rather, the law of the subject matter is at issue in the
dialogue and elicits statement and counterstatement and in
the end plays them into each other. Hence, when a dialogue
has succeeded, one is subsequently fulfilled by it
(Gadamer, “Man and Language” 66).
In the end, we can either account for this loss of control and include it in our
understanding or we can think we are in control and fail in our understanding,
undermined. Because we cannot help but understand, dialogue is an opportunity for
fulfillment, to become what we might be. As a result, we understand better, for the
uniqueness of the other demands that we accommodate his or her individuality, the world
now assimilated more fully and with more recognizable contours.
In the dialogical exchange, the participants attempt to overcome the one-sidedness
of the other. Each assertion demands a counterbalance. All are embraced by possible
truth while unable to express everything that is possible: “Most astonishing about the
essence of language and conversation is that I myself am not restricted by what I believe
when I speak with others about something, that no one of us embraces the whole truth
within his beliefs but that the whole truth can, however, embrace us both in our
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individual beliefs” (Gadamer, “What is Truth?” 46). The whole truth does embrace us
despite our individuality: we participate in dialogue in order to overcome our
idiosyncrasies and discover the universal. In submitting to dialogue, we do so in an effort
to glean what is common; the particularity of each blends into greater understanding:
“Neither partner alone constitutes the determining factor; rather, it is the unified form of
movement as a whole that unifies the fluid activity of both. We can formulate this idea as
a theoretical generalization by saying that the individual self, including his activity and
his understanding of himself, is taken up into a higher determination that is really the
decisive factor” (Gadamer, “On the Problem of Self Understanding” 54). We are so
attuned to the contentions of the other that we respond and reply before we are conscious
of it: both members sublate his or her individuality to a greater truth.
As an example of dialogue, I have chosen to highlight my interaction with
Virginia Woolf’s novels. To begin with, I both belong to the same world as Woolf and
our worlds are different. Before making any overt attempt to interpret or overcome
difference I already understand her novels (to a certain degree) in a self-evident manner:
her world is linguistically constituted and so is mine. It is only on the basis of this
unconscious congeniality that I might ask questions and identify the productivity of this
dialogue. My aim is to recognize what the words mean, but they only mean anything
within the specific context of the present moment. This moment and my individuality will
shape what I understand. Of course I might bring in anticipations to the reading that are
erroneous. It is only on the basis of the reading process itself that I might notice the
falsehood of these anticipations. This mediation of transparency and obscurity leads to an
interrogation, a means of confronting what is there in the text: “The real power of
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hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable” (Gadamer, “The
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 13). As I probe Woolf’s novels something is
comprehended but this knowledge will only be made secure when I ask how I
understand: one should “try to say how one understands” (Gadamer, Gadamer on Celan
144). When one reads a literary work he or she carries his or her world into the text and
this is inescapable: it is the reader’s task to recognize this mediation and account for it.
But it is only on the basis of the linguistically constituted world that the reader
understands anything at all. In order to understand what is there, we must confront our
interpretation, our own world. It is, however, only on the basis of the text itself that we
confront our presuppositions, our language. And before any attempt to include any
supplemental knowledge in the reading it is the language of the literature and of the
interpreter that is decisive:
No reader can understand without specialties, and yet every
reader only understands when the specialty of the occasion
is sublated by the universality of occasionality. This means
that the poem does not bring to language a specific, unique
occurrence known only to witnesses or those enlightened
by the poet directly. It means that every reader can respond
to what the language gesture conjures up, as if it were an
offer. All readers must supplement what they can perceive
in a poem on the basis of their own experience (Gadamer,
Gadamer on Celan 134).
Each reader should understand based on the language of the text itself, but this means that
the text will be understood differently (because of the reader’s particularity) and it is his
or her responsibility to account for this friction. And there is a considerable amount of
difference. The reference of the language in Woolf’s novels and my world are
undoubtedly in tension and this variance should be overcome as much as possible. But it
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is only on the basis of the meaning of the text and its demands that I should bring in any
supplemental knowledge to my interpretation.
As a male born in Louisville, Kentucky in 1983 I belong to a very different world
than that of Virginia Woolf. However, I would contend that (to a considerable extent)
mine is an inherited world—in many ways similar to that of Virginia Woolf’s: many of
the precepts and foundations of my cultural world have their grounding in the epochchanging era of Woolf. A figurehead of British Modernism, Woolf and her fiction
engaged many of the same questions with which we still wrestle. Her era and her fiction
saw fit to challenge many of the stale notions of the past: in Modernism there was a
radical questioning of all that was taken for granted. Interpretation took center stage and
many writers, intellectuals and artists sought a new grounding for interpretation. Instead
of a static world whose meaning was there to be discovered and mapped out, these
thinkers saw that the world and its meaning depended on our interaction with it—
interpretation and meaning were dynamic and in movement. There was no certainty and
there was no accepted truth. It was up to the individual to ground his or herself and find
firm footing. This continues to be our task up to the present day: “the change from
Modernism to postmodernism is not a difference in metaphysic so much as a different
stage in the digestion of the same metaphysic” (Bell, 9). But what are the precepts of
Modernism? What alternative did writers like Virginia Woolf provide? First of all,
Modernism was an era of crisis. The thinkers of the era saw that the grounding and
foundation of civilization was untenable. The world had descended into violence and
chaos, hierarchical, power-hungry and exploitative. There was no solidarity; there was no
community; many did not see themselves in each other nor recognize the value of shared
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existence. Woolf belonged to this world: where she was less just because she was a
woman; a world of colonial powers exploiting the subjugated in order to amass land,
wealth and prestige, an existence far too familiar with the ravages of war. These crises
prompted the writers and artists of the day to seek out new language, new forms—
creations that might promote community and solidarity, an awareness of one’s collective
plight:
This century had scarcely grown used to its name, before it
learned the twentieth would be the epoch of crisis, real and
manufactured, physical and metaphysical, material and
symbolic. The catastrophe of the First World War, and
before that, the labor struggles, the emergence of feminism,
the race for empire, these inescapable forces of turbulent
social modernization were not simply looming on the
outside as the destabilizing context of cultural Modernism;
they penetrated the interior of artistic invention (Levenson,
2).
For these artists, there was a sense that the world had been led to crisis because of a lack
of imagination; people too easily obeyed orthodoxy: because people did not contribute to
their own meaning there was no sense for the power and profundity of what the world
might be as a participant in its very creation. In creating new forms, the Modernist artists
challenged the populace to think in new ways: “they all knew themselves to be engaged
in forms of creative violence. For these figures the aim could never be simply to set the
imagination free; it was rather first of all to challenge an unfreedom, the oppressions of
journalism, of genteel audiences, of timid readers, of political and religious orthodoxy”
(Levenson, 2). In the case of Woolf, who acutely felt the strictures of oppression on a
daily basis, she turned to the novel as a weapon of liberation. The novel at this point had
enjoyed a long tradition and was generally considered to be an unbiased record of the
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relations between people, straightforward and clear. Novels were generally understood to
be transparent, the meaning the same no matter the reader. Woolf herself enjoyed and
participated in this tradition, but she came to realize that the traditional novel no longer
sufficiently probed the questions of the new era. As a response, Woolf mined this
tradition in order to turn it inside out, so that the readers were forced to participate, to
engage with meaning and interpret: “The response of [Woolf] to a dominant literary
culture lies in breaking with a literary tradition by totally immersing herself within it, at
once appropriating it and interrogating it” (Herrmann, 2).
The aim was liberation but this also meant a new freedom and a new
responsibility. If people were no longer told what to think, then each had to interpret. In
the Modernist era, “the question of interpretation lies at its heart” (Bell, 9). Science itself
was even challenged as people came to realize that the conclusions of science are a result
of the questions asked, depending on the observer and the conditions of the experiment:
“science does not ‘explain’ the workings of the universe, it merely describes what
happens in given conditions” (Bell, 11). The Modernist thinkers recognized that the
meaning of the world relies on each one of us and is different for every individual. Even
the transparency of history was challenged. History was now seen as an interpretive
discipline: the historian no longer merely described what happened in the past, but
instead interpreted the past based on the interests of the present moment and the historical
pressure that shapes the historical question: “The prestige of historicism was undermined
by the questioning of the scientific model, for the word history refers both to the
unimaginably vast process of events making up collective human life and to the
interpretive discipline through which it is understood” (Bell, 14).
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As the primary grounding of our access to the world, language was given a
special priority in the thought of Modernists. They saw language as a “construction
within a void” (Bell, 12). One might prioritize engagement with language and as
recompense one might feel at home instead of alienated or lost. One could build a world
that belongs to the builder, understandable because personal: “rather than describing or
reflecting the world, language was now seen to form it” (Bell, 16). But language, of
course, is not something that anybody can control, shaping our knowledge, ultimately
unfathomable. Language is inseparable from what it means to be. As a way of engaging
this self-created world and our interpretive responsibility, art acquired a special role in
this matrix. It was considered to be “an intuition of Being” (Bell, 29). Art was a means of
engaging our interpretive faculties and confronting our self-created world. Art was there
and it was irrefutable, directly engaging our existence and demanding interpretation, part
of our perception and understanding of the world. In the pantheon of art, literature was
accorded a special category. Literature accomplished everything that art could, but it also
directly involved the participant’s linguisticality, forcing the reader to confront the role of
language in his or her life and to face existential questions that could not be confronted in
any other manner: the Modernists placed “an especially primordial philosophical burden
upon imaginative literature, […in it] the active means of questioning and discovering
fundamental values, truths, and understandings for which there was no alternative
grounding” (Bell, 29). In literature, there was an opportunity to understand the world as it
might be, a world in which the reader participated in its very creation.
As a reader of Woolf’s novels, I too am a participant in their meaning. This
participation is possible because the same truth embraces myself and Woolf (incarnate in
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her novels) even if it is impossible to entirely commune with it. We are oriented to this
truth and this orientation defines our very existence. It is in our nature to understand and
to seek further understanding. For its part, understanding is realized in language. Now,
because of time, language evolves and so does meaning. It is always the same world that
is named in language, but each moment is variable, and the language shifts as it describes
the world: always inherited, acquiring new resonances, the world becomes something
else as it is articulated, looking ahead to the future. When entering into dialogue this
orientation to understanding is decisive—it is what shapes the subject matter and the
language of the participants:
How is understanding possible? […U]nderstanding is not
just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but
the mode of being of Dasein itself. It is in this sense that the
term ‘hermeneutics’ has been used here. It denotes the
basic being-in-motion of Dasein that constitutes its finitude,
and hence embraces the whole of its experience of the
world. Not caprice, nor even an elaboration of a single
aspect, but the nature of the thing itself makes the
movement of understanding comprehensive and universal
(Gadamer, Truth and Method xxvii).
Because of time and change and individuality, our experience of the world is the
foundational concern, shaping all other questions.
We are oriented to understanding and this sense of significance is fluid.
Something is always understood but motion pushes us to revise and adjust, our angle of
vision now something else. No matter what, we use language and our words are an
interpretation of the world: “Our starting point is that verbally constituted experience of
the world expresses not what is present-at-hand, that which is calculated or measured, but
what exists, what man recognizes as existent and significant” (Gadamer, Truth and
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Method 452). The raw material that we take to be distinct from our understanding
actually belongs to it, for once something is given a name and included in our discourse,
it belongs to a context that shapes it while also shaping the context, ensnared in a web of
meaning. For our linguistically constituted world defines the nature of something in the
first place, belonging to the interpretive concerns of the speaker: “Pure seeing and pure
hearing are dogmatic abstractions that artificially reduce phenomena. Perception always
includes meaning” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 80). Perception is irreducible from
meaning, so that the things of the world belong to its participants; the linguistic
understanding of things defines their identity: “Is the given not in fact the result of an
interpretation?” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 30).
We partake in dialogue to test our horizons and expand our horizons. Up to a
point, we already understand the world, but this understanding is provisional and is itself
the result of an interpretation. We participate in the hermeneutic process to secure our
understanding and to define the world a little more clearly. As the world is different with
each moment, every instant is an opportunity:
It is the world itself which is communicatively experienced
and continuously entrusted (Traditur) to us as an infinitely
open task. It is never the world as it was on its first day but
as it has come down to us. Always present when we
experience something, when unfamiliarity is overcome,
where enlightenment, insight, and appropriation succeed,
the hermeneutic process takes place in bringing something
into words and into the common consciousness” (Gadamer,
“Reflections on My Philosophical Journey” 29).
Now, the world itself can never be entirely possessed as it truly is because our own
hermeneutic situation is inescapable and this predicament shapes the understanding
process. As we read, it is our task to account for our outlook, to recognize that we belong
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to the very meaning of that which is understood. In the hermeneutic encounter, something
is understood, which leads to greater assurance and familiarity, and at the same time false
presuppositions are refuted because they are repudiated by this new, more complete
understanding.
In the encounter with tradition, in dialogue and in the hermeneutic process, we are
afforded the chance to have a better sense for the truth of things and our role in the
formation of this meaning. In each dialogical meeting we come to know more and to
understand better, but as this process occurs the nature and truth of the subject matter
morphs also: the more we understand the more want to account for our lack of
knowledge; the more that is said the more we notice everything that is unsaid. The act of
understanding includes interpretation within itself: as we belong to a situation and cannot
step out of our situation, we have the task of interpreting because each situation is
different—the interpreter brings his or her foreknowledge and foremeanings to the
subject matter and as he or she does so some of them are confirmed and some refuted;
that we have a situation at all is essential: the hermeneutic situation implies questions,
lack of knowledge and interpretation. To a significant degree, we already understand but
it is our opportunity and burden to further secure this understanding and refine it: “In all
human knowing of the world and in all orientation within the world the nature of the
moment of understanding has to be worked out” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My
Philosophical Journey” 28). This attempt, of course, is incompletable. Interpretation is
unavoidable: Gadamer points to “the inexhaustibility of the experience of meaning”
(“Text and Interpretation” 24). As we try to interpret the world certain aspects are
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highlighted and others fade into the background, unnoticed; and as we recognize certain
aspects this movement alters their meanings, as each relates the one to the other:
Interpretation shares in the discursiveness of the human
mind, which is able to conceive the unity of the object only
in successiveness. Thus interpretation has the dialectical
structure of all finite, historical being, insofar as every
interpretation seeks to supersede the one-sidedness which
that inevitably produces. […H]ermeneuetics has the task of
revealing a totality of meaning in all its relations. The
individuality of the sense intended corresponds to the
totality of all definitions (Gadamer, Truth and Method
476).
Every interpretation has to start somewhere and at a certain moment in time: this means
that each interpretation is limited in its own way. The success of an interpretation
depends on the interpreter’s ability to assimilate, include and account for this
shortcoming. In doing so, the accidental nature of interpretation might become a positive.
Each time we interpret, we have to adapt to the exact situation—which is always
different—if we hope to succeed: this means recognizing the situation and how it relates
to the subject matter and the overall meaning.
In every hermeneutic encounter we bring our own foremeanings, presuppositions
and prejudices into the process. And until we engage with the hermeneutic object we
have no way of sorting out the true, enabling prejudices from the false, distorting ones.
But once we become involved we begin to foreground our horizon against that of the
interpreted subject matter, to account for and overcome difference:
Let us consider what this idea of foregrounding involves. It
is always reciprocal. Whatever is being foregrounded must
be foregrounded from something else, which, in turn, must
be foregrounded from it. Thus all foregrounding also makes
visible that from which something is foregrounded. We
have described this above as the way prejudices are brought
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into play. We started by saying that a hermeneutical
situation is determined by the prejudices we bring with us.
They constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present,
for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 304-5).
We do not become aware of our own horizon until we encounter the horizon of the other
and in this meeting we acquire a more complete view, even if it remains partial.
There is no such thing as an objective interpretation; the world interpreted always
includes the concerns and horizon of the interpreter. The interpreter belongs to
understood meaning: “In all understanding an application occurs, such that the person
who is understanding is himself or herself right there in the understood meaning. He or
she belongs to the subject matter that he or she is understanding” (Gadamer, Gadamer in
Conversation 47). Whether we recognize it or not, something only means anything at all
because it means something to us. If we ignore our own role in interpretation then that
reading will come off as arid, stale, and lifeless. But if we include ourselves and account
for our role then the interpretation has the potential to be exciting, vigorous, insightful.
There are many occasions for dialogue; the most important and most basic
circumstance is conversation—the result of two individuals who share a world and yet
are different: when brought together each relies on a common ground on which more
might be understood. Another occasion for dialogue is the historical artifact. When one
encounters a historical artifact one is confronted with the task of interpreting it within the
entire narrative of history, to explain its place in the secuence. The historical artifact is
always the same but its meaning will change based on the interpreter. The historian
brings his or her own interests, concerns, points of view, and historical moment into the
interpretation. The interpreter cannot do otherwise. It is the interpreter’s job to account
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for the historical moment and his or her individuality and include it in the interpretation;
the past impinges on the present and the present impinges on the past. The interpreter
cannot move beyond history; it is only because of history that we understand anything at
all or have anything to say:
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long
before we understand ourselves through the process of selfexamination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way
in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus
of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of
the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of
historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual,
far more than his judgments, constitute the historical
reality of his being (Gadamer, Truth and Method 278).
In choosing to interpret history one is granted an opportunity: one might better
understand the context of being. That is, we inherit a moment and this point in time is the
result of a long tradition. This heritage—whether custom, artwork, language or text—has
been passed down through time: in some cases, like language, the tradition evolves and
changes; in others, it remains solid and permanent, as in an artwork or text. In the case of
custom or language, history has shaped its present iteration, always in process, adapting
to the moment. But in encountering history we might better understand where we come
from and how we might participate in our evolution. There is value in studying history:
the past decides who we are and in its study we might confront this formation instead of
accepting it unquestioningly.
Before we even realize it we already understand. When someone speaks to us we
understand. When we read a book we understand. When we view an artwork we
understand. We understand because it is always the same world that is presented, even
though its particulars change with the passage of time. So, too, when we study history we
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understand. But this meaning can be made secure. We can confront this significance and
try to think about what is being understood and how and why it is understood. In doing so
we might place this interpretation on firmer ground. This means that, more than anything,
the study of history is an attempt to comprehend the present moment, for history informs
the present moment and the present moment shapes how we understand history: “History
is only present to us in light of our futurity. Here we have all learned from Heidegger, for
he exhibited precisely the primacy of futurity for our possible recollection and retention,
and for the whole of our history” (Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical
Problem” 9). And the future is only accessible in light of our past. In the two, the future
and the past, there is a continuity: “Historical knowledge can be gained only by seeing
past in its continuity with the present” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 325). For its part,
this continuity is always an open question. The historian cannot go beyond his or her
historical situation and this means that there is always a mediation that the historian ought
to recognize. Each attempt to interpret history should be understood as a mediation: “The
truth is that historical understanding always implies that the tradition reaching us speaks
into the present and must be understood in this mediation—indeed, as this mediation”
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 325).
Historical interpretation implies a mediation between the interpreter and the
historical object and so too the interaction between the interpreter and an artwork. Art,
belongs under the rubric of dialogue or play; in it there is a loss of subjectivity in which
the subject matter gains ascendancy and determines the movements of the participants.
When we experience an artwork we lose control and the truth of the subject matter asserts
itself: “When a work of art truly takes hold of us, it is not an object that stands opposite
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us which we look at in hopes of seeing through it to an intended conceptual meaning. Just
the reverse. The work is an Ereignis—an event that ‘appropriates us’ into itself. It jolts
us, it knocks us over, and sets up a world of its own, into which we are drawn, as it were”
(Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation 71). Before we even know what we know the
artwork has already made its claim to truth. We are not in a position to possess the
meaning of an artwork before it has been experienced: if the experience of an artwork is
genuine then it will always surprise us and take us on a journey; in the artwork there is an
indeterminacy that provokes the participant, asking us to reevaluate our interpretive
process and overall understanding. We are drawn into the world of the artwork and in this
movement we become something else.
Dialogue in and of itself is a matter of mediating identity and difference. Play, for
its part, serves the same role. In play there is a regulation of movement that also includes
variation. This idea of regulated movement is essential. Once completed, an artwork is
self-same, it is there, and it is immutable. An artwork is intentional and it has an identity:
“It is clear here, especially in the phenomenon of repetition itself, that identity or selfsameness is intended” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 23). The artwork has a
definite identity because it regulates the interaction between itself and the interpreter:
“The function of the representation of play is ultimately to establish, not just any
movement whatsoever, but rather the movement of play determined in a specific way”
(Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 23). This movement of the play is determined
by the artwork, by its structure. An artwork, for its part, is meant to be a completed whole
in which each element interlocks. This is the nature of the artwork and part of its identity,
but the artwork also has the responsibility of accommodating itself to all potential
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participants, of anticipating the individuality and difference of all who might experience
the work. The artwork is made in anticipation of its experience: it engages fundamental
categories of perception and understanding, representing an attempt to acknowledge our
commonality. This unity, though, splits into individualities and differences as we enter
into concrete application and participation: “This definition of the work as the focal point
of recognition and understanding also means that such an identity is bound up with
variation and difference. Every work leaves the person who responds to it a certain
leeway, a space to be filled in by himself” (Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 26).
Our shared world includes a tension within itself that is inescapable. An artwork is a selfenclosed unity with no loose ends, yet this fulfillment is only possible because of the
person who experiences it. The participant is tasked with the completion of the artwork
so that it is unified, but success is only possible if the participant relates the world of the
artwork to his or her own world.
An artwork is so compelling because it belongs to our world and we belong to it,
but an artwork represents more than a faithful reproduction of reality. It is, instead, the
world transformed into a meaningful unity: “The mimetic is and remains a primordial
phenomenon in which it is not so much an imitation that occurs as a transformation”
(Gadamer, “Poetry and Mimesis” 121). Transformed into a new, coherent whole, the stuff
of perception is mined and becomes meaningful. Released from the contingency of
circumstance, the meaning of perception is placed within an overarching structure that is
intentional, thereby releasing it from the circumstance and allowing it to be there as it is,
true because it has found a home within the overall structure and significance of the
artwork: “Where something is recognized, it has liberated itself from the uniqueness and
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contingency of the circumstances in which it was encountered. It is a matter neither of
there and then, nor of here and now, but it is encountered as the very self-same. Thereby
it begins to rise to its permanent essence and is detached from anything like a chance
encounter” (Gadamer, “Poetry and Mimesis” 120). Essential to this discussion of
mimesis and transformation is the concept of recognition. In art, we recognize the way
things are: “there is no doubt that the essence of imitation consists precisely in the
recognition of the represented in the representation” (Gadamer, “Art and Imitation” 99).
Yes, it is through art that we become more familiar with the world, but part of this
improved understanding includes greater mystery. We are not able to completely possess
the meaning of an artwork, instead we tarry with the artwork and enter into its depths,
always understanding more and better, yet for this very reason pushed to ask more
questions as the exact correspondences and relations alter and adapt: “a work of art,
thanks to its formal aspect, has something to say to us either through the question it
awakens, or the question it answers” (Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation 71).
This entire discussion of dialogue hinges on the idea that language and meaning
have their origin in conversation. Before there was ever such a thing as a text or an
artwork, there were two people, each in the presence of the other, using gesture, facial
cues, and, most importantly, language to communicate. Before any words are uttered,
neither partner knows what exactly he or she wants to communicate: language blooms as
each encounters the other. We are oriented to language, to meaning, and we cannot do
otherwise. This model is decisive—precisely because it allows for question and response.
Every utterance is spoken within a definite context and it is the role of the conversation
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partner to clarify, ask questions, and place it within a broader horizon, so that its meaning
is more relatable and ultimately clearer:
“Now every single statement that we make acquires its
ultimate meaning (that is, what it says to someone) from
the question to which it supplies an answer. This is what I
call the hermeneutic character of speech: when we speak to
one another we do not so much transmit well-defined facts,
as place our own aspirations and knowledge into a broader
and richer horizon through dialogue with the other”
(Gadamer, “On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for
Truth” 106).
We have everything to gain by using language and participating in conversation. In
conversation we engage our very understanding of the world: our horizon shifts as the
dialogue progresses and as we converse with different people. Each time we actually try
to say something to someone, the world becomes something else. In point of fact, the
hermeneutic character of text and writing relies on this model of conversation: “What
characterizes a dialogue, in contrast with the rigid form of statements that demand to be
set down in writing, is precisely this: that in dialogue spoken language—in the process of
question and answer, giving and taking, talking at cross purposes and seeing each other’s
point—performs the communication of meaning that, with respect to the written tradition,
is the task of hermeneutics” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 361). This dialogical model is
so compelling because it places meaning under the rubric of transcendence. Each
statement can be clarified and expanded: more can always be said.
In any dialogue there is a loss of subjectivity; the participant’s horizon of
understanding shapes his or her subjective response. The participant submits to the
dialogue and it determines the responses of the participants; however, there is always free
will and choice. Instead of trying to fight this loss of subjectivity, the participant can
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make choices to harness this wave of meaning—by asking questions, by enquiring, what,
exactly, is happening. Like conversation, texts are also defined by dialogue. Conversation
itself guides the reading process. In a conversation the world is shared and further
defined: something comes out of it that neither participant can anticipate or predict.
Furthermore, the understanding that occurs in a conversation is not purely linguistic:
there are extra-linguistic cues that supplement and shape the understanding; the
participants have a sense for what is being conveyed but neither is able to exhaust the
articulation of this content. For its part, a text encompasses a communicative event in
which there is a hermeneutical distance. There is no opportunity for clarification and
there are no extra-linguistic cues. A text is pure language, autonomous and timeless. It is
the writer’s task to acknowledge this aspect of the text: to compose a text in such a way
that it communicates itself based on nothing but itself. The writer composes the text in
anticipation of its interpretation:
While in living conversation one tries to reach
understanding through the give-and-take of discussion,
which means that one searches for those words—and
accompanies them with intonation and gesture—that one
expects will get through to the other, in writing the
openness that is implied in seeking the words cannot be
communicated because the text is printed. Therefore a
‘virtual’ horizon of interpretation and understanding must
be opened in writing the text itself, one that the reader must
fill out (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 34).
This means that it is the writer’s responsibility to find and use language that is universal
and not idiosyncratic—to use language that represents our general relationship to the
world. And in order for a language to be universal it should also be applicable to each
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individual’s particular situation. In each application the language acquires greater nuance,
meaning and volume.
The text should be understandable in and of itself yet it should also apply to the
reader and his or her particular circumstance. Something is understood in the text, but
what, exactly, is debatable. The interpreter is trapped in a hermeneutic situation. Because
of this, all texts inhere an openness and indeterminacy that is unavoidable; it is the
reader’s task to account for this indeterminacy by asking questions and developing a
dialogue between the reader and the text: “When it is interpreted, written tradition is
brought back out of the alienation in which it finds itself and into the living present of
conversation, which is always fundamentally realized in question and answer” (Gadamer,
Truth and Method 362). In reading, the text becomes alive: the reader reads and
transforms the words into meaning. The interpreter, though, wants to respect the text as
much as possible and does not want his or her reading to be arbitrary; the text should be
understood as it is. But the text as it is depends on its enactment. The reader’s goal, then,
should be to recognize his or her role in the meaning of the text and to avoid all false
anticipations that obstruct the text as it is meant to be: “We who are attempting to
understand must ourselves make it speak. But we found that this kind of understanding,
‘making the text speak,’ is not an arbitrary procedure that we undertake on our own
initiative but that, as a question, it is related to the answer that is expected in the text.
Anticipating an answer itself presupposes that the question is part of the tradition and
regards himself as addressed by it” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 370).
A text always constitutes an answer to a question and the reader interprets with this
element in mind: he or she anticipates the content of the text based on the question to
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which it is an answer. Above all else, something is understood only because it is shared,
as each of us belong to a tradition and a world that is both understandable and
mysterious.
More than anything, dialogue represents a chance to acquire experience. As we
gain experience the world becomes more discernible, its outline colored in, more
nuanced, more textured, more vibrant. Also, part of the nature of experience is that with it
we get a sense for what the world is not: “Experience is a process. In fact, this process is
essentially negative” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 347). With each experience, we
broaden our horizons and the viewfinder becomes more focused; the essential relations of
things becomes clearer. Into each experience we bring certain expectations and these
anticipations inflect the nature of the event; with each experience certain expectations are
thwarted and this means that we are more prepared for further experience and its possible
yield; then, with the subsequent undertaking there are fewer distractions and misguided
anticipations. The upshot is that with each experience we become more open to—and
prepared for—further experiences, encounters that allow for the truth of the subject
matter to radiate:
The truth of experience always implies an orientation to
new experience. That is why a person who is called
experienced has become so not only through experiences
but is also open to new experiences. The consummation of
his experience, the perfection that we call ‘being
experienced,’ does not consist in the fact that someone
already knows everything and knows better than everyone
else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the
contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who,
because of the many experiences he has had and the
knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well
equipped to have new experiences and learn from them.
The dialect of experience has its proper fulfillment not in
134

definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that
is made possible by experience itself (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 350).
The experienced person is someone who knows what the world is not and because of this
has a better sense for what it is. What it is, of course, varies and belongs to each new
experience. And the experienced person seeks out experiences because he or she knows
that is his or horizon is limited and so is his or her knowledge; each new experience is a
chance to gain greater insight, so that further experiences are even more fruitful: “Insight
is more than the knowledge of this or that situation. It always involves an escape from
something that had deceived us and held us captive. Thus insight always involves an
element of self-knowledge and constitutes a necessary side of what we called experience
in the proper sense. Insight is something we come to. It too is ultimately part of the
vocation of man—i.e., to be discerning and insightful” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 35).
Through dialogue we acquire experience and through experience we become
discerning and insightful. Dialogue constitutes an experience because through it we get a
sense for our mistaken notions—because the dialogical partners must find common
ground and this means that the shared and the true are the valid. The result is a greater
openness to experience, an ability to share and recognize those elements that are binding
while still remaining receptive to potential meaning. Engagement with tradition is an
important means of gaining experience:
Hermeneutical experience is concerned with Tradition.
This is what is to be experienced. But tradition is not
simply a process that experience teaches us to know and
govern; it is language—i.e., it expresses itself like a Thou.
A thou is not an object; it relates itself to us. […T]he
relationship to the Thou and the meaning of experience
implicit in that relation must be capable of teaching us
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something about hermeneutical experience. For tradition is
a genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to it, as does
the I with a Thou (Gadamer, Truth and Method 352).
One gains experience when reading a text because one projects his or her world into the
text and not all of this world is valid or true. Some of it is mistaken. Until reading the
text, though, we do not know the extent to which our world includes falsehood. It is only
by reading the text and adhering to the text, by respecting the text and interpreting it
correctly—to allow it to be what it is at its most fully—that we come to realize the error
of our notions and the limitedness of our horizon; the text places its own demands and
refutes our expectations when they do not align with the text. All one can do is listen
intently and ask questions: “One intends to understand the text itself. But this means that
the interpreter’s own thoughts too have gone into re-awakening the text’s meaning. In
this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he
maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play
and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says”
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 390). It is the text itself that determines the validity and
truth of one’s horizon. Some of it is legitimate, but it is never perfect. It can be improved,
though, by engaging with the text and allowing the text to be the arbiter of validity—as
we put the text into our own words, it is the text itself that determines the legitimacy of
those words, forcing us to renounce certain expectations and include others that had been
previously ignored.
All that has been said about the text and dialogue also applies to the relationship
between the interpreter and the literary text, but the literary text belongs to its own special
category, for the literary text mines human being’s linguisticality and orientation to
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meaning; literature is, in fact, defined by our orientation to language. We grow up with
language and this unconscious acquisition determines the nature of what we understand.
Furthermore, each life is its own sort of whole, one that is coherent but still in search of
meaning and definition. Language is the means of confronting this entirety: each time we
use language, each word is only understandable in the context of the whole and the
context of the whole is understandable because of each word. It is a never-ending
dynamic process. However, the literary text represents a chance to engage with a
coherent unity that does not change. As is the case with life, the literary text is made up
of words, but these words are eminently coherent—each one links with the other—and
these words depend on nothing but themselves—each word discloses, presenting a web
of relationships and meaning that guarantees its truth. In life we are oriented to a whole
that is incomplete, a need for fulfillment that is made up of language; meanwhile, a
literary text allows us to engage with this language, but in this case the language is
complete in itself, able to constitute a meaningful unity, each word depending on the
other. A literary text represents self-fulfillment: “A poetic text is not like a sentence in the
ongoing flux of speech, but rather it is like something whole which lifts itself out of the
stream of speech that is flowing past” (Gadamer, “The Eminent Text and Its Truth” 6).
As the literary text is a unity that depends on nothing but language, it places unique
demands on the reader. The reader, too, has language but the interpreter’s language and
circumstance is necessarily different than that of the text. It is the reader’s challenge to
allow the literary text to be what it is by adapting it to his or her present situation. With
each reading, we want the text to be at its most coherent, so that it truly does fulfill itself,
but, at the same time, the interpreter must constantly adapt for this to happen. With each
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new moment, the interpreter understands differently: “No work of art addresses us always
in the same way. The result is that we must answer differently each time we encounter it.
Other susceptibilities, other attentivenesses, other openness in ourselves permit that one,
unique, single, and self-same unity of artistic assertion, to generate an inexhaustible
multiplicity of answers” (Gadamer, “Reflections On My Philosophical Journey” 44). The
artwork presents a challenge to the interpreter—one of revision and adaptation. It is a
fluid procedure: as each word combines it is a matter of looking forwards and backwards,
always seeking coherence, always forcing the reader to ask questions, never static. In
fact, the literary text includes the potential reader within itself, includes difference within
itself: “the literary text […] is simply accompanied by the interpreter’s constant cospeaking” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 46).
The interpreter is able to participate in the meaning of the literary text because of
the nature of language: the word says something—it has something to say. There is no
such thing as a word that does not say anything. The literary text, for its part, taps into
this aspect of language and takes full advantage. Instead of using language to describe a
verifiable state of affairs, it harnesses language to create its own world, its own truth.
Based on what each word says, every other word must cohere: “In literary texts the word
attains its highest coherence with the whole of the text (Gadamer, “On the Truth of the
Word” 149). In a literary text the words acquire extra value because they are
corroborated. Each word fulfills itself, depending on nothing but every other word: “The
word is true in the sense that it discloses, producing this self-fulfillment. The poetic word
suspends the positive and the posited as that which might serve to verify whether our
statement corresponds with what lies outside it” (Gadamer, “On the Contribution of
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Poetry to the Search for Truth” 112). In this case, in the context of dialogue and
interpretation, it is up to the reader to participate in this self-fulfillment, an act of
completion that includes the reader’s own linguisticality, a need to complete the text so
that it is what it is meant to be, an effort in which the language resounds even if there is
no final resolution.
The reader is a participant and it is up to the reader for the text to be itself. A text
is not a text unless it is meant to be read. This reading process, though, is variable and
dynamic. And it is precisely because of its variability that a text—and, in our case, a
literary text—represents such a tremendous opportunity. A literary text is always the
same, yet it includes within itself an infinite possibility of different interpretations.
However, there are good interpretations and bad ones too. It is the reader’s task to
understand what is there. But what is there depends on the reader, changing with each
reader and each moment. In order for an interpretation to be more correct, the reader has
no choice but to recognize and include his or her role in the active construction of
meaning. Each interpreter belongs to the meaning of that which he or she interprets:
There cannot, therefore, be any single interpretation that is
correct ‘in itself,’ precisely because every interpretation is
concerned with the text itself. The historical life of a
tradition depends on constantly being assimilated and
interpreted. An interpretation that was correct in itself
would be a foolish ideal that mistook the nature of
tradition. Every interpretation has to adapt itself to the
hermeneutical situation to which it belongs (Gadamer, “On
the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 112).
A text only means anything based on its overall context; this matrix of sense, however, is
mobile, twisting and widening, subject to unforeseeable contortions. The reader belongs
to this context and so does the text. It is up to the reader to identify where there is
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overlap, to recognize that the text belongs to an overall meaning that is shared. But it is
also the case that we do not know what we know, for everything we know is prior to—
and determines—everything we think we know. As a way of understanding better and
further and more, we read texts. In doing so we strive to interpret the text correctly:
thereby we discard misguided notions and falsehood. For a text represents a completed
whole, language at its most coherent and stable. We strive to enact this fulfillment and in
this act we recognize our own false presuppositions, for they do not accord with the
prescription of the text—that it fulfills itself:
The hermeneutical experience also has its own rigor: that of
uninterrupted listening. A thing does not present itself to
the hermeneutical experience without an effort special to it,
namely that of ‘being negative toward itself.’ A person who
is trying to understand a text has to keep something at a
distance—namely everything that suggests itself, on the
basis of his own prejudices, as the meaning expected—as
soon as it is rejected by the sense of the text itself
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 460).
It is the reader’s responsibility to listen intently because it is the text’s identity to achieve
maximum coherence; this completeness, though, depends on the reader recognizing how
the words mesh; this only happens when they are not distorted by the reader’s false
expectations; the reader senses that these anticipations are false when they do not gel with
the overall meaning of the text.
The reader occupies a situation and a text too. A literary text is identifiable and
stable but also productive of an endless quantity of interpretations. Each interpretation is
more correct when the reader recognizes his or her role in interpretation, that the text
depends on assimilation in order for it to be itself. But how does the reader avoid
arbitrary fancies? How does he or she secure the interpretive act? Here, it is up to the
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reader to accept that there is a fusion between the reader and the text and probe what this
means. The meaning of a text belongs to a context that includes the reader. To recognize
this context and identify it is part of the reader’s responsibility. This context, though, is
an open question, different for every reader. The only way that the reader can get a sense
for how and why the text means anything at all is to ask questions. In point of fact, in the
act of reading a literary text, the dialectic of question and answer never comes to a stop.
Every answer is motivated by the question to which it is an answer and every question
includes an answer within the confines of the question. A question is only a question
when it accepts certain givens while trying to open them up in a new direction: “Posing a
question implies openness but also limitation. It implies the explicit establishing of
presupossitions, in terms of which can be seen what still remains open” (Gadamer, Truth
and Method 357). Questions are absolutely vital because the world cannot be everything.
By asking questions one limits and defines the subject matter while opening it up for the
new. This nature of the question is applicable, of course, to the act of reading. A text only
has meaning because we anticipate its meaning. One is only able to anticipate meaning
by recognizing the specific subject matter of the text; the text does not concern
everything. And it is only as an answer to a question that the text resounds; the text
belongs to a context and it is within this context that the text makes sense. It is also true
that this act of anticipation leads to further questions. The text means something but it can
always mean more. By asking questions the reader gets a better sense for his or her role
in the act of meaning—the manner in which the reader belongs to the text and also a
technique for excluding false anticipations; the context for which a text has meaning is
forever open:
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Thus a person who wants to understand must question what
lies behind what is said. He must understand it as an answer
to a question. If we go back behind what is said, then we
inevitably ask questions beyond what is said. We
understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the
horizon of the question—a horizon that, as such,
necessarily includes other possible answers. Thus the
meaning of a sentence is relative to the question to which it
is a reply, but that implies that its meaning necessarily
exceeds what is said in it (Gadamer, Truth and Method
363).
If a reader understands a text as answer to a question then it follows that there are an
infinite number of possible answers to the question. The reader and the text play an equal
part in providing possible answers to the question. Furthermore, a question only has
meaning if we understand the presuppositions of the question. In order to determine the
presuppositions of the question, the reader then asks even more questions, so that its
meaning is contextualized. This act of contextualization does not cease because the
overall meaning is never rigid; the interaction between the reader and the text necessarily
remains open because of the unbridgeable distance between the two: “Understanding the
word of tradition always requires that the reconstructed question be set within the
openness of its questionableness—i.e., that it merge with the question that tradition is for
us” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 367). A text only has meaning because it addresses our
own experience; an experience that belongs to tradition but is also new and different.
We are able to understand a text because we belong to the same world as the text;
we try to enact the text at it most authentic and this act includes assimilating the text to
our own particular situation; this effort necessarily includes anticipating the content and
relating it to our own world; however, when the text does not align with our own
experiences and expectations, then our primary recourse is to ask questions. “The
142

negativity of experience implies a question. In fact we have experiences when we are
shocked by things that do not accord with our expectations. Thus questioning too is more
a passion than an action. A question presses itself on us; we can no longer avoid it and
persist in our accustomed opinion” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 360). Indeed, we cannot
help but ask questions, but the questions only sprout when we are engaged with the text.
It is our desire to bring the text to its original authenticity and this means that we ask
questions; we do so because our world is both the same and different as that of the text
and it is our aim to highlight this mediation—so that, instead of distortion, we achieve
communion. For when we read a literary text, when we have a hermeneutic experience,
we interrogate because our horizon has altered—the text is now seen from a new angle
and we want to understand the implications of this shift. By asking questions, then, we
further define the world and come closer to the truth. For each question already includes
true presuppositions and is an attempt to further sort out the true ones from the false: “All
dialectical negativity contains an adumbration of what is true” (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 460). We interpret as a result of our engagement with the text, as a means of
placing the text in the context of our interaction with it; it is a matter of having the right
expectations, of confirming certain anticipations and refuting others. In point of fact, all
meaning includes interpretation because all meaning is necessarily open, for all that is
said only has meaning as it relates to what might be said: “Nothing that is said has its
truth simply in itself, but refers instead backwards and forward to what is unsaid”
(Gadamer, “Man and Language” 67). Undoubtedly, we have no choice but to interpret,
but in asking questions we might further secure our interpretation; we might even inch a
little closer towards the truth of the world.
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CHAPTER 5
MRS. DALLOWAY

Tracing the rhythms of the day, Mrs. Dalloway highlights the variety of ways that
people experience one moment to the next. Illuminating the manner in which people are
oriented to understanding and fulfillment, this novel presents characters whose
perceptions and outlook are shaped by the need for resolution. Each character in the
novel has undergone a series of experiences that define his or her world: now, in the
midst of another day, these characters confront a sequence of moments in which they are
drawn to resolve the past with the present as it looks toward the future. Each character in
this novel has lived his or her particular story, one in which he or she developed binding
connections: first, with a mother and father, with family, and then, with the surrounding
community. Gadamer advises us that to interpret literature we recognize that the
characters’ first experiences of love and commonality are not conscious, but they
determine their orientation to the world. In this manner these characters learn to speak
and use language; the world begins to take shape. At the same time, when the world
seems to acquire its lasting appearance things continue to shift and change. Nevertheless,
there is something in these characters’ understanding that recognizes the possibility of
communion, of living in a world that belongs to them and to which they belong. At this
point, they turn to the people who matter most in their lives—those very people who were
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decisive in forming the world as it has become, those who inspire the very language that
shapes understanding—and remember that it is through them that the world becomes
meaningful; that it is at its most true when it is shared.
Mrs. Dalloway emphasizes the productive, unfathomable nature of relationships
and human interaction: the outcome of all dialogue, of all human interaction can never be
predicted. This interaction provides the impetus for language, meaning, and greater
understanding. It forces one to reassess and acknowledge one’s blind spots, to notice
those aspects of one’s horizon that that are mistaken. Mrs. Dalloway stresses that all
knowledge should be tempered with the knowledge that one does not know; more can
always be said and knowledge is limited. These, in fact, are central concerns of
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. In many ways, these ideas resonate with much of
the critical effort to interpret this novel, but they also undermine and transcend much of
the critique. For example, DiBattista correctly argues that concepts such as truth and
reality are elusive in Mrs. Dalloway: “The imaginative center, where truth and beauty,
life and death coexist as terms in the transparent equation of reality, eludes, as Mrs.
Dalloway dramatizes, the spirit’s grasp” ( 24). DiBattista’s analysis is appropriate—truth
and reality are, to a certain degree, elusive—but she fails to appreciate how, and in what
manner, they are accessible. For life is not entirely mysterious; there are moments of truth
and understanding too. Mrs. Dalloway explores this tension. In it are characters who seek
truth and make an effort to reach it. Although not always successful, the possibility is still
decisive. The actions and thoughts of these characters are oriented toward approaching
truth and understanding reality: these characters seek out interactions that will contribute
to this effort, interactions that determine truth and reality, terms that are dependent on
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engagement and participation. For his part, Ruotolo echoes this idea that the dynamic of
human relationships is decisive: “Typically for Woolf, human intercourse occurs on the
boundary of the mind’s knowledge, some obscure communion deeper than ideology and
more fundamental than sex” (114). Ruotolo is on the right track, but his analysis does not
fully consider the ontological consequences and implications of this “obscure
communion.” This concept of human connection is decisive, productive of meaning and
language, the very world of each character. Human relationships may be shrouded in
darkness, but they are still one’s primary avenue towards improved meaning and
understanding.
In Mrs. Dalloway we encounter characters who are entangled in time’s web: to a
considerable extent, each has already developed his or her outlook, his or her worldview,
but this day is a new day and, like any other, it presents its own particular set of
challenges. As each individual moves about the world, as each encounters strangers and
friends, the world becomes something else. For these characters, the world has already
become what it is, but, with every new experience, each has no choice but to synthesize
these new experiences, to accommodate these new experiences so that they square with
the past. This, in fact, is the nature of hermeneutical experience:
[I]n the utilization of the linguistic interpretation of the
world that finally comes about, something of the
productivity of our beginnings remains alive. […] What I
am describing is the mode of the whole human experience
of the world. I call this experience hermeneutical, for the
process we are describing is repeated continually
throughout our familiar experience. There is always a
world already interpreted, already organized in its basic
relations, into which experience steps as something new,
upsetting what has led our expectations and undergoing
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reorganization itself in the upheaval (Gadamer, “The
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 15).
Mrs. Dalloway is the story of a June day in London and the different characters
who populate the city. Clarissa Dalloway is at the center of the narrative. A middle-aged
socialite, she is hardly the obvious candidate for transcendent meaning (she is just a
housewife, neither an artist nor an intellectual), yet she experiences thoughts and feelings
that do matter, that do represent a willingness to go deeper; she too wonders about the
meaning of life and her role in its drama. Set right after the end of World War I, the
meaning and impact of this novel hinges on the particular concerns of its time and place.
Certainly, the author and her English compatriots were still reeling from the savagery of
this conflict. In many ways, this novel is a response to this schism-producing world
event. For the war was a symptom of a larger problem, of social and historical trends that
culminated in outright conflict. To a considerable extent, this war was the result of
modernization, of blind faith in science and technology, industrialization and
imperialism. Certainly, the era preceding the War was one of rapid change. For many,
there was a sense of unidirectional progress: with science and technology, the world was
becoming more understandable and so was the ability to control and distribute its objects
and resources. People moved to cities en masse, hoping for an easier life: cities promised
technological infrastructure, jobs in industry and a resultant source of steady food and
reliable housing. With this movement, though, there was a growing sense of inequality
(as those with capital exploited those without), of increased competitiveness, and an
alienation stemming from the loss of home and place. This industrialization and faith in
progress could not be stopped. Indeed, the European powers embraced science,
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technology and industry. Soon their goal was to amass resources, control markets and
develop technology that would aid in these efforts. To this end, the competitive instinct
was primary: all technology, all industry was necessarily good as long as they promoted
their sense of progress. But competition, technology, and industry are not necessarily
good. For these countries became increasingly competitive in the race for resources and
markets. Rivalries grew, eventually metastasizing into bloody conflict.
For its part, the artistic, intellectual, and philosophical movement known as
Modernism is a response to these trends. For, with all of this blind faith in science and
progress, there was a pushback to open one’s eyes and see the limitations of science, to
identify its proper place within human understanding. For science gives the impression of
objectivity and promotes the idea that there is one way to see the world and one objective
truth. This sense of objectivity led the European powers to believe that their way was the
right way—that they were closer to truth than anybody else—and that this way of
thinking should be exported and promoted around the world. Under the guise of science,
there is a devaluing of individuality, an obfuscation of one’s interpretive and creative
nature: people become tools, cogs in a machine. The artists, philosophers and
intellectuals commonly associated with Modernism retorted by asserting the primacy of
creativity and the relativity of science. Science was recognized as “one of the possible
orders of understanding rather than […] the ultimate form of truth statement” (Bell 11).
For all scientific conclusions depend on an observer, somebody who determines the
parameters of the experiment and the research questions that shape the conclusions. All in
all, “the underlying notion of observation was increasingly problematic” (Bell 11). These
thinkers came to conclude that “science is a reflection of the human mind before it is a
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reflection of the world” (Bell 11). If science is a reflection of the human mind, then what
is the human mind and how does it work? Many of these thinkers recognized the
concurrence between the human mind and the world: the two are inseparable. These
thinkers saw “the human world as self-created”, dependent on one’s interaction with it
(Bell 14). Language was seen to be the primary means of this interaction: “rather than
describing or reflecting the world, language was now seen to form it” (Bell 16). The most
important and most relevant of these thinkers to relativize science and recognize the
importance of interpretation and language in human understanding was Martin
Heidegger. He, in fact, was a relative contemporary of Virginia Woolf. Born seven years
later, he belonged to a similar historical milieu as Virginia Woolf. Certainly, the two
engaged similar questions; as such, it is no surprise that there is resonance between
Woolf’s concerns and Gadamer’s, for Gadamer was a student of Heidegger’s. Heidegger
emphasized “human involvement in language as resistant to technical or external
analysis” (Bell 17). In other words, any attempt to describe language already takes place
in language: language is concurrent with one’s embeddedness in the world. As language
and the meaning of the world cannot be parsed, the relative status of each individual
came to be affirmed: “the relative status of the human was a central recognition of
Modernism itself” (Bell 13).
As the world for each individual is different because of his or her interaction with
it, many artists began to explore the dynamics of this interaction, to promote this sense of
interpretive responsibility and awareness. In the field of painting, for example, Claude
Monet’s 1874 painting, Impression-Sunrise, is considered by many to be the first Modern
painting (Fiero, 6: 114). According to Fiero, “the painting says more about how one sees
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than about what one sees” (6: 114). This painting emphasizes the primacy of the
perceiving individual—that perception varies depending on who sees and what that
person chooses to highlight. As the 19th Century came to a close and the 20th gained
steam, there was a gradual moving away from realistic representation and a moving
toward formal innovation and abstraction, an attempt to represent the world as the artist
sees it. Certainly, Virginia Woolf paid attention to these changes in art, as when she
declares that human character changed forever in 1910, the year of the first PostImpressionist exhibit in England (Schwarz 26-7). In these paintings, one can notice an
emphasis on individuality, perception, and personal vision: “These painters demonstrated
that artists could create their own order in a chaotic world. Thus they intentionally
neglect some details, while they simplify, distort, exaggerate, and stress others to express
their emotions, solve problems of pictorial space and create effects, In a sense, the artist’s
temperament and perspective become the subject” (Schwarz 27).
Modernist novelists adopted a similar project of highlighting perception, of
showing that each individual belongs to his or her own world. According to Schwarz,
these authors “realized that each person perceives a different reality and lives in […] a
‘closed circle’” (19). At the same time, the world of each individual is influenced by and
influences the worlds of others. Much of Modernist literature focuses on this interaction
between individuals. To capture the Modernist mode of perception, Woolf creates
characters that embody this Modern trope. For its part, the characters in Mrs. Dalloway
represent unique individuals who have been shaped by his or her upbringing and
circumstance, characters who interpret their place in the world, who are shaped—and
shape—as each interacts with others. These characters belong to a world that is
150

changing—some believe in God, others do not—a world that is in crisis, one in which the
stale precepts of the past are inevitably questioned. Like many who lived at the time,
most of these characters do not purport to have the final answer or to understand
absolutely. Instead they live in an atmosphere of questioning and wondering, of
uncertainty. Certainly, in Clarissa we get a sense for her outlook: she wonders about the
meaning of things and accepts that she will never reach an absolute conclusion, but she
also does not despair, willing to test and explore, aware that she might find clues as she
interacts with people and shares in the meaning of the world. This aspect of Clarissa’s
personality is highlighted when she is out in the street, pondering life and its mystery:
“She knew nothing; no language, no history; she scarcely read a book now, except
memoirs in bed; and yet to her it was absolutely absorbing” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 8). It
is “absolutely absorbing” because of her engagement with people, as the narrative
immediately stresses: “Her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct” (Woolf, Mrs
Dalloway 9).
Undoubtedly, Woolf presents Clarissa as a character who tries to understand. She
makes an effort, but she is also presented as someone who recognizes the limitations of
her effort. A part of her is aware that no matter her intent, understanding and meaning
cannot be forced. Nevertheless, much of the critical reception has chosen to focus on
Clarissa’s subjectivity. Hussey, for example, argues that “Clarissa is engaged in what
may be seen as a search for her ownmost identity: her recollections of childhood and an
unresolved early love affair often prevent her from having a sense of continuity in her
being” (25). Of course, Clarissa’s identity is important, but my argument is that Woolf
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stresses those experiences of meaning that lie beyond subjectivity, situations in which
meaning springs forth, the result of an unconscious interaction with people and language.
As Clarissa goes through her day, her many experiences, perceptions and
sensations are filtered through the lens of her past, her relationships, and a potential
future that she yearns to optimize. Each scent or sight triggers memories and thoughts
that shape her mood; the very identity of these sensations and perceptions depend on her
past experiences. In her case, the world turns out to be the result of her interaction with
the people who know her best. In this context, Gadamer’s words resonate: “It belongs to
the nature of familiarity with the world that whenever we exchange words with one
another, we share the world” (“On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth”
115). Somehow, she senses that each relationship, each encounter, is of the utmost
importance, at the heart of any to attempt to understand or find fulfillment. According to
Gadamer, dialogue and relationships are, in fact, one’s main source of fulfillment:
The basic constitution of the game, to be filled with its
spirit—the spirit of buoyancy, freedom and the joy of
success—and to fulfill him who is playing, is structurally
related to the constitution of the dialogue in which
language is a reality. When one enters into dialogue with
another person and then is carried along further by the
dialogue, it is no longer the will of the individual person,
holding itself back or exposing itself, that is determinative.
Rather, the law of the subject matter is at issue in the
dialogue and elicits statement and counterstatement and in
the end plays them into each other. Hence, when a dialogue
has succeeded, one is subsequently fulfilled by it (“Man
and Language” 66).
Indeed, Clarissa has a sense for this nature of dialogue as she tends her relationships—
that they shape who she is, that they are her primary means of finding fulfillment. She
knows that there is something indefinably productive about relationships: their yield is
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always more and different than one anticipates—with each encounter, insight,
reassurance and provocation. And when the relationship is at its most productive, when
the participants find commonalities and a shared world, then each acquires a sense for
what the world might be at its most true; each feels more at home, less alienated, the
world more understandable because it has been corroborated. Certainly, Clarissa
recognizes the value and productivity of her interactions with others: she knows that each
meeting represents a tremendous opportunity; that this very person presents a chance to
approach the world as it truly is; that this moment of unconscious congeniality shapes
one’s horizon and how one understands at all. Clarissa is reminded of the potential of her
interpersonal encounters when she recalls how she has failed her husband; she knows she
has failed him because there have been moments when she has sensed the potential and
power and possible insight—the intense feeling of communion and completeness—of her
interactions:
Only for a moment; but it was enough. It was a sudden
revelation, a tinge like a blush which one tried to check and
then, as it spread, one yielded to its expansion, and rushed
to the farthest verge and there quivered and felt the world
come closer, swollen with some astonishing significance,
some pressure of rapture, which split its thin skin and
gushed and poured with an extraordinary alleviation over
the cracks and sores! Then, for that moment, she had seen
an illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner
meaning almost expressed. But the close withdrew; the
hard softened. It was over—the moment (Woolf, Mrs.
Dalloway 32).
Each encounter and each relationship are, to a certain extent, indefinable: within each
there is an unquantifiable emotional and sexual undercurrent. Clarissa recognizes that
there is something that occurs between two people that is decisive yet uncontrollable: the
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ways in which two people connect cannot be intellectualized. Clarissa is content with her
decision to marry Richard, yet she also knows that their connection is imperfect—with
Richard there is not intense passion nor is there transcendent meaning; however, Clarissa
is fully aware that such experiences are possible when two people come together. When
two people enter into a dialogue and confront the world there are moments when the
passion of the interaction is decisive. Both parties submit to the dialogue and it is the
subject matter that gains ascendency. Now, the topic of the dialogue could be absolutely
anything, but the possible subject matter is only available within the world horizon of
each participant; each particular is only understandable as it relates to the entire context.
Each participant brings his or her self into the dialogue, a self that is oriented to the
whole, of everything that might be understood, of everything that might be at all: “We are
ourselves encompassed by the whole, which we are and which is in us; but not
encompassed in such a manner that the whole would be present for us as the whole. We
encounter it rather as the totality and vastness, wherein everything is, only through
adhering to what has been allotted us, ie., the nómos, whatever it may be” (Gadamer,
Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History 91). When people share the
world in conversation, there is always the possibility that one might glimpse this whole
and gain an improved sense for one’s place in it; the world and its meaning—one’s very
perceptions—are confirmed. So, “the world come[s] closer” and is at its most meaningful
for Clarissa when she is most connected with someone.
Clarissa has a sense for the potential of people. She knows that every individual,
when combined with the right person, might gain a firmer footing and feel more
complete. She herself has experienced such moments of communion. She has lived such
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moments and they shape how she experiences her day. She knows that each day carries
within it tremendous potential—she feels an “exquisite suspense” from one moment to
the next, aware that one cannot force moments of understanding and unity (Woolf, Mrs.
Dalloway 30). It is only within the context of time that one might commune with the
world. Every moment is new: a particular challenge and a particular opportunity.
Sometimes one feels good, sometimes one feels bad; sometimes one feels inspired and at
others stumped. But these opportunities only come about as time passes. The number of
moments that one might seize are limited. With each passing hour, opportunities become
fewer. At the same time, these opportunities evolve as one grows and changes: the
manner in which one harnesses a moment depends on past experiences and how one has
been shaped. With the right experiences and a refined ability to process those
experiences, every new experience acquires greater meaning and more impact.
The action of this narrative takes place within the space of one day. And from the
very beginning we get a sense for its narrative arc: Clarissa will be hosting a party in the
evening; she needs to prepare for this party. This event is essential because it is a chance
for people to come together: for each and every guest, the party represents an opportunity
for the world to become something else—more understandable, more vibrant. For
Clarissa too: it is a chance to make a connection that could change her life. By means of
her party, she might “kindle and illuminate” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 5). In this example,
Woolf utilizes the metaphor of fire to highlight the manner in which two people interact:
when people come together, something comes to be that neither can anticipate, an
interaction of passion, the result new and unexpected.
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It is within the context of the looming party that Clarissa lives her day. In many
ways, this day is special because people will come together who might not otherwise; that
people will come together at all is of special importance—each encounter is necessarily a
unique opportunity. In other ways, this day is entirely ordinary: one wakes up at the
beginning and goes to bed at the end, the sun rises and sets, and the birds still chirp. So
too, Big Ben booms with the passing of each hour. With each vibration, Woolf highlights
the thematics of this novel: meaning and truth are only accessible within the context of
time. Each new moment is different and it is up to each character to face this difference;
time is incontrovertible and seeps into each and every little crevice; time will end but
until then all one has is each moment; the past has been and the future will be, each
impinging on the present. Certainly, this is Clarissa’s feeling as she contemplates her
present circumstance: “She was not old yet. She had just broken into her fifty-second
year. Months and months of it were still untouched. June, July, August! Each still
remained almost whole, and as if to catch the falling drop, Clarissa (crossing to the
dressing table) plunged into the heart of the moment, transfixed it, there—the moment of
this June morning on which was the pressure of all the other mornings” (Woolf, Mrs.
Dalloway 36-7). It is important for Clarissa to digest the moment, to assess and orient
herself, to determine who she really is, in spite of distractions, in spite of change, to
ground herself, so that she might become more as a result of the party instead of scattered
or confused. By “plunging into the very heart of the moment”, Clarissa prepares herself
for what may come. This is, in fact, something we all might do if we hope to understand:
“In all human knowing of the world and in all orientation within the world the nature of
the moment of understanding has to be worked out” (Gadamer, “Reflections on My
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Philosophical Journey” 28). For each moment is different, a synthesis of the past and
one’s expectations, and it is worthwhile to confront its nature, to understand it for what it
is so that one might approach coherence.
This particular approach to understanding is characteristic of Modernism in and of
itself. In Modernism one encounters a special emphasis on the subject and the uniqueness
of the individual. In part, each individual is different because of his or her experiences
and background. In this novel and in Gadamer’s philosophical approach one can easily
notice this accent on individuality and personal history. Part of understanding includes
understanding one’s place in the moment—how it relates to the past and its possible
impact on the future: “Memory enables us to integrate experience in a series of ongoing
syntheses which become understandable as we interpret the past and future in a changing
present” (Kern 45). With the importance of memory in mind—the manner in which it
informs understanding and the human subject—many Modernist thinkers came to
recognize the value of confronting and accounting for one’s personal past: “the personal
past began to attract a variety of prominent thinkers who scrutinized it with
unprecedented care and insisted that an understanding of it was essential to a healthy and
authentic life” (Kern 61).
This day is new and fresh, an opportunity and a challenge. Its success depends on
what has happened before and what might happen in the future, but there is still a feeling
of personal responsibility: within the confines of the possible, one makes choices. And
certainly there is a feeling that the meaning and value of the day depends on one’s
approach to it: each day, each moment represents an opportunity to live in a world of
one’s own creation, as participants in its meaning. Clarissa recognizes this aspect of the
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world—that it depends on her to create it, that she is responsible: “Heaven only knows
why one loves it so, how one sees it so, making it up, building it round one, tumbling it,
creating every moment afresh” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 4). Every moment is new and it
depends on each and every one of us to interpret these moments. Here, though,
interpretation is not something that happens after the experience, but is instead part of
one’s perception of the world: “Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions
that artificially reduce phenomena. Perception always includes meaning” (Gadamer,
Truth and Method 80). Indeed, the meaning of the world depends on the approach to it;
interaction with the world, ability to describe it, and expectations actually determines
meaning: “We are simply following an internal necessity of the thing itself if we go
beyond the idea of the object and the objectivity of understanding toward the idea that
subject and object belong together” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 457). Of course, this
creative opportunity and responsibility depends on one’s past experiences and how the
moment fits into what remains. And it is the case that Clarissa will be hosting a party
that evening; her experiences are filtered through the lens of what is to come.
Furthermore, her old friend, the man she almost married, Peter Walsh, remains foremost
on her mind. From the very beginning of the novel her sensations and experiences trigger
memories of Peter; to a certain degree he is the arbiter and fulcrum of Clarissa’s world:
“For they might be parted for hundreds of years, she and Peter; she never wrote a letter
and his were dry sticks; but suddenly it would come over her, If he were with me now
what would he say?” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 7). For Clarissa, it is because of Peter that
the world has acquired its present shape and color—her perception of it, its very
significance.
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So, too, Clarissa remains a central figure in Peter’s world: “no one understood
him, felt with him, as Clarissa did” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 46). For both, underlying
their relationship is a spring of overwhelming emotion and feeling. Between them there is
and was an undeniable connection that molded their worlds. Because of the complicated
reality of love and feeling, they did not marry each other, yet neither can deny that there
was and is love, that their connection determined who they became: “She had influenced
him more than any person he had ever known” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 153). For
Clarissa, too, Peter is decisive: “He made her see herself” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 168).
This novel culminates with Clarissa’s party and at this party Peter fixates on Clarissa.
Recently returned to London from India, Peter yearns to reconnect with Clarissa. Despite
their problems and complications, he knows that she remains a central figure in his life.
Any subsequent love or happiness that he might have found after their separation still
hinges on his initial relationship with Clarissa. For Peter, his bond with Clarissa
represented the apex of emotion and feeling. As a result, any subsequent relationships are
forever skewed, any emotion or feeling never fully understandable: “He had not found
life simple, Peter said. His relations with Clarissa had not been simple. It had spoilt his
life” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 192). So, when Peter talks to his and Clarissa’s mutual
friend, Sally Seton, they discuss what matters most. Sally states her position plainly: “For
she had come to feel that it was the only thing worth saying—what one felt. Cleverness
was silly. One must say simply what one felt” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 191). Peter wishes
he could say what he feels, for then he might actually understand his emotions. Bereft of
words, Peter flounders; for, until he is able to articulate his emotions, they remain
mysterious: “‘But I do not know […] what I feel’” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 191). Indeed,
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Peter wishes he could verbalize his feelings so that they might be understandable; we all
need language if we hope to understand: “To come into language does not mean that a
second being is acquired. Rather, what something presents itself as belongs to its own
being” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 457). Peter struggles to pin down his emotions, but
he recognizes that Clarissa still influences any feeling that he might have; he senses that,
maybe, she can help him rediscover his feelings and their true nature. Maybe Clarissa can
prompt the language that might calm his emotional turmoil. When, in the end, he finally
sees Clarissa again at the party, he thinks to himself: “What is this terror? what is this
ecstasy? […] What is it that fills me with extraordinary excitement?” (Woolf, Mrs.
Dalloway 194). She is still the potential source of a world that might reach fulfillment
and this potential is both scary and exciting—terrifying because he has so much to lose;
thrilling because he has so much to gain.
Now, my consideration of this relationship between Clarissa and Peter—and the
marriage between Clarissa and her husband Richard—is somewhat complicated by
societal and historical strictures. Certainly, the general concept of love, marriage, and
friendship between men and women has evolved and changed over time: the ways that
men and women interact is very different now than it was then. To a certain degree, it is
unavoidable that I will project my sense of this interaction between men and women as it
has taken shape in the beginnings of the Twenty-first century, but, at the same time, an
acute and highly developed historical consciousness belongs to the present moment also.
I cannot help but affirm that the world was different then than it is now. Certainly,
traditionally, women have been second-class citizens, often seen as property, and bereft
of agency. The Modern period was a time of rapid change and this movement
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comprehends the status of women. It was during this time that the suffrage movement
began, culminating in Great Britain in 1918 when women won the right to vote. This
right was one step in the direction towards equality, but undoubtedly there was much left
to rectify. As one might expect, Virginia Woolf was part of this conversation. In general,
she focused on “equal opportunity for education and economic advantage” (Fiero, 6:
110). She also argued for “psychological independence from men” (Fiero, 6: 110). Now,
in order to win the right to vote and to rally for a more equal status, women had to unite
as a group and, to a certain extent, affirm their status as different from men. However,
Woolf took issue with this grouping of women, as if all women were the same or shared
similar characteristics. Instead, Woolf aimed to transcend this concept of gender
difference and to promote a notion of women as people, with similar interests, desires and
needs as men. Her aim was to affirm the “value of human life itself in its natural
freedom” (Payne, 2). All in all, the point was that people should be allowed to become
who they might be, that each might become the best version of his or her self. And it is
this theme that stands out in Mrs. Dalloway. A middle-aged socialite and housewife,
Clarissa hardly represents radicality, but it is exactly within this atmosphere of tradition
that Clarissa might transcend traditional gender norms. In her relationships with Peter and
Richard, there is a general tension between tradition and transcendence. Belonging to
their time and place, there is no doubt that their relationships were shaped by societal
expectations. At the same time, they grew up and matured in a time of rapid change.
While seeking a sense of fulfillment that could only come to fruition as something that
takes place within society, these characters also interact in a way that undermines these
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expectations. In their interactions there is this sense that the most important thing is to
encourage one’s individual freedom so that he or she might reach fulfillment.
Woolf indicates in her novelistic characterization that Peter and Clarissa are
essential to each other and how each understands the world. Clarissa, for her part, is
acutely aware of the mystery of people and of life; people are inscrutable and so is life,
each capable of the unexpected: “She would not say of any one in the world now that
they were this or that” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 8). It is impossible to know people as they
truly are, she thinks, but we do make judgments and conclusions, even when one knows
that these opinions might not be entirely accurate; that is, each attempt to know someone
should be tempered with the recognition that people are unknowable and surprising.
Clarissa herself wrestles with this tension between revealment and concealment, surface
and depth. On one end of things, to a certain degree Clarissa can accurately judge people
just by being in the same room with them: “Her only gift was knowing people almost by
instinct” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 9). On the other end: “she would not say of Peter, she
would not say of herself, I am this, I am that” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 8-9). Clarissa is
fully aware of the paradox of judging others: people contain within them an infinite
depth, yet they necessarily assert themselves. In one’s interactions with others there is
something identifiably there. With this in mind, Gadamer’s philosophy resounds: “Being
is visible not only as the one but also, and just as originally, as the other and as the
multiplicity of differences, and as the identity and difference that comes into language”
(“Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language” 44). In many ways, these
considerations are part and parcel of the historical climate in which Woolf wrote and
Gadamer philosophized. The world was in crisis and many were seeking an alternative to
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the mindset that had led Western civilization into war: there was a “widespread belief that
Western civilization had lost its course” (Matthews and Platt 589). Objective certainty
was a central component of Western civilization and its unidirectional notion of progress
and many thinkers decided that it was necessary to dismantle this notion. So, instead of
certainty, these thinkers preferred uncertainty—as the individual relates to the world and
as one tries to understand the world: “a questioning mood became the normative way of
looking at the world, replacing the certainty of previous centuries” (Matthews and Platt
589).
Certainly, Clarissa feels like she is capable of unexpected surprises—and the
people she meets too. This too is Clarissa’s feeling as she lives her day: each day should
be approached with radical wonder; anything can happen; she is part of the world yet
outside of it; each moment is a gift and a burden; she could die at any moment: “She
sliced like a knife through everything; at the same time was outside, looking on. She had
a perpetual sense, as she watched the taxi cabs, of being out, out, far out to sea and alone;
she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day” (Woolf,
Mrs. Dalloway 8). Clarissa accepts that life is fleeting, that it is both comprehensible and
incomprehensible, that it exhilarates as it frustrates. And it is within this context that
Clarissa lives her life: she will die and everything will end; her access and opportunity
are limited—all she has is the moment. Willing to look death in the face, Clarissa
confronts her finitude: “Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking towards Bond
Street, did it matter that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without
her; did she resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that she ended
absolutely?” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 9). Woolf suggests by this passage that Clarissa
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recognizes that no one knows what happens when we die, but we all know that it will
happen and that when it does all of this striving and needing and wanting and wondering
will cease.
And it is this notion of death that tinges much of the novel. Death is always there
and it is always an option. Clarissa never dies in the narrative nor does she contemplate
suicide, but death still remains a central motif. In point of fact, it is famously known that
Woolf initially intended for Clarissa to commit suicide; death is at the center of this
narrative. Considering the mass carnage of World War I, it is no surprise that death
would play such a prominent role in this fictional account. The specter of death was
everywhere, seemingly inevitable. Although many considered Western civilization to be
on a track of progress, part and parcel of this progress was the potential for mass
annihilation: “The same science, technology, and medicine that extended and improved
life produced weapons that made it easier for modern armies to annihilate each other”
(Winks and Neuberger 289). This potential for annihilation hovered over everyone,
requiring all to look death in the face. So, at Clarissa’s party, death takes center stage,
offering a clear juxtaposition between the joviality and mirth of the party and the stark
finality of death. This story culminates with Clarissa’s party, a time when people can
come together and celebrate and feel unity, a time when people can forget about their
worries and frustrations, yet even an event like a party cannot gloss over life’s ultimate
truth: “Oh! thought Clarissa, in the middle of my party, here’s death” (Woolf, Mrs.
Dalloway 183). Septimus Warren Smith has committed suicide. He is a topic of
conversation because Doctor Bradshaw is at the gathering, having treated Septimus just
that day. Septimus is a stranger to Clarissa, yet his life and death affect her deeply: he is a
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reminder that life is short and temporary. In contemplating his death, Clarissa
understands the truth of life: “A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about
with chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop in corruption, lies, chatter. This
he had preserved. Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate; people
feeling the impossibility of reaching the centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness
drew apart; rapture faded, one was alone. There was an embrace in death” (Woolf, Mrs.
Dalloway 184). Certainly, for Clarissa (and people in general) in one’s daily life one very
rarely feels like one has a handle on everything; there are always distractions and
circumstances that bend meaning; but in death there is no longer this anguish and anxiety
of wanting to know but never reaching a final conclusion; finally, in death, one
communes with the world and the circle is complete, consciousness no longer striving for
unity.
Septimus’ suicide serves as a point of contrast for Clarissa: she is still alive and
the world remains vibrant, but she knows that she has an option—she can die if she
chooses; it is possible. And it is Septimus’ suicide that reminds Clarissa that each
moment is a gift, that it is up to her to choose how to live: “But what an extraordinary
night! She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had killed himself. She felt
glad that he had done it; thrown it away. The clock was striking. The leaden circles
dissolved in the air. He made her feel the beauty; made her feel the fun” (Woolf, Mrs.
Dalloway 186). Clarissa reacts to Septimus’ suicide positively because his death helps
clarify the true nature of life; death itself is like a frame that allows the viewer to see what
is and what is not; life is limited and mysterious but it is all there is.
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This particular day concludes with Clarissa’s party, an event in which people
might celebrate community, commonality, and solidarity. But this party is not all joy;
Septimus’ suicide intrudes. Woolf chooses to include Septimus as a central character
because his plight sheds light on the ravages of war and the vicious character of
humanity. Of course, not everyone experiences the brutality of war to such a heightened
degree nor does everyone feel the cutting edge of one’s fellow being, but, undoubtedly,
Septimus’ outlook and world has been warped by war. Sensitive by nature, he entered the
war enthusiastic about literature, as someone who acutely felt the benefits of community
and solidarity. But the war changed him; it was inevitable. Forced to participate in the
downfall of others, Septimus had no choice but to shut down and snuff out his affective
capacity, his ability to empathize, all feeling and emotion. In her article, “Trauma and
Recovery in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway,” Karen DeMeester echoes this notion:
“During combat, indifference is a survival tool that protects the psyche from being
overwhelmed by the horror received through the senses” (658). Furthermore, within this
environment of heightened stress, Septimus developed a close friendship with his
commanding officer, Evans. But Evans did not survive the war and Septimus had even
further reason to despair and retreat into himself: “when Evans was killed, just before the
Armistice, in Italy, Septimus, far from showing any emotion or recognizing that here was
the end of a friendship, congratulated himself upon feeling very little and very
reasonably. The War had taught him. It was sublime” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 86). When
Septimus returns from the war, he begins to realize that the war has changed him and he
starts to panic; he fears that he will not lead a normal life, that he is no longer able to
share or love: “When peace came he was in Milan, billeted in the house of an innkeeper
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with a courtyard, flowers in tubs, little tables in the open, daughters making hats, and to
Lucrezia, the younger daughter, he became engaged one evening when the panic was on
him—that he could not feel” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 86).
As readers, we do not first learn of Septimus at Clarissa’s party. He is introduced
much earlier, at the beginning of the day, when Clarissa is out buying flowers for her
party. Clarissa is out in public, among the masses of people who happen to be in London
that very day. Everyone becomes mesmerized by a car that may or may not include the
Prime Minister or the Queen of England. Septimus is one of those people being
mesmerized: he too is captivated. But Septimus is not only enthralled by the car, he is lost
in reverie because his perceptions and sensations demand an explanation; terrible things
have happened to Septimus; he has been chosen to suffer; this pain, though, must have
some benefit—there must be some unique meaning attached to his experiences:
And there the motor car stood, with drawn blinds, and upon
them a curious pattern like a tree, Septimus thought, and
this gradual drawing together of everything to one centre
before his eyes, as if some horror had come almost to the
surface and was about to burst into flames, terrified him.
The world wavered and quivered and threatened to burst
into flames. It is I who am blocking the way, he thought.
Was he not being looked at and pointed at; was he not
weighted there, rooted to the pavement, for a purpose? But
for what purpose? (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 15).
There must be some special significance linked to Septimus’ tribulations. His perceptions
are supercharged because he has witnessed extreme cruelty and suffering; he knows what
people are capable of and this knowledge tinges his perceptions—they are endowed with
need; his pain must be useful in some way; the world and its appearance must be
meaningful, harmonious; surely, resolution and unity are possible:
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But they beckoned; leaves were alive; trees were alive. And
the leaves being connected by millions of fibres with his
own body, there on the seat, fanned it up and down; when
the branch stretched he, too, made that statement. The
sparrows fluttering, rising, and falling in jagged fountains
were part of the pattern; the white and blue, barred with
black branches. Sounds made harmonies with
premeditation; the spaces between them were as significant
as the sounds. A child cried. Rightly far away a horn
sounded. All taken together meant the birth of a new
religion (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 22-3).
Septimus is particularly equipped to comprehend the scope of existence because he has
witnessed the underbelly of human nature (degradation, cruelty) and the truth of the
world is only available in this context—as something that must be meaningful,
harmonious and understandable despite—or because of—the way people treat one
another. At the same time, Septimus’ perceptions are distorted because he has not been
able to link his pre-war existence with his post-war life. He is stuck in his own head,
unable to overcome his trauma. As DeMeester contends, “The survivor’s traumatized
mind apprehends the traumatic event as ever-present, and his memories of the event often
exist in the present consciousness as encapsulated images and fragments of thought that
are juxtaposed against other nontraumatic memories but do not relate to them
sequentially or chronologically” (651). To recover from his trauma, he “must escape the
prespeech chaos of his traumatized psyche and form his fragments of thought into a
coherent, communicable narrative” (DeMeester 652). But Septimus is unable to form a
coherent narrative; he lacks a sympathetic interlocutor, an outlet for his thoughts and
emotions, somebody who might understand his plight.
Woolf includes the character of Septimus in her novel because he represents what
might happen when the world is turned upside down by war; instead of propping each
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other up, people chop each other down; when each is obligated to renounce the value and
dignity of others; when each witnesses and participates in carnage. These experiences
could not but change Septimus. As a response, in a last-gasp attempt to regain normalcy,
Septimus chooses to marry Lucrezia. But this marriage to Lucrezia did not rescue
Septimus. He remained bereft, alone, solitary—on an island. And Lucrezia suffers as a
result. She too ends up feeling alone, disconnected from Septimus, each unable to
understand the other. Lucrezia yearns for a connection with Septimus; she longs to be
able to communicate with him; she wants to understand him and him to understand her.
But they inhabit different worlds. Septimus is pre-occupied with working out the
consequences of the War: he feels that he is uniquely qualified to interpret truth and
meaning. He has approached the limits of human cruelty, of feeling, of life; he has
walked to the edge and looked over the precipice: “He lay back in his chair, exhausted
but upheld. He lay resting, waiting, before he again interpreted, with effort, with agony,
to mankind” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 68). Septimus feels the need to interpret because he
senses that his background uniquely qualifies him to understand the true nature of things.
Septimus acknowledges and trumpets the value of interpretation—his very need to
interpret—because his familiarity with the world has been destabilized. One may not
recognize the value of interpretation—and one’s need for it—but it is something that
occurs regardless: “interpretation seems to be a genuine determination of existence rather
than an activity or intention” (Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 71). Septimus thinks
that his experiences must include a secret meaning, that there must be an explanation for
his pain, that his primary duty and challenge is to interpret this meaning. But,
unfortunately, Septimus struggles to articulate the profound insights that he is uniquely
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equipped to share; precisely because they are so important, because they are so deep,
Septimus becomes frustrated; these insights are of such importance that any flaw, any gap
between his need and the realization of this need becomes glaring:
[H]e, Septimus, was alone, called forth in advance of the
mass of men to hear the truth, to learn the meaning, which
now at last, after all the toils of civilization—Greeks,
Romans, Shakespeare, Darwin, and now himself—was to
be given whole to… ‘To whom?’ he asked aloud. ‘To the
Prime Minister,’ the voices which rustled above his head
replied. The supreme secret must be told to the Cabinet;
first that trees are alive; next there is no crime; next love,
universal love, he muttered, gasping, trembling, painfully
drawing out these profound truths which needed, so deep
were they, so difficult, an immense effort to speak out, but
the world was entirely changed by them for ever (Woolf,
Mrs. Dalloway 67).
Here, Septimus recalls civilization and its accomplishments: people like Shakespeare or
Darwin, people who themselves interpreted the world, shared their interpretation with
others, and challenged people to participate in this interpretive effort. To interpret, to
approach truth, Septimus fully appreciates the value of this effort—but precisely because
of his need (its immensity, its complexity), Septimus despairs. In the character of
Septimus one notices an emphasis on interpretation and this emphasis reflects one of
Modernism’s primary tenets—that each person is different and interpretation should be
adjusted based on this difference. This variability of personality and experience became a
central concern of many artists and intellectuals of the time: “They sought to depict a new
kind of realism, situated in the subjective rather than the objective realm” (Winks and
Neuberger 310). The character of Septimus is particularly appropriate for a consideration
of the subjective because of the uniqueness and intensity of his experiences and
consciousness. The unique subjectivity of Septimus reflects one of Modernism’s
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principal tropes: “Culture had a new function for the modernists: not to represent,
explore, analyze, or catalog objective reality, but to turn inward and explore under the
surface of things, to express the subjective experience unique to each individual,
including contradictory feelings, drives, energies at the very heart of life” (Winks and
Neuberger 310).
Septimus is obsessed with his need for understanding, but the world that he
endeavors to interpret is very different than that of Lucrezia. The two struggle to
communicate, to connect, each on a different wavelength. The reference of the language
of each is utterly dissimilar. As DeMeester puts it, “Communication between a trauma
survivor and an untraumatized listener is diminished by a gap in meaning that to an
extent exists in all attempts to communicate. Though the listener recognizes the words the
traumatized person uses, she cannot comprehend the reality these words represent; there
is an irreconcilable gap between the intensity of experience and emotion the veteran
wishes to convey and the experience and emotion the listener can imagine and feel”
(654). His concerns are different than hers and vice versa. As a result, Lucrezia also feels
alone, abandoned even. Unable to communicate with the most important person in her
life, the world loses its color, becomes indiscernible and murky with shadows. So, when
Lucrezia comments to her husband that he should see the Milan gardens, she feels that
the words do not reach Septimus, obsessed as he is with his own predicament:
There was nobody. Her words faded. So a rocket fades. Its
sparks, having grazed their way into the night, surrender to
it, dark descends, pours over the outlines of houses and
towers; bleak hillsides soften and fall in. But though they
are gone, the night is full of them; robbed of colour, blank
of windows, they exist more ponderously, give out what the
frank daylight fails to transmit—the trouble and suspense
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of things conglomerated there in the darkness; huddled
together in the darkness; reft of the relief which dawn
brings when, washing the walls white and grey, spotting
each windowpane, lifting the mist from the fields, showing
the red-brown cows peacefully grazing, all is once more
decked out to the eye; exists again. I am alone; I am alone!
(Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 23-4).
Lucrezia is unable to communicate with Septimus because their concerns are entirely
separate; without this communication, the world lacks meaning, becomes
incomprehensible, as if the world were bathed in darkness: “The light that causes
everything to emerge in such a way that it is evident and comprehensible in itself is the
light of the word” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 478). In the same way that the world is
indistinguishable when completely dark, Lucrezia’s world is imperceptible because she
has no one to share it with; instead of reaching their destination and illuminating their
shared existence, her words are duds, unable to reach self-fulfillment, launched towards
their target but never reaching it—instead of enlightenment, darkness.
Septimus enters the novel when he is out with his wife; later, he visits Doctor
Bradshaw’s office; then he commits suicide; and finally he resurfaces at Clarissa’s party,
when she learns of his fatal act. We get a sense for the arc of his day and how he might
make that final decision—his mindset and all that it implies. For Septimus, the pain of the
day accumulates precipitously, so much so that he feels compelled to end his life. Now,
Septimus is included in this novel because he represents one possible direction that a day
might take. In the character of Septimus one sees a contrast between his dejection and
Clarissa’s approach to her day. Clarissa is not a perfect person and she too sometimes
struggles and sometimes despairs, but she has also been lucky, having lived a life in
which she was nurtured and loved. Clarissa is thankful for her lot in life, but she also
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knows that she has contributed significantly to her own happiness and success; she has
made an effort. Clarissa is fully aware that with each day and each moment anything can
happen, that time itself brims with danger and opportunity. With each instant she might
understand and feel more or she might fail, cowed by the mystery and challenge of
existence. However it may be, she knows that every day presents tremendous
opportunity, within each a series of moments that could change her life: so that she might
be who she wants to be and the world might be what it should be. But time is running out
for Clarissa: she has lived more years than remain; her opportunities are becoming less
and less abundant; her burden, her need, is becoming more and more acute. Now she
feels a growing sense of urgency to embrace each moment:
she feared time itself, […] the dwindling of life; how year
by year her share was sliced; how little the margin that
remained was capable any longer of stretching, of
absorbing, as in the youthful years, the colours, salts, tones
of existence, so that she filled the room she entered, and
felt often as she stood hesitating one moment on the
threshold of her drawing-room, an exquisite suspense, such
as might stay a diver before plunging while the sea darkens
and brightens beneath him, and the waves which threaten to
break, but only gently split their surface, roll and conceal
and encrust as they just turn over the weeds with pearl
(Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 30).
Clarissa experiences such an intense feeling of suspense because she knows that her
opportunities are becoming scarcer; her experiences are shaped by her sense of the future,
a future that is dwindling, intensifying the importance of the present moment, one that
may or may not prove decisive.
As Clarissa prepares for the party, as she moves about her house and muses, her
thoughts return to Peter; she cannot help but do so, as he occupies such a central role in
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her story. She recalls that her outlook in life, her very vocabulary has been shaped by
Peter: “She owed him words: ‘sentimental,’ ‘civilized’; they started up every day of her
life as if he guarded her” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 36). She then wonders when Peter
would be back from India and he appears at her house. His visit affects her deeply: his
influence in her life is so important, his role in her past so central, that his presence
challenges Clarissa, reminding her of where she is and what she has become. His
presence prompts her to evaluate the entirety of her life:
‘Do you remember the lake?’ she said, in an abrupt voice,
under the pressure of an emotion which caught her heart,
made the muscles of her throat stiff, and contracted her lips
in a spasm as she said ‘lake.’ For she was a child, throwing
bread to the ducks, between her parents, and at the same
time a grown woman coming to her parents who stood by
the lake, holding her life in her arms which, as she neared
them, grew larger and larger in her arms, until it became a
whole life, a complete life, which she put down by them
and said, ‘This is what I have made of it! This!’ And what
had she made of it? What, indeed? sitting there sewing this
morning with Peter (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 43).
Here we might return to Gadamer’s notion that we are oriented towards unity, that we are
a whole and that the whole is in us. Clarissa recalls her parents because they were more
influential and more present than anyone else when she began her life. Now that she is
beginning to near her end, she remembers her parents because they are especially
qualified to assess the continuity of her life, how all of the parts fit together, the extent to
which she has fulfilled her potential. This sense of continuity constitutes a vital aspect of
Modernist thought. The Modernists placed an emphasis on subjectivity and the
uniqueness of the individual; a vital part of this subjectivity and particularity is one’s
memory; for its part, memory is one’s primary means towards attaining continuity—
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without memory each moment would be discrete and disconnected. Many Modernist
thinkers contemplated the importance of memory, with Bergson commonly considered to
be the most important: “For Bergson, memory was all-important as the condition of our
free will: it is through memory, he argued, that our actions transcend predictable
mechanical responses to the extent that we bring our accumulated experiences to bear on
a given situation. Consciousness or ‘duration’, in which the present is swollen with the
past is the essential feature of our humanity” (Fernihough 69).
And, of course, in the same way that Peter mediates Clarissa’s life, Clarissa is
also the arbiter and reference for Peter. Peter even depends on Clarissa to approve his
current love-interest. Peter wants Clarissa to acknowledge and endorse his new life, his
new love, for it is because of Clarissa that Peter has become who he is; it is because of
her that he has fallen in love once again:
There they are! he thought. Do what you like with them,
Clarissa! There they are! And second by second it seemed
to him that the wife of the Major in the Indian Army (his
Daisy) and her two small children became more and more
lovely as Clarissa looked at them; as if he had set light to a
grey pellet on a plate and there had risen up a lovely tree in
the brisk sea-salted air of their intimacy (for in some ways
no one understood him, felt with him, as Clarissa did)—
their exquisite intimacy (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 45-6).
This intimacy between Peter and Clarissa is so decisive that it determines how each feels
about life and the people in their lives. It is, in fact, because of Clarissa that Peter became
who he was, that he ended up choosing to marry Daisy at all.
This day happens to be Peter’s first day back in London after several years spent
in India. Back in London to consult with lawyers about divorce and marriage, Peter finds
himself with several idle hours to pass while waiting for his next appointment. Having
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visited with Clarissa, he chooses to wander about London, contemplating his life and the
changes that have taken place in London during his time away. At this moment, Peter
feels detached, without anchor, as if the usual distractions and concerns have melted
away, as if his circumstance was completely new, as if he were freed to confront his life
with a renewed outlook and fresh eyes, the world and its meaning supremely mysterious,
yet there to be confronted as it truly is: “And just because nobody yet knew he was in
London, except Clarissa, and the earth, after the voyage, still seemed an island to him, the
strangeness of standing alone, alive, unknown, at half-past eleven in Trafalgar Square
overcame him. What is it? Where am I? And why, after all, does one do it?” (Woolf, Mrs.
Dalloway 52). These are questions without a direct answer, questions that seep into
anything and everything humans do, part of an undercurrent that sweeps people along,
always there, belonging to every statement or answer that is given. These questions
belong to an essential orientation to the world:
How is understanding possible? […U]nderstanding is not
just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but
the mode of being of Dasein itself. It is in this sense that the
term ‘hermeneutics’ has been used here. It denotes the
basic being-in-motion of Dasein that constitutes its finitude,
and hence embraces the whole of its experience of the
world. Not caprice, nor even an elaboration of a single
aspect, but the nature of the thing itself makes the
movement of understanding comprehensive and universal
(Gadamer, Truth and Method xxvii).
Gadamer notes that people are oriented to understanding and this orientation is decisive;
everything one does or thinks depends on one’s understanding of the world, but people
rarely recognize or confront this orientation; one normally contemplates particulars and
concrete situations, but rarely questions those factors and elements that contribute to the
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nature of the situation and one’s understanding of it. Moreover, this novel implies that by
confronting one’s orientation one might readjust it so that one approaches life with
clearer vision.
In Woolf’s novel Peter feels liberated to confront his life with fresh eyes, to ask
questions that normally remain in the background, to challenge his presuppositions,
orientation, outlook and horizon, as Gadamer claims is necessary for understanding. Peter
knows that, in doing so, there is supreme reward. For he knows that his life and its yield
depends on his participation—its meaning depends on his attitude and approach: “one
makes up the better part of life” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 54). That life and its meaning
depends on one’s participation is a common Modernist trope. Life is unique for each and
every person: there is an “infinite variation in the ways each individual perceives reality”
(Winks and Neuberger 310). One participates in meaning, and this significance depends
on one’s past and one’s relationships—all that has determined one’s vocabulary and
horizon. As a result, Woolf has Peter return to Clarissa so that he might contemplate their
relationship: it is because of her that he is who he is. Peter accepts that Clarissa is an
individual, with her own idiosyncracies and unique traits; like everyone else, she is of
infinite depth and richness. Because she is so particular and special, Peter still wrestles
with understanding her, defining her, parsing her personality. In Clarissa, Peter notes a
strange juxtaposition: she is both extremely friendly and open to others, while forever
withholding her interior, her essence, sedulous of her privacy, unwilling to share
everything—or, at least, that which is most important. Nevertheless, there is something
about Clarissa that directly confronts Peter and burrows into his core—perhaps it is her
private depth: “That was the devilish part of her—this coldness, this woodenness,
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something very profound in her, which he had felt again talking to her; an
impenetrability. Yet heaven knows he loved her. She had some queer power of fiddling
on one’s nerves, turning one’s nerves to fiddle strings, yes” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 61).
That Clarissa guards her most profound depths so diligently appeals to Peter; her interior
and the manner in which she safeguards it represents an alternative for Peter and a
challenge.
Peter cannot and should not dismiss Clarissa. For Peter, Clarissa has a presence
that is undeniable and exhilarating. She is far from a perfect person, with no special
talents or skills, yet her very being exudes dignity and humanity. Among people, her
generosity, humility and acceptance stand out: the world is harsh enough and challenging
enough already—as an antidote, people should accept each other, embrace each other,
support each other. Instead of criticizing and analyzing, one might embrace the world for
all it has to offer: Clarissa had “that extraordinary gift, that woman’s gift, of making a
world of her own wherever she happened to be. She came into a room; she stood, as he
had often seen her, in a doorway with lots of people round her. But it was Clarissa one
remembered. Not that she was striking; not beautiful at all; there was nothing picturesque
about her; she never said anything specially clever; there she was, however; there she
was” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 76). For Peter, Clarissa’s presence is enough. In her
bearing, her appearance, her gestures and looks, Clarissa’s value is undeniable: embedded
in the world, Clarissa accepts her place and does her best to improve it, all the while
doing the same for others (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 76).
Clarissa remains central to Peter’s narrative, a sequence that remains unfinished
and continues to unfold. A middle-aged man, Peter finds himself taking stock, assessing
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everything that has happened in life and everything that might yet happen. Fortunate in
many ways, Peter has been lucky enough to live a full life, to fall in love, to travel, to
persevere, to withstand and overcome the vicissitudes of existence. As a young man,
Peter was passionate, filled with verve and exuberance; he was someone who embraced
his instincts and impulses. But, in youth, it is hard to fully understand the meaning and
importance of one’s choices and experiences—one’s context is limited. Grown older,
Peter accepts that his future may no longer be expansive, but he also acknowledges that
his experiences are now more understandable and belong to a wider context—everything
means more: “The compensation of growing old, Peter Walsh thought, coming out of
Regent’s Park, and holding his hat in hand, was simply this; that the passions remain as
strong as ever, but one has gained—at last! The power which adds the supreme flavour to
existence,—the power of taking hold of experience, of turning it round, slowly, in the
light” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 79). The benefits of age and experience emerge in this
character. With them, he is better prepared to understand the meaning of new
experiences, their significance understandable within a wider frame of reference;
furthermore, with experience he knows to discard certain concerns and avoid certain
distractions, so that the truth of the experience might flower, so that understanding is
more focused. This aspect of experience is a central concern of Gadamer:
The truth of experience always implies an orientation to
new experience. That is why a person who is called
experienced has become so not only through experiences
but is also open to new experiences. The consummation of
this experience, the perfection that we call ‘being
experienced,’ does not consist in the fact that someone
already knows everything and knows better than everyone
else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the
contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who,
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because of the many experiences he has had and the
knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well
equipped to have new experiences and learn from them.
The dialect of experience has its proper fulfillment not in
definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that
is made possible by experience itself (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 350).
Peter acknowledges the value of experience; he appreciates that the world is more
understandable with more context; he embraces the idea that he is more discerning, less
distracted by the superfluous or the irrelevant. The manner in which the past effects the
present and its degree of influence were important considerations for the Modernists; the
background and experiences of each individual shapes meaning and perception. In her
article, “Consciousness as a Stream”, Fernihough quotes the Modernist novelist Dorothy
Richardson, who analyzed the personal past and its influence on the present in similar
terms to that of Bergson: “In actual experience it is more like an agglomeration, a vital
process of crystallization grouped in and about the human consciousness, confirming and
enriching individual experience” (69).
With age, Peter has gained a better sense for life and the meaning of his
experiences. However, he remains fully aware that life remains mysterious: it is, in fact,
so compelling because it can never be fully understood. It is incomprehensible, yet there
are moments of communion and correspondence, moments in which truth asserts itself,
when its impact cannot be denied: for example, moments of beauty. When Peter
experiences the beautiful, he is often overwhelmed, feeling, at least in the moment, an
exhilarating clarity, as if he were given access to the true nature of things. This clarity
prompts an emotional response: however clear and understandable, however potent,
Peter’s impressions of things will never fully be understood or communicated. So, when
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Peter tries to explain to himself why he is prone to uncontrollable bouts of emotion, he
signals the weight of beauty and understanding, the challenge they present:
in privacy one may do as one chooses. One might weep if
no one saw. It had been his undoing—this susceptibility—
in Anglo-Indian society; not weeping at the right time, or
laughing either. I have that in me, he thought standing by
the pillar-box, which could now dissolve in tears. Why,
heaven knows. Beauty of some sort, and the weight of the
day, which beginning with that visit to Clarissa had
exhausted him with its heat, its intensity, and the drip, drip,
of one impression after another down into the cellar where
they stood, deep, dark, and no one would ever know. Partly
for that reason, its secrecy, complete and inviolable, he had
found life like an unknown garden, full of turns and
corners, surprising, yes; really it took one’s breath away,
these moments; there coming to him by the pillar-box
opposite the British museum one of them, a moment, in
which things came together; this ambulance; and life and
death (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 152).
For Peter then, life is secretive yet open; in it he encounters something that is identifiably
there and understandable, yet this identity includes difference and change within itself.
Gadamer’s philosophical approach can be applied here to Peter’s experience:
“Hermeneutics has the task of revealing a totality of meanings in all its relations. The
individuality of the sense intended corresponds to the totality of definitions” (Gadamer,
Truth and Method 467).
Peter had visited Clarissa earlier that day and their meeting had impacted him
deeply; to see his old friend after several years, to see the woman he had loved, to revisit
his passion and heartache—all of this affects him to the core. For Peter could not escape
Clarissa’s influence: despite their sharp edge, his encounters with Clarissa were
consistently fruitful; although she might challenge him, her particular manner of being
would always provoke Peter, push him to expand his world:
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Brief, broken, often painful as their actual meetings had
been what with his absences and interruptions […] the
effect of them on his life was immeasurable. There was a
mystery about it. You were given a sharp, acute,
uncomfortable grain—the actual meeting; horribly painful
as often as not; yet in absence, in the most unlikely places,
it would flower out, open, shed its scent, let you touch,
taste, look about you, get the whole feel of it and
understanding, after years of lying lost. Thus she had come
to him; on board ship, in the Himalayas; suggested by the
oddest things […]. She had influenced him more than any
person he had ever known (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 153).
Their relationship is so intense, their encounters so powerful, that Clarissa remains in
Peter’s mind even when she is not there. There is something about Clarissa that provokes
Peter; her outlook, her words, and her very bearing demand an explanation; something
about her may provide an answer; their conversations comprehend their situation, who
they are; because of their conversations the world is understood more completely. In
point of fact, this is the nature of dialogue and conversation; by way of the other, one’s
vision becomes clearer: “Self-understanding always occurs through understanding
something other than the self, and includes the unity and integrity of the other”
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 83).
This self-reflective, productive element of dialogue is illustrated when Peter
contemplates attending Clarissa’s party: Peter braces himself for the gathering, fully
aware that he will undergo, once again, one of these painful yet exhilarating encounters
with Clarissa. He is also mindful that he will be among scores of people, at a party, an
environment in which individuals come together to celebrate togetherness and
community. Peter is not a naturally social person, but he recognizes that parties have their
value and worth. A light and mirthful event, one in which people have no obligations and
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feel no pressure, people might alight on topics that would not otherwise be approached;
furthermore, it is a chance for people to meet who would not meet otherwise: a party’s
value is often surprising and unexpected; it is common to be inspired by this mixing, this
jumbling together of personalities and differences. Frequently, one does not even know
what one knows nor does one even make an effort to overcome mystery until enlightened
or provoked by the right person: “For this is the truth about our soul, he thought, our self,
who fish-like inhabits deeps seas and plies among obscurities threading her way between
the boles of giant weeds, over sun-flickered spaces and on and on into the surface and
sports on the wind-wrinkled waves; that is, has a positive need to brush, scrape, kindle
herself, gossiping” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 161). There is something about meeting
different personalities and individuals that pushes one to go in entirely new and different
directions; one feels the need to account for the other person and in doing so acquires a
better sense for who one is; one also feels provoked to assert one’s particular stance, to
compare and contrast, to test one’s horizon.
Peter recognizes the appeal of parties and he intuits that this party will matter, that
he will have an experience. It is not just the possibility of seeing Clarissa that compels
Peter, he also anticipates that he will experience beauty; but not just beauty, life in its
entirety: people, space, eccentricities, sounds, all combining somehow, in harmony
somehow, related somehow. All of it is significant, yet Peter also knows that this
significance is incomplete—there, interesting, real, meaningful but forever questionable:
It was not beauty pure and simple—Bedford place leading
into Russell Square. It was straightness and emptiness of
course; the symmetry of a corridor; but it was also windows
lit up, a piano, a gramophone sounding; a sense of pleasuremaking hidden, but now and again emerging when, through
183

the uncurtained window, the window left open, one saw
parties sitting over tables, young people slowly circling,
conversations between men and women, maids idly looking
out (a strange comment theirs, when work was done),
stockings drying on top ledges, a parrot, a few plants.
Absorbing, mysterious, of infinite richness, this life
(Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 163).
Peter wrestles with these contrasting impressions of life, aims to balance them: life is
meaningful, harmonious, and symmetrical, yet within this order there is variability and
difference; the understood itself branches into questions.
Like Clarissa, Peter contemplates the depth of life—its meaning and its mystery.
He knows that there are no final answers but still believes that life is worth exploring and
interrogating, that it might be more understandable if he participates in its meaning. But
Peter is less tolerant than Clarissa, more exacting. As an emblem of his personality, Peter
consistently brandishes his pocket knife and fiddles with it: “What an extraordinary habit
that was, Clarissa thought; always playing with a knife. Always making one feel, too,
frivolous; empty-minded; a mere silly chatterbox as he used” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 44).
As this habit would suggest, for Peter all of life’s intricacies are worth exploring and this
effort should be precisely executed; one should confront life’s challenges with open eyes
and controlled movements; one should be unrelenting and focused.
At times Peter can irritate Clarissa. He demands too much, needs too much.
Despite his imperfections, Clarissa almost chose to marry Peter; she still wonders, even,
if maybe she should have married him. As she weighs the positives and negatives of her
life-decisions, Clarissa generally concludes that she was right to marry Richard instead of
Peter. With Peter, she might have been happy but she almost might have been cowed by
the more flinty elements of his personality—his exactingness, his demands. With
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Richard, however, Clarissa feels that her life has turned out much smoother, easier, less
dramatic; perhaps she might not experience as many moments of bliss as with Peter, but
she also may have avoided innumerable moments of despair and frustration. For Richard
encourages Clarissa to be herself, to do as she pleases, and to think as she chooses; he
accepts her as she is, someone who prefers privacy, someone who recognizes that some
things cannot or should not be shared: “And there is a dignity in people; a solitude; even
between husband and wife a gulf; and that one must respect, thought Clarissa, watching
him open the door; for one would not part with it oneself, or take it, against his will, from
one’s husband, without losing one’s independence, one’s self-respect—something, after
all, priceless” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 120). Although Peter might be essential to
Clarissa’s world and her horizon, his and Clarissa’s interaction is not entirely positive; he
might expand Clarissa’s world, but, to a certain extent, he also distorts it. For his part,
Richard might not inspire Clarissa to the same degree, but he is also more accepting and
encouraging.
Certainly, Richard does respect and understand Clarissa’s need for privacy, but it
is also true that he, like Peter, does not entirely understand Clarissa’s motivation for
throwing parties. In the case of Richard, he worries about Clarissa’s health, the toll the
parties take, and, in Peter’s case, he thinks that she cares more about rank and status, that
she hosts parties to promote Richard’s station and, by proxy, Clarissa’s. This criticism
rankles Clarissa and she feels the need to defend herself. She searches herself, attempting
to understand why, exactly, she feels compelled to throw parties. First, she tells herself:
“What she liked was simply life” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 121). Then she elaborates:
“They’re an offering” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 121). Now, Clarissa equates parties with
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life because these get-togethers represent a chance for people to share and communicate,
to simply be among one another. When people gather, no one can anticipate the outcome.
She throws parties as an offering to her friends and acquaintances, a gift to life itself, so
that all might experience an increase in being. At a party, each attendee has an
opportunity to renew or develop his or her bond with others, so that the world might be
more understandable, so that each might feel more at peace:
But to go deeper, beneath what people said (and these
judgments, how superficial, how fragmentary they are!) in
her own mind now, what did it mean to her, this thing she
called life? Oh, it was very queer. Here was So-and-so in
South Kensington; some one up in Bayswater; and
somebody else, say, in Mayfair. And she felt quite
continuously a sense of their existence; and she felt what a
waste; and she felt what a pity; and she felt if only they
could be brought together; so she did it. And it was an
offering; to combine, to create; but to whom? (Woolf, Mrs.
Dalloway 122).
Woolf portrays Clarissa as a character with an acute sense for the essential dignity of her
fellow beings. She recognizes that each has a special value, has something to offer. But
Clarissa’s friends and acquaintances are all submerged in his or her life, his or her world,
working, eating, moving forward; and it is not easy to rouse oneself, to take time to
connect, to visit with one’s friends, to do something different, to break with routine.
Clarissa feels moved to do her part to battle complacency by giving parties; in doing so
she might spark her friends to go further, to connect with strangers or long-lost-friends, to
consider what is or might be, to grow and evolve.
Clarissa feels the need to bring people together, to combine, to create; but what
exactly is she creating? She is building a venue, an arena for people to learn from one
another. Of course, people do not go to a party with the express intent of learning, but it
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is an implied aspect of all conversation. At a party, people very often feel liberated, freed
to discuss topics that might not be considered otherwise, compelled to flit around, test
and wonder. Frequently people wear special clothing to parties and find themselves in
unusual situations with unusual people; such events are an escape from the routine and
the mundane: “Every time she gave a party she had this feeling of being something not
herself, and that every one was unreal in one way; much more real in another. It was, she
thought, partly their clothes, partly being taken out of their ordinary ways, partly the
background, it was possible to say things you couldn’t say anyhow else, things that
needed an effort; possible to go much deeper” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 171). Liberated
from one’s daily routine, now in a situation where one might discuss questions that
normally do not seem relevant, unexpected topics suddenly become important—at a new
setting, with different people, the world suddenly seems different—and one feels the need
to confront this difference.
Clarissa brings people together because each individual contains within him or
her an infinite depth, a unique perspective that never becomes depleted. And when people
share each becomes more. But even as one becomes more, one never entirely gains a firm
handle on meaning; no matter how much one knows, there is something about the
moment that destabilizes and unsettles; one’s perception necessarily includes meaning,
cannot help but find meaning, but this meaning does not blot out mystery; difference will
never be entirely overcome—the world is always in motion, people always inscrutable:
“that’s the miracle, that’s the mystery; that old lady, she meant, whom she could see
going from chest of drawers to dressing-table. She could still see her. And the supreme
mystery […] was simply this: here was one room; there another. Did religion solve that,
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or love?” (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway 127). No matter how much one understands or knows,
one’s concerns and circumstances determine meaning; something is understood, but the
thing itself resists mastery, its implications infinite, belonging to the perception itself: “Is
the given not in fact the result of an interpretation? It is interpretation that performs the
never fully complete mediation between man and world, and to this extent the fact that
we understand something as something is the sole actual immediacy and givenness”
(Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 30). One inherits a world and it is based on this
inheritance that one slowly adapts to its nature; it is up to each person to participate in its
meaning and to nurture an understanding that recognizes the challenge and opportunity
that one faces; if one embraces the opportunity then one might live in a world that
inspires and vibrates with potential, the possibility of unity right there, within one’s
reach, even if it necessarily slips out of one’s grasp.
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CHAPTER 6
TO THE LIGHTHOUSE

The story of the Ramsay family on vacation at their summer home and their
houseguests, To the Lighthouse explores the sometimes-porous, sometimesinsurmountable borders that exist between individuals, the difference and affinity that
represents both a challenge and an opportunity for understanding and growth. For in these
characters we encounter individuals who are drawn to share their lives in community;
who, despite their need to share, maintain their uniqueness, aware that their particular
stake in the world is of special value. Each has his or her or own particular story and
special way of seeing and understanding; when together, though, each becomes more; in
sharing the world each might refine his or her viewpoint and discard his or her
idiosyncrasies, those unexamined assumptions that inhibit understanding; furthermore, in
sharing one might confirm and reinforce those assumptions—one’s very horizon—that
promote truth and understanding. The principle characters of this novel are Lilly Briscoe,
an amateur painter and houseguest of the family, and the matriarch and patriarch of the
family, Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay, the father and mother of eight children, a philosopher and
his generous-hearted, socially-attuned wife. Lilly, for her part, is infatuated with this
family and all that it represents—in particular, she is obsessed with Mrs. Ramsay—her
beauty, her instincts, her general way of being. In Lilly’s mind, Mrs. Ramsay is a clue in
her effort to understand, a central piece in the puzzle of meaning. As a central component
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in her effort to interpret, Lilly paints a portrait of Mrs. Ramsay as she reads to her son
James: her aim is to represent in pictorial form the balance and unity within the family, a
harmony that exists because its members directly confront and account for their
differences. In producing her painting, Lilly’s goal is to impose a form and structure on
her understanding of this family and the world. In her attempt to paint, Lilly necessarily
engages her perceptions and her sense of meaning; the painting only means anything as it
relates to this family and the world, a collection of individuals who are willing to face the
world with open eyes and participate in its creation. In particular, in Mr. and Mrs.
Ramsay we encounter two characters who emphasize participation, who recognize the
value of effort and engagement. A philosopher, Mr. Ramsay directly confronts the nature
of reality and the meaningfulness of the world—he is someone who attempts to identify
the mechanisms of each individual’s interaction with the world and the implications
therein. For her part, Mrs. Ramsay possesses a highly refined social instinct: she stresses
the importance and value of one’s interpersonal relationships—by way of these
relationships one might approach a more refined notion of truth and understanding.
Undoubtedly, Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay are individuals with their own particular
characteristics and interests. In the case of Mrs. Ramsay, she privileges those experiences
where she connects and interacts with others. In this connection, and in this interaction,
truth and improved understanding become more accessible: “Understanding or its failure
is like an event that happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good
conversation or that it was ill-fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its
own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it—i.e.,
that it allows something to ‘emerge’ which henceforth exists” (Gadamer, Truth and
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Method 385). In this instance, neither member of the interaction knows what it will yield,
but that it will produce something valuable is the important point. As for Mr. Ramsay, his
personality prefers isolation, concentration and interrogation. His aim is to understand the
world for what it is, to abstract those factors and elements that belong to perception and
meaning. This, of course, is central to his vocation—he is willing to plumb the depths, to
question and consider; he might not reach a final answer, but in the effort he might
contribute to improved understanding. Though Mr. Ramsay chooses to shoulder this
burden, this responsibility belongs to everyone:
It is the world itself which is communicatively experienced
and continuously entrusted (Traditur) to us as an infinitely
open task. It is never the world as it was on its first day but
as it has come down to us. Always present when we
experience something, when unfamiliarity is overcome,
where enlightenment, insight, and appropriation succeed,
the hermeneutic process takes place in bringing something
into words and into the common consciousness” (Gadamer,
“Reflections on My Philosophical Journey” 29).
Indeed, Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay are central to the meaning of this novel. In the
character of each and in the way that they mesh, one gleans that each depends on the
other and the world becomes more understandable as a result of the other. But not all
critics agree with this stance. For example, A.O. Frank argues that the two occupy a
“basically binary scheme” (24). She contends that, on one end, lies Mr. Ramsay, aligned
with professional philosophy, and, on the other, is Mrs. Ramsay, aligned with social
instinct and creativity. To Frank, this binary is related to “the question of truth” (27).
Frank goes on to flesh out her position: “The opposing claims come from professional
philosophy on the one hand, and some at least quasi-artistic type of knowledge on the
other. Thus it is Woolf who sets up an opposition between philosophy and art, dropping
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early hints that truth dwells in the latter and not the former, but this refers to one
particular type of philosophy only” (27). In this case, the kind of philosophy Frank is
referencing has to do with the type of philosophy that presents the world as an object and
one reaches the truth of the object by way of method, a circumstance in which the subject
discounts his or her role in the interpretation, so convinced of his or her sovereign
subjectivity that he or she believes it can be entirely accounted for and included in one’s
understanding. But the reader does not know the specifics of Mr. Ramsay’s philosophical
stance. Sure, Mr. Ramsay may practice a type of philosophical thought that clashes with
art, the social, and the personal, but that does not mean that he is completely alienated
from truth or interpersonal fulfillment. Just because he is wrong in some ways, does not
mean that he is wrong in all ways. That he is willing at all to question and probe the
transaction between human being and the world is commendable and of value. Mrs.
Ramsay loves and appreciates Mr. Ramsay for this particular characteristic, and Mr.
Ramsay has the same feeling about his wife and her particular approach to life. Frank
goes on to consider the philosophical implications of this binary and how they manifest
themselves in the novel: “What we can know, how we know it and what are the
conditions under which we live and know are the concern [of To the Lighthouse].
[…T]he question of knowledge is tied in with the question regarding the structure of the
world or reality” (33). In this instance, I do not disagree with Frank, but I would argue
that her binary scheme distorts and undermines the manner in which the novel enacts
these considerations. To my mind, the entire novel hinges on the harmony and
resonance—the accommodation of identity and difference—that takes place as the couple
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interacts; the world is more understandable and meaningful as the result of this
interaction.
Divided into a tripartite structure, the action of this novel takes place within the
space of two days, each divided by an interlude of ten years. During the first day, the
family prepares to visit the lighthouse. This potential journey is important to the
Ramsays’ son James; only six years old, it represents an excursion into the possible, into
the unknown, the light house right there, but still in the distance. For James, his very
perception is filtered through his anticipation—whether or not they will go to the
lighthouse. But they never reach the lighthouse, the weather prohibitive. Other events
take place also: Mrs. Ramsay reads to her son James while Lilly paints a picture of the
scene, and everyone gathers around the dinner table to share a meal. Then the day ends,
and ten years pass. In this section, titled “Time Passes”, the impersonality, power and
savagery of time is highlighted; several members of the Ramsay family do not survive:
Mrs. Ramsay, Prue (giving birth), and Andrew (in the war). Then, in the final section, the
family and several of the same houseguests return to the vacation home, a place that
reminds them of their loss, a place where they might heal, a means of resolving the past
with the present. Furthermore, Mr. Ramsay and two of his children, his son James and his
daughter Cam, decide to, at last, visit the lighthouse. In its structure, the first section (that
day in which Lilly begins her painting, everyone shares a meal, and the trip to the
lighthouse is still a possibility) frames the final section, another day ten years later, one
that is very different because Mrs. Ramsay is no longer alive, nor James, nor Prue. On
this day Lilly Briscoe finishes her painting and reaches resolution; Mr. Ramsay and
James also reach their goal—they successfully land at the lighthouse.
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These central characters attain resolution within the framework of time; so too
their actions and thoughts take place within a world that is historically conditioned.
Generally considered to be a high watermark of Modernism, To the Lighthouse directly
addresses and reflects the concerns of its time and place (early twentieth Century
Europe). Though it plays a mostly peripheral role, World War I is the historical event that
is most decisive for understanding the context of this novel, as it was a symptom of larger
historical, and societal conditions. For Hussey, in fact, Woolf’s work is an attempt to
expose the links between the personal and society at large: “all Woolf’s work is deeply
concerned with war; that it helps redefine our understanding of the nature of war; and that
from her earliest to her final work she sought to explore and make clear the connections
between private and public violence, between the domestic and the civic effects of
patriarchal society, between male supremacy and the absence of peace, and between
ethics and aesthetics” (“Living in a War Zone” 3). Overall, it is Woolf’s aim to subvert
the dominant paradigm of univocal objectivity and progress that led to war in the first
place. For, in war, there is a deliberate elision of human dignity and value; people are
seen as tools and instruments; the depth and significance of each individual is discounted.
In her novels and, in particular, To the Lighthouse, Woolf succeeds in highlighting the
supreme worth of each individual—the individual’s unique and valuable purchase on the
world. Furthermore, she suggests that it is through interacting and engaging with others
that the world becomes more understandable and meaningful; that shared experience is an
avenue to truth, that truth itself is a matter of engagement with the world and each other.
So, it is Woolf’s contention that every individual is unique and particular and this
uniqueness is of special importance; through the combination of different individuals and
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personalities one might gain insight and the world might be more understandable.
According to Matthews and Platt, To the Lighthouse emphasizes the “differing senses of
reality experienced by the characters” (570). Yes, this novel trumpets the potential and
value contained within each person, an interpretive opportunity that is in direct
opposition with the objectivity necessary for science and technology: “Inner domains
modernism explores could sustain values and desires imperiled by the ‘progress’ of
modernity and the recent war, obviously restoring, in particular, depth and significance to
a sense of self much imperiled in a new machine age” (Stevenson 154). In each character,
one does notice depth and significance, in each a sense of meaning that is variable and in
movement as they combine and interact.
One such character is Lilly Briscoe, someone who is committed to understanding
and truth. Toward this end, Lilly chooses to paint. Lilly’s vocation as a painter also
belongs to a larger historical context. At the time, art and painting were in the midst of a
revolution: “Although there were many trends within this revolution, in painting and
sculpture it generally meant a shift from an art that reflected the natural world to one
rooted in the artist’s inner vision, from an art based on representational or naturalistic
images to one devoted to nonrepresentational or nonobjective forms, and from an art
focused on content to one dedicated to the process of creation itself” (Matthews and Platt
542). Certainly, in her painting Lilly aims to represent her inner vision and she does so in
a way that is nonrepresentational. For its part, Lilly’s painting is an attempt to transfer
into visual form her understanding of this family, this place, this moment—all as they
relate to her understanding of the world, her very perceptions. In particular, Lilly fixates
on Mrs. Ramsay. As Lilly attempts to finish her painting, she is inundated with emotion
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and feeling; Mrs. Ramsay’s absence a spur, Lilly aims to comprehend her friend—her
importance, her weight, her value. In many ways this painting is a tribute to Mrs.
Ramsay. Mrs. Ramsay is so important to Lilly because her very presence and personality
prompted Lilly to understand more and differently, to see the world with improved
clarity; Lilly senses something very truthful about Mrs. Ramsay in the way she interacts
with the world and those around her. For example, as Lilly attempts to complete her
painting, she recalls a particular scene in which she, Mrs. Ramsay and Charles Tansley
share an experience on the beach, a scene of unity and connection. Charles Tansley, for
his part, is a difficult person who has endured a difficult life. So, as Lilly tries to paint,
she recalls this particular moment on the beach, when she and Charles played together,
skipping stones on the water, and Mrs. Ramsay watched them and wrote letters. Because
Lilly and Charles were fond of Mrs. Ramsay, they were able to overcome their
differences and share a moment that stayed in her memory, an instant when life seemed
good and honest. To Lilly, it was as if the presence of Mrs. Ramsay had united Charles
and herself, as if her presence made the world less complicated. To Lilly, this
recollection, and the role played by Mrs. Ramsay, might be compared to a work of art:
That woman sitting there writing under the rock resolved
everything into simplicity; made these angers, irritations
fall off like old rags; she brought together this and that and
then this, and so made out of that miserable silliness and
spite (she and Charles squabbling, sparring, had been silly
and spiteful) something—this scene on the beach, for
example, this moment of friendship and liking—which
survived, after all these years complete, so that she dipped
into it to re-fashion her memory of him, and there it stayed
in the mind affecting one almost like a work of art (Woolf,
To the Lighthouse 160).
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Lilly equates this particular scene on the beach, this memory of her and Charles, with a
work of art—and this comparison is vital. A work of art is something essential,
something illuminating. It is deep and unfathomable. It is a means of insight. It is
coherent, complete and entire, yet provocative. This moment and memory is like a work
of art because in it there is a clue to understanding, insight and meaning. According to
Gadamer, art is an essential means of self-confrontation, an opportunity to see in new and
different ways:
Language signifies memory. Mnemosyne is, however, the
mother of all the muses and so the patron of art. Art—
whether picture, word, sound, song, or whatever its origin
was or its present social function may be—means, in the
final analysis, a way of confronting ourselves in which we
become mindful of ourselves. In word as in picture, in
petroglyph as in the song, and still in the refined and
mediated forms of later literature, the world as a whole—
the whole of our world experience—has become present.
And even the most silent forms of modern painting, which
radiate a brooding silence, evoke in us the ‘you are that.’
Such an experience of the whole, in which we confront
ourselves, occurs through the continual new-awakening of
the echoing of art. In this lies the actual distinguishing
characteristic of humans (Hans-Georg Gadamer on
Education, Poetry, and History 90).
Somehow, she and Charles were able to enjoy each other’s company on that day;
something about that day and their interaction is exhilarating and meaningful, so much so
that it is compared to a work of art. Despite their differences, despite their antagonism
and antipathies, Lilly and Charles were able to connect, enjoy—this day, and the
antipathy overcome, is of special value to Lilly. For once they were able to enjoy each
other’s company: people can find common ground after all. Mrs. Ramsay played a vital
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role: her presence and its significance united them. They were able to enjoy the day,
share, learn, and grow, all because of Mrs. Ramsay.
Now, these thoughts occur to Lilly as she herself is painting, as she remembers
Mrs. Ramsay, as she tries to understand why this woman is so important—how her
absence is such an important presence. Mrs. Ramsay is gone, but her legacy remains
strong, hovering over Lilly and the Ramsay family, as ubiquitous as oxygen. Someone
who had an acute sense for the value of each individual, someone who recognized that
people have much to offer, Mrs. Ramsay promoted tolerance, generosity, openness:
people should be accepted as they are—it is worthwhile to share with each other, talk
with each other—much can be gleaned. It is this stance, this attitude that Lilly
particularly appreciates as she remembers Mrs. Ramsay and that specific memory of
them on the beach: life should be enjoyed, appreciated—all one can do is what one can;
to try, to accept mystery and challenge but still take the necessary step and leap forward.
When Lilly remembers Mrs. Ramsay and her ability to resolve difference into
acceptance, she compares this memory to a work of art and this thought leads Lilly into
an even more general consideration: what is the meaning of life? With Mrs. Ramsay’s
absence so present, with this recollection of her and Charles in harmony despite their
antagonisms, with this painting in front of her, Lilly is drawn towards this most general
of all questions. It is a relevant question as she paints, as she considers the subject matter
and how to express it visually. It is an applicable query as she tries to pin down Mrs.
Ramsay, as she strives to understand who this woman was and why she means so much:
What is the meaning of life? That was all—a simple
question; one that tended to close in on one with years. The
great revelation had never come. The great revelation
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perhaps never did come. Instead there were daily little
miracles, illuminations, matches struck unexpectedly in the
dark; here was one. This, that, and the other; herself and
Charles Tansley and the breaking wave; Mrs. Ramsay
bringing them together; Mrs. Ramsay saying, ‘Life stand
still here’; Mrs. Ramsay making of the moment something
permanent (as in another sphere Lilly herself tried to make
of the moment something permanent)—this was of the
nature of a revelation. In the midst of chaos there was
shape; this eternal passing and flowing (she looked at the
clouds going and the leaves shaking) was struck into
stability (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 161).
Simply put, there is no final answer to Lilly’s question, as each variant plays off each
other, leading to further considerations, more caveats, more explanations, mystery
surging forth as more is said. Yet there are moments when life seems understandable,
when there is harmony and balance, when the different components fit the one with the
other. In this instance, Lilly points toward shared experience as an essential clue: this
scene on the beach when she felt at harmony with Charles Tansley and Mrs. Ramsay; that
Mrs. Ramsay was able to resolve Lilly and Charles’ differences, that her presence could
be so impactful and powerful. To Lilly, there was something about Mrs. Ramsay that
simplified the world; Mrs. Ramsay was cognizant of the value and meaning and
opportunity of just such a moment—that a simple day and a simple activity such as
relaxing on the beach could be so impactful; perhaps the inescapable mystery and eternal
flux of existence includes understanding within itself, an access point, one that derives
from shared experience and personal connection: “The nature of the hermeneutical
experience is not that something is outside and desires admission. Rather, we are
possessed by something and precisely by means of it we are opened up for the new, the
different, the true” (Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 9).
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People are oriented to understanding and this orientation is decisive for all interaction:
truth emerges as something unexpected; identity and difference blend together.
As Lilly attempts to paint her portrait of Mrs. Ramsay and James, she considers
the Ramsay family and their friends. In many ways, this painting frames the entire novel.
This novel is about the space between people, how this space is crucial to the nature of
understanding and meaning: this painting comprehends these considerations also. So, as
Lilly attempts to finish her painting, she does so with Mrs. Ramsay in mind, with
meaning in mind. There is something in Lilly that recognizes the importance and value of
these people and their interconnectedness: each is different, yet each is more because of
their interactions, their undeniable connection. Lilly acknowledges that this connection is
a source of understanding and fulfillment. It is her aim to mine this connection and
present it in her artwork, to present it so that it is seen for what it is. This, according to
Gadamer, is one of the primary functions of art: “In it we can see without any doubt that
a picture is not a copy of a copied being, but is in ontological communion with what is
copied. It is clear from this example that art, as a whole and in a universal sense,
increases the picturability of being. Word and image are not mere imitative illustrations
but allow what they present to be for the first time fully what it is” (Truth and Method
137). Lilly senses that within this family there is a feeling of completeness and it is this
unity that she aims to represent in pictorial form: “She seemed to be standing up to her
lips in some substance, to move and float and sink in it, yes, for these waters were
unfathomably deep. Into them had spilled so many lives. The Ramsays’; the childrens’;
and all sorts of waifs and strays of things besides. A washer-woman with her basket; a
rook; a red-hot poker; the purples and grey-greens of flowers: some common feeling held
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the whole” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 192). This family represents a model of love and
feeling, of undeniable connection. Each makes an effort and does so in a way that
acknowledges the provisionality of this effort; although one might misstep, each can rely
on the knowledge that there below lies a safety net of affection and support; one might be
uncertain, but not about these feelings: here is verification and corroboration, a sense that
all uncertainty is shared, the world itself meaningful and uncertain all at once.
For it is this feeling of connection, of shared experience, that attracts Lilly. She
recognizes that love and family and togetherness promote a sense of completeness: “It
was some such feeling of completeness perhaps which, ten years ago, standing almost
where she stood now, had made her say that she must be in love with the place” (Woolf,
To the Lighthouse 192). It is this feeling of coherence and unity that Lilly aims to
represent in her painting: “And as she dipped into the blue paint, she dipped too in the
past there” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 172). It is, of course, a nearly impossible task to
represent this family—and Lilly’s feeling about them—in her painting. But Lilly does
have an idea of what she is trying to accomplish. She is attempting to represent
completeness, harmony and balance. Also, too, the primary subject matter of her painting
is Mrs. Ramsay as she reads to her son James. But Lilly does not attempt to represent
mother and son realistically, instead she focuses on line and color—how they signify and
represent balance. When Lilly explains to Mr. Bankes her artistic decisions, we get a
better sense for her mission: “It was Mrs. Ramsay reading to James, she said. She knew
his objection—that no one could tell it for a human shape. But she had made no attempt
at likeness, she said. For what reason had she introduced them then? he asked. Why
indeed?—except that if there, in that corner, it was bright, here, in this, she felt the need
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of darkness” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 52). As Lilly engages with her painting she
engages with balance and harmony: an order and unity that Lilly is drawn to and strives
towards. For this reason Lilly chooses to paint: to engage her perception of the world and
its meaningfulness. In transforming her perceptions into a meaningful structure, they
might become more understandable and truthful: “Thus the concept of transformation
characterizes the independent and superior mode of being of what we called structure.
From this viewpoint ‘reality’ is defined as what is untransformed, and art as the raising
up (Aufhebung) of this reality into its truth” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 112).Yes, by
means of her painting, Lilly’s perceptions are transformed into a meaningful structure
and this structure comprehends unity and order: “art is present whenever a work succeeds
in elevating what it is or represents to a new configuration, a new world of its own in
miniature, a new order of unity in tension” (Gadamer, “Art and Imitation” 103). In point
of fact, this emphasis on the meaningfulness of art and its ability to order the world and
one’s understanding of it constitutes an important attribute of Modernism as it responded
to the trends of its time. At the time, there was a prevailing “mood of uncertainty
produced by […] the outbreak of World War I” (Fiero, 6: 30). With this uncertainty in
mind, art was seen as an especially vital means of ordering and understanding the world:
“Modernism is viewed as a kind of aesthetic heroism, which in the face of the chaos of
the modern world (very much a ‘fallen’ world) sees art as the only dependable reality and
as an ordering principle of a quasi-religious kind. The unity of art is supposedly a
salvation from the shattered order of modern reality” (Eysteinsson 9).
Now, Lilly does not finish her painting during the first section of the novel, the
first day, but it remains in her mind during the ten years that divide the novel. There is
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something about the painting that is so essential, so important and meaningful, that it
stays with her as she participates in her day-to-day existence, jostling her, still a matter to
be resolved:
There was something (she stood screwing up her little
Chinese eyes in her small puckered face), something she
remembered in the relation of those lines cutting across,
slicing down, and in the mass of the hedge with its green
cave of blues and browns, which had stayed in her mind;
which had tied a knot in her mind so that at odds and ends
of time, involuntarily, as she walked along the Brampton
road, as she brushed her hair, she found herself painting
that picture, passing her eye over it, and untying the knot in
her imagination. But there was all the difference in the
world between this planning airily away from the canvas,
and actually taking her brush and making the first mark
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse 157).
By means of this painting, Lilly might understand herself, how her personal narrative
might be unified; she might approach coherence and continuity:
Self-understanding always occurs through understanding
something other than the self, and includes the unity and
integrity of the other. Since we meet the artwork in the
world and encounter a world in the individual artwork, the
work of art is not some alien universe in which we are
magically transported for a time. Rather, we learn to
understand ourselves in and through it, and this means that
we sublate (aufheben) the discontinuity and atomism of
isolated experiences in the continuity of our own existence
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 83).
This painting, though, is a challenge that is rather indefinable, no true way to
know when the painting has really been completed, when this knot has truly been untied.
Nevertheless, Lilly is unwilling to ignore the mystery and uncertainty, the challenge of
the painting; it is there, it remains, and no one but Lilly will finish it. It is her
responsibility. In completing her painting, Lilly has the feeling that she will approach
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greater understanding, that she and the world will be closer together. This, according to
Gadamer, is one of the primary functions of art—to recognize the world for what it is:
When I recognize someone or something, what I see is
freed from the contingency of this or that moment of time.
It is part of the process of recognition that we see things in
terms of what is permanent and essential in them,
unencumbered by the contingent circumstances in which
they were seen before and are seen again. This is what
constitutes recognition and contributes to the joy we take in
imitation. For what imitation reveals is precisely the real
essence of the thing” (“Art and Imitation” 99).
This painting represents a challenge to be confronted, one that is part of Lilly’s very
marrow, her essence, one that relates to any and all of her activities. But now, when it is
time to finish, Lilly also recognizes the high stakes, the practical realities. For one might
have a general sense of what needs to be done, but when it comes time to do the actual
painting, the practicalities become overwhelming; there are so many possibilities; in the
doing, though, the limitations become more noticeable too. Lilly cannot instantaneously
change who she is: she already has a style, a way of being, which determines what
appears on the canvas. It is Lilly’s task to fully harness the positives of her style and
personality, to use them to her advantage—instead of obstacles, aids. All Lilly can do is
make the leap, participate:
For a moment it stayed trembling in a painful but exciting
ecstasy in the air. Where to begin?—that was the question
at what point to make the first mark? One line placed on the
canvas committed her to innumerable risks, to frequent and
irrevocable decisions. All that in idea seemed simple
became in practice immediately complex; as the waves
shape themselves symmetrically from the cliff top, but to
the swimmer among them are divided by steep gulfs, and
foaming crests. Still the risk must be run; the mark made
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse 157).
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Lilly is fully aware that each decision, each brushstroke changes the nature of the entire
picture, that possibility becomes something else as she paints, that the success of her
painting requires her to respond and react, to revise and amend as she moves forward. In
this effort, of course, there is a distinct parallel between the sense of possibility inherent
in both art and life: there are nothing but decisions and actions and, once done, there is no
turning back. At this point all one can do is incorporate and account for these decisions
and move forward, to do so in a way that unifies. In all cases, there is no escaping one’s
situation and circumstance, yet within each person there is a sense of limitless
possibility—art is a means of engaging this tension:
Amidst the variety of art, this same message of the whole
addresses us over and over again. Indeed, this seems to
provide a more precise answer concerning the significance
of art and beauty. This means that in any encounter with
art, it is not the particular, but rather the totality of the
experienceable world, man’s ontological place in it, and
above all his finitude before that which transcends him, that
is brought to experience (Gadamer, The Relevance of the
Beautiful 32-3).
In participating in art one is attempting to identify and share in generalities and
universalities: everyone perceives and this perception is meaningful; by means of
participation in art one might resolve and unify and share in what one sees. It is an effort
to discover essence, to achieve balance and unity, to represent the world for what it is:
“The concept of imitation can be used to describe the play of art only if one keeps in
mind the cognitive import of imitation. The thing presented is there (Das Dargestellte ist
da). That is the situation basic to imitation. When a person imitates something, he allows
what he knows to exist and to exist in the way that he knows it” (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 113). This is Lilly’s aim, to represent the world in a way that reveals its
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underlying structure, those shared experiences of perception that undergird the meaning
of the world:
She took up once more her old painting position with the
dim eyes and the absent-minded manner, subduing all her
impressions as a woman to something much more general;
becoming once more under the power of that vision which
she had seen so clearly once and must now grope for
among hedges and houses and mothers and children—her
picture. It was a question, she remembered, how to connect
this mass on the right hand with that on the left. She might
do it by bringing the line of the branch across so; or break
the vacancy in the foreground by an object (James perhaps)
so. But the danger was that by doing that the unity of the
whole might be broken (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 53).
As Lilly attempts to represent the world as she knows it to be, it is an attempt that does
not allow for verification. Instead it is the structural whole that is decisive, the one and
only criteria that matters. As one takes action to balance out the painting—or life—then
that very act changes the nature of the whole; a response is required to unify—and then
another—and then another.
Overall, it is Lilly’s mission to commune with the world, to represent her
impression, her perception of the world and its visual meaning. For Lilly appreciates the
meaning and mystery of what she sees. Perception includes meaning but Lilly also knows
that this meaning is incomplete, that it depends on her to flesh out its body and identity.
In doing so she might approach a closer correspondence between her perception of a
thing and its meaning in her life: “What was the problem then? She must try to get hold
of something that evaded her. It evaded her when she thought of Mrs. Ramsay; it evaded
her when she thought of her picture. Phrases came. Visions came. Beautiful pictures.
Beautiful phrases. But what she wished to get hold of was that very jar on the nerves, the
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thing itself before it has been made anything” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 193). The thing
itself, of course, depends on the perceiver; each thing is different based on the person
who sees it. Lilly, for her part, accepts the provocative thrust of the world as what it is:
the world means infinitely and variously; its meaning belongs to her interaction with it. It
is Lilly’s aim to plumb this interaction, to mine her feelings and impressions so that the
world is represented as she feels it, to represent the world as she has experienced it. This
accent on perception, in fact, is a predominant characteristic of Modernism. According to
Eysteinsson, “Modernism is felt to signal a radical ‘inward turn’” (26). This turn to
subjectivity constituted “a revolt against the traditional relation of the subject to the
outside world” (Eysteinsson 28). Traditionally, this relation to the outside world accepted
that the world was the same for everyone and it was up to the individual to discover its
essence, its eternal truth. The Modernists responded by demonstrating the variability of
the subject and the moment, with truth itself contingent on this variability.
For it is Lilly’s goal to bring her world to appearance, so that she understands it
for what it is and so that it might be shared. Visually, the world is nothing but a series of
appearances, but these appearances include an infinite depth and meaningfulness. That is,
the meaning of each appearance is infinite and variable, yet these appearances are
communicable and subject to dialogue, the meaning there to be chiseled even as it resists
total mastery: “The play of art as appearance is played out between us. The one takes the
creation simply as a creation, just as the other does. Communication takes place when the
other person takes part in what is imparted to him—and in such a way that he does not, as
it were, only receive in part what is communicated to him, but shares in this knowledge
of the whole matter that is fully possessed by both of them” (Gadamer, “The Play of Art”
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128). These appearances are meaningful, but it is not until one engages with this
meaningfulness that they acquire a more definite identity and understandability. In
painting, one engages with these appearances and by doing so one approaches essence,
the manner in which the meaningfulness of the visual is shared and understood. It is this
shared visual experience that Lilly mines: “Here she was again, she thought, stepping
back to look at it, drawn out of gossip, out of living, out of community with people into
the presence of this formidable enemy of hers—this other thing, this truth, this reality,
which suddenly laid hands on her, emerged stark at the back of appearances and
commanded her attention” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 158). For Lilly, painting is an
avenue to truth, in that she engages with her perception of the world and this perception
becomes something definite and real, something that demands that she account for
absolutely everything, something that makes perception itself both more meaningful and
understandable.
Lilly is vital to the meaning of this narrative, but she is not the only character who
lies at its heart. Mrs. Ramsay is central too. Lilly’s painting concerns Mrs. Ramsay—her
huge presence in the first section, her gaping absence in the final section. The mother of
eight children and the wife of a philosopher, Mrs. Ramsay has chosen to nest in the heart
of life. Beautiful, she is used to people wanting her and needing her and praising her,
offering her tributes; she is used to people listening to what she says and obeying what
she says. Her beauty and heartfelt personality gives her access to the intimate concerns of
her friends and loved ones—she is convincing in her charm and grace, her
straightforward simplicity. People are drawn to trust her and need her. For her part, Mrs.
Ramsay is drawn to share with and influence those around her: it is in her nature to help
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and care. More than just being helpful, Mrs. Ramsay’s transaction with the world is
truthful and honest—it is her instinct to understand the plight of those around her and to
acknowledge that it is something universal, a burden that might be eased when shared.
For example, the reader gets a sense for Mrs. Ramsay’s character when the narrative
discusses her ability to empathize with “stories of great passion, of love foiled, of
ambition thwarted” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 29). Although she might not have
undergone these experiences to the same degree of intensity, she is still able to identify
with and understand them, at home with people and the vicissitudes of life. Part of Mrs.
Ramsay’s character is an awareness of the difficulty and challenge inherent in living: part
of life is disappointment—it is unavoidable. To grow up, to learn and have experiences
also means that one’s horizon and expectations are refuted: “Every experience worthy of
the name thwarts an expectation” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 350). It is her ability to
comprehend people’s shared plight that endears her to others: “She knew then—she knew
without having learnt. Her simplicity fathomed what clever people falsified. Her
singleness of mind made her drop plumb like a stone, alight exact as a bird, gave her,
naturally, this swoop and fall of upon truth which delighted, eased, sustained—falsely
perhaps” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 29). Mrs. Ramsay is so simple and capable of
understanding the world as it is because she trusts her instincts—that, when shared, the
world is more understandable.
It is Mrs. Ramsay’s nature to share with others; so too it is her nature to act, to do.
Instead of just talking about the need to help others, she acts. In this action she is at
home, comfortable, where she belongs. When helping, when sharing, she is most herself:
“She never talked of it—she went punctually, directly. It was her instinct to go, an
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instinct like the swallows for the south, the artichokes for the sun, turning her infallibly to
the human race, making her nest in its heart” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 196). This
instinct, for its part, is Mrs. Ramsay’s primary tool for understanding. It is an approach to
life that is foreign to Lilly but one that she appreciates. Lilly has her own personality and
approach—one that starkly contrasts with Mrs. Ramsay—but Lilly sees that Mrs. Ramsay
is successful, that her approach allows her to know the world as it is: “did she lock up
within her some secret which certainly Lilly believed people must have for the world to
go on at all? Everyone could not be as helter skelter, hand to mouth as she was. But if
they knew, could they tell one what they knew?” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 57). Lilly
senses that Mrs. Ramsay has figured things out. Of course, no one ever fully understands
everything, but Lilly feels that Mrs. Ramsay has come closer to truth, that she
understands better than most. However, this sort of knowledge is difficult to relay: a
secret, it is something that is so central, so vital, that one is not aware of it—something
that shapes who and what somebody understands and who and what somebody is. Sure,
one can try to communicate the identity of one’s platform, one’s horizon, but the words
are bound to miss the mark, the width and depth and simultaneity always outpacing one’s
ability to express it. This concept that one can never truly know oneself or express all that
one knows resonates with the concerns of Modernism. The Modernists acknowledged
that this aspect of the self was decisive and decided to explore its contours: “As writers
lost confidence in their perception and grasp of things outside man’s consciousness—
feeling that they hardly knew themselves, much less anything outside themselves—they
inevitably turned inward to that consciousness for their subject matter” (Beja 47). In the
characterization of Mrs. Ramsay and Lilly’s desire to unlock her friend’s interior, one can
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notice this highlighting of the self, this stress on what and how one understands, whether
it be one’s limitations or one’s possibilities.
Lilly is drawn to Mrs. Ramsay. Mrs. Ramsay’s sense for truth attracts Lilly; when
Lilly is attempting to finish her painting, she returns again and again to Mrs. Ramsay. She
recalls several scenes in which she and Mrs. Ramsay are together. In one, Lilly has her
arms around Mrs. Ramsay’s knees, to get as “close as she could get” (Woolf, To the
Lighthouse 50). Lilly wishes she could truly understand Mrs. Ramsay: “she imagined
how in the chambers of the mind and heart of the woman who was, physically, touching
her, were stood, like the treasures in the tombs of the kings, tablets bearing sacred
inscriptions, which if one could spell them out, would teach one everything, but they
would never be offered openly, never made public” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 51). Lilly
intuits that Mrs. Ramsay holds a key to understanding and that if she could possess it then
she would understand. But complete understanding cannot be shared nor gained, the
intricacies too knotted, the view too one-sided. However, one can refine one’s
understanding and improve. Through dialogue, one can expand one’s horizon, approach
the world with improved clarity: “when we speak to one another we do not so much
transmit well-defined facts, as place our own aspirations and knowledge into a broader
and richer horizon through dialogue with the other” (Gadamer, “On the Contribution of
Poetry to the Search for Truth” 106). In this context, the emotional component of this
interaction should not be discounted: caring for someone is a crucial step towards
understanding. Strong feelings are commonly a fount of inspiration—one is suddenly
able to see from the other’s point of view and the world is both unified and corroborated:
“Could loving, as people called it, make her and Mrs. Ramsay one? for it was not
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knowledge but unity that she desired, not inscriptions on tablets, nothing that could be
written in any language known to men, but intimacy itself, which is knowledge, she had
thought, leaning her head on Mrs. Ramsay’s knee” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 51). In the
relationship between Mrs. Ramsay and Lilly we get a sense for the value and importance
of closeness, of intimacy. Together, close, ready to share, the two seek something that
can only be found in the interaction. Neither pursues something specific; instead each
flowers when in the presence of the other—narrowness and bias, one’s self-doubt—these
evaporate in this intimacy. Despite individual particularities and differences, each has a
world and it is this shared experience that shapes the dialogue, allowing it to illuminate
truth and refute falsehood: “Most astonishing about the essence of language and
conversation is that I myself am not restricted by what I believe when I speak with others
about something, that no one of us embraces the whole truth within his beliefs but that
the whole truth can, however, embrace us both in our individual beliefs” (Gadamer,
“What is Truth?” 46). It is an interaction that pushes the individual to account for the
presence of the other; it is a dynamic that is neither conscious nor difficult: the world
glows, backlit from within, effortlessly illuminated. Stabilized by this platform of
intimacy and feeling, one might take risks, experiment, always aware that this platform
will cradle and support. Furthermore, because of this connection, one is pushed to
explore: the difference of the other a spark that flames into language, into understanding.
Indeed, Lilly recognizes the value of sharing, of intimacy and human connection,
and so does Mrs. Ramsay. It is this feeling of community that Mrs. Ramsay promotes
above all others. The dinner scene is a good example of this effort. More will be said
about this scene, but, for the moment, Mrs. Ramsay’s contribution to the success of this
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dinner is most relevant. She is the heartbeat of this summer home and everyone
connected to it. Her social instinct, her sense for the value and importance of human
individuality—and connection—means that she is the social and emotional puppet
master. In many respects, she is the thread that connects everyone: “Nothing seemed to
have merged. They all sat separate. And the whole of the effort of merging and flowing
and creating rested on her” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 83). It is not an easy task, but it is
her identity to bring people together. This characteristic helps explain why she is so
valued, why she is viewed as exceptional, supremely wise, at home with truth and
understanding, a willing participant in the meaning of the world. And it is this reputation
that enables her to influence her friends and family so noticeably: they trust her instincts,
her sense for truth, her implicit knowledge that she knows the right path, the right
decision. And it is Mrs. Ramsay’s influence that persuades Paul Rayley and Minta Doyle
to marry. Mrs. Ramsay does not openly persuade them to marry, but her very personality
embodies the argument without saying a word; in Mrs. Ramsay they cannot but notice the
value of marriage and human connection. For Minta and Paul, Mrs. Ramsay is a model to
emulate; her very presence suggests that marriage and love are possible and even
appealing: “They would, she thought, going on again, however long they lived, come
back to this night; this moon; this wind; this house: and to her too. It flattered her, where
she was most susceptible of flattery, to think how, wound about their hearts, however
long they lived she would be woven” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 113).
For her part, Mrs. Ramsay is neither a poet nor a philosopher. It is not her life’s
task to engage with—understand and interpret—the primordial phenomena of the world.
But she does not completely ignore the value of intellectual and creative engagement. She
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is not a laser beam of focus and intensity, but she is still drawn to language, to textuality,
to the rhythm and musicality, the mystery and disclosure of poetry. As when, after dinner,
she alights in the study, joins her husband, and picks a book of poetry randomly, opens it
randomly, and reads what is there. There is something about the balance, the rhythm, the
capacity to evoke, the imaging of the world, that settles Mrs. Ramsay: the world can be
understandable and ordered—it can be beautiful and complete. Although her life is filled
with frayed edges and unanswerable questions, it can be corralled and contained; mystery
can be accounted for, included, part of the very meaning; life can be put into language
and made understandable. For Mrs. Ramsay reads a sonnet and in this reading acquires a
feeling of completeness; a sensation that stems from her participation, a unity that is her
responsibility: “So reading she was ascending, she felt, on to the top, on to the summit.
How satisfying! How restful! All the odds and ends of the day stuck to this magnet; her
mind felt swept, felt clean. And then there it was, suddenly entire; she held it in her hand,
beautiful and reasonable, clear and complete, the essence sucked out of life and held
rounded here—the sonnet” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 121). The words of the sonnet are
only understandable as they relate to Mrs. Ramsay’s perceptions; in the reading she is
reminded of what she sees and understands; but, instead of a series of fragmented
impressions, in the sonnet she discovers order and balance, a feeling of resolution that is
transferred to her life and all that it might be. In Gadamer’s philosophical outlook poetry
is a means of confronting one’s familiarity with the world:
When we grow up in a language, the world is brought close
to us and comes to acquire a certain stability. Language
always furnishes the fundamental articulations that guide
our understanding of the world. It belongs to the nature of
familiarity with the world that whenever we exchange
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words with one another, we share the world. The word of
the poet does not simply continue this process of
Einhausung, or ‘making ourselves at home.’ Instead it
stands over against this process like a mirror held up to it.
But what appears in the mirror is not the world, nor this or
that thing in the world, but rather this nearness or
familiarity in which we stand for a while. This standing and
this nearness find permanence in the language of literature
and, most perfectly, in the poem (“On the Contribution of
Poetry to the Search for Truth” 115).
In engaging with a poem, one has the opportunity to enact order and meaning, as all the
words belong and relate to a meaningful whole. One gains insight and understanding
because one relates the unity of the poem to the potential unity of life. The Modernists,
for their part, were particularly enamored with art and literature’s ability to provide order
where otherwise there was chaos: “the modernists were convinced that they could impose
an order on the seeming randomness, and meaninglessness of human of human
existence” (Matthews and Platt 570).
In addition to Lilly and Mrs. Ramsay, Mr. Ramsay is vital to the meaning of this
novel. A philosopher, he is intensely engaged with meaning, the transaction that occurs
between the individual and the world. For its part, Mr. Ramsay’s philosophical
engagement also belongs to a historical moment, a philosophical climate that was rapidly
changing. This change might be described as “a late nineteenth-century turn in
philosophy from describing the world to an investigation of its ‘conditions of possibility,
to ‘formulating an experience of the world, a contact with the world which precedes all
thought about the world’” (Hussey, “Woolf: After Lives” 20). Though his philosophical
position is never outlined, it is within this climate that Mr. Ramsay philosophizes. His
task is to question and probe, to consider all of those factors that contribute to meaning,
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an amalgamation of factors that elude and morph as they mesh and combine. For his part,
Mr. Ramsay is defined by the intensity of this effort: to approach life and all of its
complexities; to discover what is common, what we all share—this is his responsibility
and it is very difficult, a supreme challenge. But this is his life’s work and he is
committed. Certainly the weight and challenge of his effort renders him surly and
frustrated, the answer never entirely clear, the complexity too knotted. In all, though, the
effort is worthwhile: despite the ever-extending horizon, his work does contribute to
improved understanding; the texture becomes stronger, the weave tighter; illusion and
false understanding are sidestepped and truth embraced. In point of fact, to a considerable
degree, Mr. Ramsay’s concerns resonate with the subject matter of this very project: he
too considers “Subject and object and the nature of reality” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse
23). In Gadamer’s case, he argues for the indivisibility between the world as it is
perceived and named and the world as it is: “We are simply following an internal
necessity of the thing itself if we go beyond the idea of the object and objectivity of
understanding toward the idea that subject and object belong together” (Truth and
Method 457). Now, these considerations are foreign to the other characters of this novel,
but they sense that his work matters. Lilly, for example, acknowledges his contribution:
that the ephemeral, multi-colored world might be reduced to essence, the extraneous and
superfluous discarded. As an emblem of his work, Lilly is told to think of a kitchen table
when she is not there. Lilly marvels that Mr. Ramsay is able to reduce perception to
something so bare and geometric. She notices that he is exceptional, different: “Naturally,
if one’s days were passed in this seeing of angular essences, this reducing of lovely
evenings, with all of their flamingo clouds and blue and silver to a white deal four-legged
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table (and it was a mark of the finest minds so to do), naturally one could not be judged
like an ordinary person” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 23). Undoubtedly, Mr. Ramsay is
different than most, a man who is willing to approach life’s most difficult questions, a
man who doggedly hunts for truth and abhors falsehood.
But Mr. Ramsay’s outlook and effort includes collateral damage. His instinct for
the thoughts and feelings of others is stunted. His primary concern is truth, never mind
the consequences. He is blunt to a fault, even with his children. At the opening of this
novel, the reader gets a sense for Mr. Ramsay’s heartlessness. At this point, husband and
wife discuss with their son James if he will be able to go to the lighthouse tomorrow.
Mrs. Ramsay says that it might be possible—the weather could be mild. Mr. Ramsay says
that it definitely will not be possible, a storm on the horizon. Both are right in their own
way. For Mrs. Ramsay, the weather could change, necessarily unpredictable; for Mr.
Ramsay, meteorology is a science, objectively predictable. To Mr. Ramsay, planning for
a trip that will surely not happen is silly and foolhardy, a bad example for his son. For
Mrs. Ramsay, the possibility of the trip should be maintained, James’ very mood
dependent on the prospect of this trip. Mrs. Ramsay would like to encourage James’
sense of hope and possibility: the trip, after all, might happen. But Mr. Ramsay would
prefer James to confront life as it is, harsh and uncompromising: “What he said was true.
It was always true. He was incapable of untruth; never tampered with a fact; never altered
a disagreeable word to suit the pleasure or convenience of any mortal being, least of all
his own children, who, sprung from his loins, should be aware from childhood that life is
difficult; facts uncompromising” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 4). Yes, “life is difficult”,
but, as readers, we get a sense that Mr. Ramsay is too rigid in his principles; sure, parents
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should prepare their children for the challenges of the world; at the same time, however,
parents should encourage their children, protect and promote their sense of hope and
wonder. When the world is presented so bleakly, children might not feel motivated to
participate, might feel overwhelmed and choose to withdraw. Furthermore, in his
absolutism we see a lack of consideration for context and audience. To seek truth with
such intensity is honorable, but to do so in a manner that is rigid or inflexible could also
obscure truth, too unreceptive to the nuances of the moment and its demands. The
importance of this adaptability is one of Gadamer’s primary concerns: “Every
interpretation has to adapt itself to the hermeneutical situation to which it belongs” (“On
the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth” 112).
Regarding Mr. Ramsay’s character, the novel seems to maintain an attitude of
ambivalence. On one side, he should be commended for his effort and his willingness to
confront life’s most difficult and challenging questions; he wants nothing more than to
understand. On the other, his consideration of these questions seems to discount the
moment, the context, and the participation of the individual, as if one could arrive at a
final answer that explains everything. Too often Mr. Ramsay fails to include his own
participation in the thing being understood; this inclusion is one of Gadamer’s primary
directives: “In all understanding an application occurs, such that the person who is
understanding is himself or herself right there in the understood meaning. He or she
belongs to the subject matter that he or she is understanding” (Gadamer in Conversation
47). Because he seems to view the world as something that can be objectively
understood, Mr. Ramsay seems to believe that he can arrive at a final answer. This is his
ultimate goal and he is willing to strain himself to the utmost in order to reach it. As an
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emblem of his effort, the novel presents his philosophical thought as if it were
sequential—once one problem is solved then on to the next, until there are no more
problems, the world fully mapped—as if each problem was like a letter of the alphabet—
if one can recite all of the letters then one has conquered the entirety of mystery. In this
scheme, Mr. Ramsay has reached Q, has gone farther than most everyone else. Now he is
on to R, but is unable to nail it down. It is his life’s goal, his supreme priority, willing to
work himself until nothing is left: “Qualities that would have saved a ship’s company
exposed on a broiling sea with six biscuits and a flask of water—endurance and justice,
foresight, devotion, skill, came to his help. R is then—what is R?” (Woolf, To the
Lighthouse 34). Mr. Ramsay is committed, willing to endure discomfort and pain,
prepared to sacrifice for his goal. But no matter how much he tries, he cannot overcome
his limitations—life remains mysterious, the world a question. According to Gadamer,
the world will forever remain questionable, as all understanding is limited and more can
always be said: “Nothing that is said has its truth simply in itself, but refers instead
backwards and forward to what is unsaid” (Man and Language 67). But Mr. Ramsay
should be commended for his effort: despite his shortcomings, he is willing to try, to take
on the responsibility of understanding, of contemplating something that is bound to
frustrate, cannot but frustrate.
For this effort requires a willingness to go deep, to discard irrelevancies, to
concentrate one’s thought to the point of essence, to recognize scope, to place oneself and
others in proper context. To do so, of course, is to acknowledge one’s smallness, the
world and understanding ultimately unfathomable; to accept one’s place, to account for it
and to consider the implications—these are his concerns. Overall, his aim is to confront
219

understanding: “It was his power, his gift, suddenly to shed all superfluities, to shrink and
diminish so that he looked barer and felt sparer, even physically, yet lost none of his
intensity of mind, and so to stand on this little ledge facing the dark of human ignorance,
how we know nothing and the sea eats away the ground we stand on—that was his fate,
his gift” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 44). Mr. Ramsay only wants to think about those
transactions between the individual and the world that are most essential, transactions
that are necessarily limited but, at the same time, are most potent because of these
limitations. This notion that human understanding and human reason are limited are
characteristic of Modernism. It was a time when many began to refute “the precept that
human reason governs human behavior” (Fiero, 6: 27). It was also an era when there was
“a loss of confidence in moral absolutes” (Fiero, 6: 69). The subject was no longer seen
to be in control of his or her self, subject to contradictory thoughts and feelings, and there
was no certainty about good or bad either; the limitations of the human subject began to
acquire greater weight—how to account for them and incorporate them into one’s
understanding.
However ambitious Mr. Ramsay might be, however willing to pursue the most
difficult challenges, he is able to do so because he has the support of his wife. She is his
beacon of light should he lose his way. It is because she believes in him that he is able to
take risks; it is because she loves him that the world is worth exploring: “If he put
implicit faith in her, nothing should hurt him; however deep he buried himself or climbed
high, not for a second should he find himself without her” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 38).
Mrs. Ramsay is willing to sacrifice for her husband, to spend her energy in a way that
sustains and nourishes him. But their relationship is not a one-way street either. Mr.
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Ramsay also sustains and nourishes Mrs. Ramsay. During the dinner scene, for example,
the group discusses fishermen and their wages and Mrs. Ramsay yearns for her husband
to comment on the topic. To her, he is wise and knowledgeable, capable of illuminating
the topic in a way that makes it both interesting and important: “One word, she said to
herself. For if he said a thing, it would make all the difference. He went to the heart of
things. He cared about fishermen and their wages. He could not sleep for thinking of
them. It was altogether different when he spoke; one did not feel then, pray heaven you
don’t see how little I care, because one did care” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 95). The two,
then, are a team, each giving something to the other, something missing but needed.
Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay are very different, but, when combined, create something
new that is better than the sum of its parts, each depending on the other, each inspiring
the other. Each compensates for the limitations of the other, as when Mr. Ramsay needs
reassurance and love or Mrs. Ramsay needs precision and accuracy—upon interacting,
they produce “successful creation”, their relationship so alive it has a pulse: “Every throb
of this pulse seemed, as he walked away, to enclose her and her husband, and to give to
each that solace which two different notes, one high, one low, struck together, seem to
give to each other as they combine” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 38-9). In the interaction,
in the other, there is balm and relief, a resonance that soothes. In the marriage the two
become more; in the particular character of the other, each a feeling of corroboration and
a challenge. In general, there is a sense of shared perception, of looking at the same thing:
“So that is marriage, Lilly thought, a man and a woman looking at a girl throwing a ball”
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse 72). Marriage represents a chance to share, to belong to the
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same world, to partake in the meaningfulness of perception. No matter their differences,
this sharing fulfills, sustains, allows each to be more confident in his or her individuality.
In marriage the world is shared and in this sharing there is a chance to transcend
one’s individuality and limitedness; one’s partner sees what one does not see, one’s blind
spots become more visible. In the interaction, one becomes more, but part of this
interaction includes friction, an immitigable difference; this difference can never be truly
overcome: “it was painful to be reminded of the inadequacy of human relationships, that
the most perfect was flawed” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 40). All human relationships are
imperfect because of the primacy of individuality—the differences are patent: “To be this
and not that constitutes the determinacy of all beings” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 442).
Differences can never entirely be overcome. Each person sees and understands from a
particular horizon: “The infinite perfectibility of the human experience of the world
means that, whatever language we use, we never succeed in seeing anything but an ever
more extended aspect, a ‘view’ of the world” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 444). The
particularities are ingrained, but one can choose to be generous, one can choose to give.
Instead of fixating on the differences as something to be overcome, they can be
celebrated, they can be seen as an opportunity. In the case of the Ramsays, there are
certainly many differences, yet each chooses to embrace the other without hesitation;
love is intangible, inexpressible, something that occurs between two people in a way that
is entirely unique and unrepeatable; every moment, every instance, every interaction has
its own identity, requiring its own particular approach. So, when Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay
find themselves together at the end of the day, the two discuss the day, the dinner, and
two of their houseguests, the newly engaged couple, Paul Rayley and Minta Doyle. This
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engagement leads the Ramsays to think about their own marriage—its nature, what each
means the one to the other. At this moment Mr. Ramsay wants his wife to tell him that
she loves him, something—the book hints—that he requests rather often. But Mrs.
Ramsay distrusts the verbalization of her feelings, scared that the words will not capture
her true feelings, preferring to express her feelings with action. But between them there is
a concord, a sense for the thoughts and feelings for the other without them ever being
said. This concord is unique to their marriage and to their history: they are able to
communicate wordlessly, in their own nonverbal language. So, Mrs. Ramsay chooses not
to express her love with words, yet she successfully relays the message—she loves him
so much that she does not even need to say it: “And she looked at him smiling. For she
had triumphed again. She had not said: yet he knew” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 124).
Their love is unique: a shared feeling that is indecipherable to anyone but the couple, an
interaction with its own special language, reliant on nobody else, vindicated by the only
people that matter.
In addition to Lilly and the Ramsay couple, the Ramsay children are vital to the
impact and meaning of this novel. In particular, James and Cam stand out. After all, the
two, along with their father, finally reach the lighthouse, ten years after their initial effort.
We first meet James and Cam when they are six and seven years old respectively. Fresh
and new to life, James hinges all of his hopes and dreams on this trip to the lighthouse.
To him, somehow, it represents a daring expedition, a chance to explore the unknown and
reach a far-away goal. This failed trip stays in James’ mind, a symbol for life: one sets a
goal and one is thwarted. It is no one’s fault, but disappointment and pain are inevitable.
James imagines a particular scene to illustrate this thought: “Suppose then that as a child
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sitting helpless in a perambulator, or on some one’s knee, he had seen a wagon crush
ignorantly and innocently, some one’s foot? Suppose he had seen the foot first, in the
grass, smooth, and whole; then the wheel; and the same foot, purple, crushed. But the
wheel was innocent” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 185). One is bound to be disappointed,
overcome, stymied, and it is no one’s fault. Part of what it means to live is to suffer:
“What a man has to learn through suffering is not this or that particular thing, but insight
into the limitations of humanity” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 351). All one can do is
accept this reality, live with it, move forward, respond and react accordingly.
James was disappointed as a child and this disappointment informs his outlook as
an adolescent. In the end, he does reach the lighthouse, even if he is no longer
enthusiastic about the prospect. Nevertheless, in this long-delayed trip he is compelled to
revisit the seeds of his pessimism and gloominess. Back when he was a child, the
lighthouse represented possibility, mystery; ten years later it is something material,
practical. James realizes that the lighthouse represents many things: “For nothing was
simply one thing” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 186). When, in the end, James finally
alights at the lighthouse, he describes it as “stark” and “bare” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse
203). He compares it to his own life: “It confirmed some obscure feeling of his about his
own character” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 203). Having finally made it the lighthouse,
James accepts and confronts life as it is: it brims with adversity and challenges; though
alone and bereft, one stands tall, endures, and cherishes those moments of joy that are
even more special because nothing is guaranteed.
Aside from James, Cam and Nancy also play an important role in the narrative.
To a considerable degree, both represent adolescence—the link between adolescence and
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possibility. Nancy appears most prominently in the first section of the novel, when she is
out hiking with Paul Rayley and Minta Doyle. During this trip, Paul is on the cusp of
proposing marriage to Minta. He feels nervous and so does Minta—both are uncertain
about their future. It is one of the most important decisions that the two will make, a fork
in the road, two distinct futures. Based on this choice, the future of each will completely
transform; but nothing is certain, verification impossible—one can only leap. So, there
comes a point when Minta grasps Nancy’s hand, releases it, takes it again, lets it go, and
so on: Nancy senses why Minta is so nervous—she will make a decision that will shape
her entire life. For, it is true, deep profound connection determines meaning, the world a
potential source of inspiration, fulfillment in the distance but visible. Nancy registers this
dynamic, that love and marriage could be hers, all of its possibility, all of its potential
disappointment: “When Minta took her hand and held it, Nancy, reluctantly, saw the
whole world spread out beneath her” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 73). Nancy instantly
intuits that the world itself is shaped by one’s decisions and one’s relationships; options
and choices are inevitable. Each path is bound to be misshapen in some way, flawed and
limited. Furthermore, these potentialities are rarely one-sided: something might be
gained, but something is also lost. So, when Minta loses her brooch and cries, Nancy
feels that Minta is not only lamenting her lost brooch; Minta is emotional because she is
growing up and decisions are on the horizon, because her elections are likely flawed,
bound to lose even as she gains: “It might be true that she minded losing her brooch, but
she wasn’t crying only for that. She was crying for something else. We might all sit down
and cry, she felt. But she did not know what for” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 77). No
matter her decision, Minta will suffer dissapointment. All relationships are imperfect—
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here tension, there conflict, the differences insuperable. Or—perhaps better, perhaps
worse—one is alone, in charge of one’s destiny, but uncertain about its meaning and
importance, no one there to support or challenge it.
Cam, for her part, hardly appears in the first section of the novel, but figures more
prominently in the final section, when she, James, and their father travel to the
lighthouse. During this trip her adolescent mindset appears in bold relief: the world
awaits, almost anything possible. During this trip she daydreams, released from habit, out
on the water, on an adventure, her sensations new and special: “It was the sense of
adventure and escape that she wanted […] From her hand […] there spurted up a fountain
of joy […]. And the drops falling from this sudden and unthinking fountain of joy fell
here and there on the dark, the slumbrous shapes in her mind; shapes of a world not
realized but turning in there darkness, catching here and there, a spark of light; Greece,
Rome, Constantinople” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 189). For Cam, there is an entire
world that remains to be realized, awaiting her, at its most powerful when she chooses to
engage with it, only possible if she becomes what she might be. To know the world and
belong to the world is a primary concern for everyone: how to make it happen? What
steps should be taken? There is no direct answer, but the possibility of self-fulfillment is
undeniable.
The members of the Ramsay family are the primary characters of this novel, but
the houseguests are also critical. Much has already been said about Lilly, but it is also
worth discussing the guests as a group, as members of a community that includes the
Ramsays. Overall, that so many different and unique personalities have gathered together
is of special note. Because there is friendship, because there is dialogue, the world of
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each might expand. In the interaction, one might grow; furthermore, one might notice
one’s blind spots, those unexamined assumptions that remain unnoticed until revealed by
the presence of another. For example, the trio of Mr. Carmichael, Charles Tansley, and
Mrs. Ramsay: each represents an alternative to the other, a reproach and a rebuke, a
means of contrast. Each so different, when one sees the world through the eyes of the
other, one’s entire outlook becomes skewed, strange, wobbly: “Her going was a reproach
to them, gave a different twist to the world, so that they were led to protest, seeing their
prepossessions disappear, and clutch at them vanishing. Charles Tansley did that too: it
was part of the reason why one disliked him. He upset the proportions of one’s world”
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse 196). Both Mr. Carmichael and Charles Tansley are oriented
towards thinking and contemplation, while Mrs. Ramsay is drawn towards action; when
they interact, each sees the limitedness of his or her personal outlook and position.
At the same time, in community, in sharing, there is a sense of enlargement.
Because of the differences—and in spite of them—the world becomes more. It is a
dynamic where the similarities and the differences blend and respond to each other—the
outcome now more refined because the similarities push one to highlight priorities and
the differences push one to discard irrelevancies. In sharing the world there is a sense of
corroboration and refinement, of understanding better and more; that there are differences
at all is part of the appeal: “That was his way of looking, different from hers. But looking
together united them” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 97). Mr. Bankes and Mrs. Ramsay are
united when the two look at the same thing, the thing now more vibrant and so too Mr.
Bankes and Mrs. Ramsay. And it is this sensation of common experience that stands out
when the entire house gathers for dinner. The world is filled with infinite possibility, with
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an infinite variety of people, but these people find themselves in this particular house,
immersed in this particular dinner, with these particular people; at this moment, the world
is something concrete and definite. Instead of anything, they are engaged with something.
To have a place, to be with people who matter, who care—in this there is tremendous
value, instead of uncertainty, stability and reassurance: “they were all conscious of
making a party together in a hollow, on an island; had their common cause against that
fluidity out there” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 97). In this case, this collection of
individuals has chosen to share and interact with one another; each responds to the other
in a way that accounts for the other, allowing for a suspension of subjectivity and an
orientation to the group as a whole that leads to unexpected insight and meaning.
According to Gadamer, this is the nature of dialogue—in it there is a loss of subjectivity
in which the subject matter itself becomes the decisive factor, shaping all who participate:
“Neither partner alone constitutes the determining factor; rather, it is the unified form of
movement as a whole that unifies the fluid activity of both. We can formulate this idea as
a theoretical generalization by saying that the individual self, including his activity and
his understanding of himself, is taken up into a higher determination that is really the
decisive factor” (“On the Problem of Self Understanding” 54). The outcome of this
grouping is unpredictable—the resultant feelings, conversation, glances and looks, are
necessarily spontaneous and of the moment: no one knows if this dinner will be special, if
it will lodge itself in the memory of these individuals, if it will, by chance, shift meaning
into clearer focus. But this feeling of togetherness is the first step, a loss of self that
allows one to see from a different perspective, swept up by the group.
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This sense of potential, that the dinner could be special, memorable and important
is most acutely felt by Mrs. Ramsay. She possesses a highly attuned awareness of people
and their concerns: she knows that this dinner—and the shared experience that it
implies—is both a challenge and an opportunity. She acknowledges that individual
differences are hard to overcome, that each has his or her particular priorities; community
also comprehends acrimony, bitterness, and resentment. But she also accepts that the
challenge is worth confronting. No matter the pain, the reward is worth it. So she links
people together, so she insists that everyone dine in unity. At the same time, there is no
guarantee that people will get along, that the conversation will soar, that people will feel
comfortable. Everyone may be caught up in his or her particular concerns, as when Mrs.
Ramsay wonders to herself, “But what have I done with my life?” (Woolf, To the
Lighthouse 82). At this point Mrs. Ramsay feels disconnected from her family, her
friends, and the world. She feels as if she has done nothing worthwhile, as if nothing
matters. Each person is separate, apart from the other other, nothing in common, no unity.
Directly, Mrs. Ramsay experiences the urge to merge these disparate personalities, to
experience unity—in doing so she might reconnect with her greatest ability and
accomplishment, her weightiest responsibility: “Nothing seemed to have merged. They
all sat separate. And the whole of the effort of merging and flowing and creating rested
on her” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 83). Mrs. Ramsay binds them together, a source of
commonality, each connected to her in some way. She takes on the responsibility because
she has the capacity to do so; she knows that the potential reward is worth the sacrifice;
everyone might feel as if he or she belongs; each might feel at home, the world suddenly
truer and more understandable.
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If they are lucky, the group might amble into a meadow of peace and ease, of
comfort, where there is no strain, the feelings completely natural, unforced, where each
feels exalted, uplifted. According to Gadamer, this is the nature of dialogue, of play: “It is
part of play that the movement is not only without goal or purpose but also without effort.
It happens, as it were, by itself. The ease of play—which naturally does not mean that
there is any real absence of effort but refers phenomenologically only to the absence of
strain—is experienced subjectively as relaxation. The structure of play absorbs the player
into itself, and thus frees him from the burden of taking the initiative, which constitutes
the actual strain of existence” (Truth and Method 105). Near the end of the dinner, Mrs.
Ramsay does feel this way—everyone is together and this togetherness is as it should be:
Everything seemed right. Just now (but this cannot last, she
thought, dissociating herself from the moment while they
were all talking about boots) just now she had reached
security; she hovered like a hawk suspended; like a flag
floated in an element of joy which filled every nerve of her
body fully and sweetly, not noisily, solemnly rather, for it
arose, she thought, looking at them all eating there, from
husband and children and friends; all of which rising in this
profound stillness (she was helping Mr. Bankes to one very
small piece more, and peered in the depths of the
earthenware pot) seemed now for no special reason to stay
there like a smoke, like a fume rising upwards, holding
them safe together (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 104-5).
To Mrs. Ramsay then, this group brought together is its own special entity, one that is of
special value precisely because of its uniqueness, because the group is capable of
overcoming strife, because, despite the differences, each person means something to the
other. To Mrs. Ramsay, this mood of unity and togetherness is what matters most; people
do connect, people do depend on each other—these needs are eternal; when people
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experience this connection, it is a moment that lasts, one that is decisive and defines all
subsequent experience, all engagement with otherness, all potential growth:
Nothing need be said; nothing could be said. There it was,
all round them. It partook, she felt, carefully helping Mr.
Bankes to a specially tender piece, of eternity; as she had
already felt about something different once before that
afternoon; there is a coherence in things, a stability;
something, she meant, is immune from change and shines
out (she glanced at the window with its ripple of reflected
lights) in the face of the flowing, the fleeting, the spectral,
like a ruby; so that again tonight she had the feeling she had
had once today, already, of peace, of rest. Of such
moments, she thought, the thing is made that endures
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse 105).
It is only because of moments like these that the world means anything at all. It is only
because people bond with one another and begin to care that the world inspires and
compels. It is not an act of consciousness; in the moment, one does not know what is
happening; instead, it is a matter of attunement to the other, to the subject matter; the
world springs forth as something meaningful, as something irrefutable and undeniable
while still withholding its innermost meaning.
In the first section of the novel, “The Window”, the reader gets a sense for the
Ramsay family and their houseguests: their concerns, their values, their goals. In
particular, the reader sees that Mrs. Ramsay is at the heart of this group—she is the
binding agent that enables and empowers each person to belong and share. But then Mrs.
Ramsay dies, ten years pass, and the dynamics change considerably. In this final section,
“The Lighthouse”, Mr. Ramsay and two of his adolescent children, James and Cam, are
en route to the lighthouse. Also, Lilly returns to the summer home and chooses to finish
her painting, the very same one she began ten years earlier. In the end, all attain their
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objectives: the Ramsays reach the lighthouse and Lilly completes her painting. The
meaningfulness of these goals and their resolution are informed by the first section, when
Mrs. Ramsay and all of the Ramsay children were still alive, the War still in the distance;
they are also informed by the passage of time and all that it implies. In the dividing
section, then, the reader is tasked with directly engaging with time—its identity, its
elusiveness.
For Woolf does not present time as something immediately understandable or
straightforward; it is, instead, vague and slippery. It is something that envelops,
unavoidable, unknowable because its dominion has already been asserted before it has
even been recognized. Time does not care; time does not stop; time is impersonal.
Certainly, belonging to time and as a part of time, people already understand; the passage
of time and the development of meaning are unavoidable; the world and human being
necessarily correspond and it is inevitable that this world discloses itself as each person
grows and changes. There are, of course, moments in time, when the individual feels that
the world’s meaningfulness has been revealed, finally understandable—but this epiphany
is only temporary and so too this feeling of completeness—the passage of time will
necessarily confound too:
It seemed now as if, touched by human penitence and all its
toil, divine goodness had parted the curtain and displayed
behind it, single, distinct, the hare erect; the wave falling;
the boat rocking, which, did we deserve them, should be
ours always. But alas, divine goodness, twitching the cord,
draws the curtain; it does not please him; he covers his
treasures in a drench of hail, and so breaks them, so
confuses them that it seems impossible that their calm
should ever return or that we should ever compose from
their fragments a perfect whole or read in the littered pieces
the clear words of truth. For our penitence deserves a
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glimpse only; our toil respite only (Woolf, To the
Lighthouse 127-8).
Effort, engagement, and humility have their rewards: one might approach the world for
what it is. But this reward is only temporary and brings with it corresponding challenges;
for once one has finally understood, the world has already swiveled, meaning has already
shifted; this understanding still serves as a light in darkness, as a foundation for
understanding, but truth remains elusive—something right there, yet forever one step
ahead. No matter how much one wants to understand, no matter how precise and accurate
one might be, one cannot fully account for or overcome one’s hermeneutical situation;
one’s limitedness and givenness necessarily lead to interpretation: “It is not only that
historical tradition and the natural order of life constitute the unity of the world in which
we live as men; the way we experience one another, the way we experience historical
traditions, the way we experience the natural givenness of our existence and of our world,
constitute a truly hermeneutic universe, in which we are not imprisoned, as if behind
insurmountable barriers, but to which we are opened” (Gadamer, Truth and Method
xxiii). We are opened to the world and this access point demands adjustment and agility
if we hope to approach truth—a correspondence between the individual, the moment, and
the world.
The passage of time includes difference and even finality—death: Mrs. Ramsay
perishes during this interlude and so too Prue and Andrew (Andrew because of the war
and Prue in childbirth). As time passes, events occur and they are mostly a matter of
providence, out of one’s control—one is bound to be disappointed, to struggle; oftentimes
there is no recourse, no answer. Despite the impersonality of time and its ravages, a
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feeling of possibility still remains: one might understand, one might find an answer;
despite the confusion and the chaos, the world and one’s place in it might be understood,
the essential relations of things might be uncovered: “The mystic, the visionary, walking
the beach on a fine night, stirring a puddle, looking at a stone, asking themselves ‘What
am I,’ ‘What is this?’ had suddenly an answer vouchsafed them: (they could not say what
it was) so that they were warm in the frost and had comfort in the desert” (Woolf, To the
Lighthouse 131). There is always a sense that the answer is one turn around the corner,
that this feeling (despite the impossibility of permanently grasping it) is enough; the
potential is what comforts, motivating the seeker to continue looking. According to
Gadamer, one cannot help but understand and it is time that requires an adjustment to
difference, to change, even if the answer always outpaces the question and questioner:
“understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but the
mode of being of Dasein itself. It is in this sense that the term ‘hermeneutics has been
used here. It denotes the basic being-in motion of Dasein that constitutes its finitude and
historicity, and hence embraces the whole of its experience of the world. Not caprice, or
even an elaboration of a single aspect, but the nature of the thing itself makes the
movement of understanding comprehensive and universal” (Truth and Method xxvii).
Yes, the ultimate goal is to attain a correspondence between the way the world
truly is and the way one sees it. But there is no guarantee; one is bound to be uneasy and
uncertain; but one keeps searching; the possibility of an answer is only open to those who
seek:
As summer neared, as evenings lengthened, there came to
the wakeful, the hopeful, walking the beach, stirring the
pool, imaginations of the strangest kind—of flesh turned to
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atoms which drove before the wind, of stars flashing in
their hearts, of cliff, sea, cloud, and sky brought purposely
together to assemble outwardly the scattered parts of the
vision within. In those mirrors, the minds of men, in those
pools of uneasy water, in which clouds for ever turn and
shadows form, dreams persisted, and it was impossible to
resist the strange intimation which every gull, flower, tree,
man and woman, and the white earth itself seemed to
declare (but if questioned at once to withdraw) that good
triumphs, happiness prevails, order rules; or to resist the
extraordinary stimulus to range hither and thither in search
of some absolute good, some crystal of intensity, remote
from the known pleasures and familiar virtues, something
alien to the processes of domestic life, single, hard, bright,
like a diamond in the sand, which would render the
possessor secure (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 131-2).
Yes, in the world, one notices an order and one wishes to be on par with this order;
maybe by paying close attention one can truly understand. Maybe in the world there are
hints that help explain how to organize one’s very being, how to be at all. One wants an
assurance, a means of easing uncertainty.
But there are no final answers. People are limited, flawed; every vision, every
view, every answer is bound to disappoint and miss the target; these flaws are patent,
unavoidable; the world is bound to be skewed:
Did Nature supplement what man advanced? Did she
complete what he began? With equal complacence she saw
his misery, his meanness, and his torture. That dream, of
sharing, completing, of finding in solitude on the beach an
answer, was then but a reflection in a mirror, and the mirror
itself was but the surface glassiness which forms in
quiescence when the nobler powers sleep beneath?
Impatient, despairing yet loth to go (for beauty offers her
lures, has her consolations), to pace the beach was
impossible; contemplation was unendurable; the mirror was
broken (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 134).
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During this section of the novel, the theme of war appears most prominently, as when the
narrative describes Andrew’s death, or “the silent apparition of an ashen-colored ship for
instance, come, gone; there was a purplish stain upon the bland surface of the sea as if
something had boiled and bled, invisibly, beneath” (Woolf, To the Lighthouse 133-4).
One gets the sense that there is a link between time, understanding, and war. In this
scheme, war is a result of misdirected understanding, of people who fail to acknowledge
the necessity and importance of interpretation, of people who see the world as an object
to be controlled and mastered. If the world is the same for everyone, if it is subject to
dominance, then the essential value, worth, and contribution of individuals is minimized:
people become expendable, peripheral to truth and meaning. War is the result of the
passage of time if people do not adjust to the interpretive demands of difference and
change; interpretation includes an acknowledgement of the value and contribution of the
other; every attempt to interpret with clarity corresponds to an elevation of meaning and
human connection.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

To sum up, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and Virginia
Woolf’s novels highlight and emphasize the interpretive opportunity and responsibility of
the individual. This commonality lends itself to an analysis of both Woolf’s novels and
Gadamer’s philophical outlook: by probing Woolf’s novels in light of Gadamer’s
philosophy, one gains an improved understanding of the reference of the words that
inhabit her novels, words that have been combined to create a fictional world in which
the characters understand better or worse—fail or succeed—based on their willingness to
privilege and confront those experiences and situations that shape consciousness, those
experiences that determine how and what one understands. By relating Gadamer’s
philosophy to Woolf’s novels, one engages with an enactment and practical instantiation
of Gadamer’s philosophical approach. Gadamer stresses the link between the literary text
and one’s interpretation of daily existence. In all cases, the literary text is only
understandable as it relates to one’s world and one’s world becomes more understandable
as it interacts with the literary text. Through interrogation of this interaction, one
confronts the concept of interpretation and its implications.
Interpretation, for its part, hinges on the indivisibility between language, meaning,
and world. Language is necessarily interpretive; the meaning of the world and its
appearance in language constitute a non-distinction. That the world meaningfully appears
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in language is of special importance; human being is tuned to engage with the appearance
and the meaning of the world and art belongs to this process. An artwork engages one’s
perceptions of the world and its meaningfulness; by means of art one might gain insight
and understand better. In all cases—whenever and wherever the concept of interpretation
is involved—the dialogical situation is crucial. All language use, all interpretation,
belongs to a concrete situation and this situation determines the understandability and
appropriateness of all statements and assertions.
Embedded in their cultural and historical worlds, Woolf’s fiction and Gadamer’s
philosophy arose in response to the encroaching impersonality of scientific objectivity, an
objectivity that can be directly linked to World War I, inequality, subjugation, and
exploitation. As a riposte to the contention that the world can be objectively understood,
Woolf and Gadamer argue that the world is understood uniquely and individually,
according to the person who understands. Meaning is in constant evolution, dependent on
the level of participation and engagement of the individual. Furthermore, in the
interaction with others, with artworks and texts, the world necessarily becomes more
understandable, its meaning in clearer focus. This emphasis on the contribution and
participation of the individual in the meaningfulness of the world lends itself to a
recognition and acknowledgement of the essential dignity, value and worth of the
individual; all people should be respected and each person has something to gain through
dialogue and personal connection.
Woolf and Gadamer’s response to the subject-object dichotomy endemic to
scientific method belongs to the larger philosophical, intellectual, and artistic movement
known as Modernism. To the Modernists, Western civilization had lost its course, on the
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brink of mass annihilation. Certainly, in the way people treated one another, in the way
societies were organized and countries interacted, there was a widespread feeling of
malaise and sickness. If civilization were to proceed in the same direction, unchecked, the
consequences could be enormously destructive. This potential for mass destruction, this
devaluing of human life, has its roots in the levelling process that belongs to scientific
objectivity: if the entirety of the world can be objectively understood, then the
contribution and the value of the individual is diminished. Furthermore, this objectivity
elides the potential for community and solidarity. With people as mere instruments, the
potential of shared experience and the consequent insight is discounted. In response, the
Modernists stressed the uniqueness of each individual as he or she interacts with the
world and the potential insight and expansion of one’s world as he or she interacts with
others. In addition, interpretation itself took on a special role in Modernism, as
interpretation necessarily implies the unique contribution and experience of the
individual. To this end, the Modernists stressed the importance and centrality of art, as it
necessarily engages one’s interpretive faculties, pushing one to think more, differently,
and creatively.
Using these concepts as an organizing principle—in particular, the notion that
subject and object belong together when the world appears in language—I chose to
interpret Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse, two novels that highlight the individual’s
interpretive opportunity and responsibility. Mrs. Dalloway, for its part, is about a June
day in London, the war recently ended, still reverberating, and the variety of ways that its
inhabitants experience one moment to the next. In this novel, each character has a unique,
personal history, with a particular way of understanding and being in the world. It is
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based on this particularity that each individual confronts the fluidity of the day, each in
search of resolution and coherence. This notion of particularity, of the uniqueness of the
subject is reflective of Modernism. According to the Modernist mindset, each individual
was seen to inhabit his or her particular world, and this particularity shaped how each
person interpreted and understood the moment in time; it was up to the individual to
incorporate and account for this uniqueness instead of approaching the moment with a
one-size-fits-all approach. Certainly, in the characters of Clarissa Dalloway, Peter Walsh,
and Septimus Warren Smith one notices this emphasis on subjectivity and the interpretive
thrust belonging to this subjectivity. In particular, Clarissa and Peter persistently
contemplate their personal situation and circumstance, always trying to understand how
the present moment fits with their personal past and potential future. Though somewhat
estranged, Clarissa and Peter’s deep connection and shared past are decisive for how each
understands the world. In order to understand the present moment, both consistently
return to the other, as both have a sense that this relationship is still imminently
influential, still formative of the horizon of each. The two acknowledge that the world is
both understandable and mysterious and this recognition informs their approach to
understanding; instead of trying to master the moment and the meaning understood, the
two place themselves in situations where meaning might spring forth, the result of
dialogue and a shared world. Peter and Clarissa privilege experiences of meaning and
dialogue because each has a sense that his or her understanding, his or her ability to
control what is understood, is limited. This sense that one is not fully in control of one’s
mind, of one’s consciousness, constitutes a Modernist trope. Before one is even aware of
it, one’s consciousness has been shaped, and this shaping is decisive for understanding.
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Furthermore, scientific objectivity itself hinges on the sovereignty of consciousness and
in these characters one notices a subversion of this sovereignty. As for Septimus, he
represents what might happen when the present moment fails to cohere with the past and
a potential future. Septimus’ mindset and outlook is skewed by the war; a witness and
participant in bloodshed and carnage, he was forced to disconnect from people, the
feelings too intense to process. No longer able to connect with people and estranged from
his past, Septimus now lives in a solipsistic world, lacking corroboration and inspiration,
inevitably warped. Eventually, Septimus decides to commit suicide, the only means of
reaching resolution. In the character of Septimus, then, one notices an extreme example
of this Modernist trope of subjectivity—how one’s past and experiences can determine
meaning, the intense need to square the meaning of the world with one’s experience of
the world. Overall, the goal of each character is to live in a world that belongs to them
and to which they belong, a need reflective of the loss of grounding and the
corresponding search for grounding that is characteristic of the modern world. The extent
of their success in this endeavor depends on their willingness to privilege personal
relationships and their potential yield. In dialogue and in interaction with others, one
never knows what the yield will be, but the difference of the other necessarily leads to
insight and improved understanding. So these characters seek out experiences that will
contribute to interpretive clarity, aware that the meaning of the world depends on their
participation.
For its part, To the Lighthouse explores the borders that exist between individuals,
the difference and affinity that represent both a challenge and an opportunity. That is,
each individual is particular and unique, yet shared experience and meaning belong to
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this individuality. The characters in this novel mediate the polarities of familiarity and
strangeness. As the characters interact, their horizons of understanding and meaning
expand and refine. As with Mrs. Dalloway, one also notices in this novel a heavy accent
on subjectivity, on the uniqueness, depth, and unfathomability of the individual and the
manner in which the individual’s world shifts and changes. This emphasis on subjectivity
constitutes one of Modernism’s salient tropes, a direct rebuke to the impersonal
objectivity of the modern world. So, the world of each character alters as time passes and
each engages with others. In particular, one notices a triangular relationship between
Lilly Briscoe, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay. In the novel, Lilly paints a scene in which she
aims to represent her understanding of this family and how it relates to the meaning of the
world. To Lilly, this painting represents an opportunity to understand the world for what
it is, as a painting is a meaningful whole in which all of the parts fit together, components
that represent one’s perception of the world. That art is capable of ordering one’s world
and providing insight is of special importance. The Modernists, in fact, considered art to
be an essential means of order and understanding. With the world—and its objective
underpinnings—mired in chaos and destruction, art was considered to be an antidote, a
means of engaging one’s subjective experience, an experience that directly refutes
impersonal objectivity while necessarily involving one’s sense of meaning and
understanding. For Lilly, this painting is a way to engage with her particular way of
understanding and it is also a means of engaging with the unique subjectivity of Mr. and
Mrs. Ramsay. In the case of Mr. Ramsay, his life’s work consists of interrogating the
individual’s interaction with the world and he does so with the utmost intensity,
concentration, and effort. As for Mrs. Ramsay, she privileges those experiences of
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personal connection, drawn to them, aware that in them the world might appear with
greater clarity. In all, these characters participate in the meaning of the world, always
aware of the provisionality of this understanding, yet still willing to seek out experiences
that will push them to become more, experiences that will yield truth even as the world
remains shrouded in mystery.
Overall, then, one’s interpretive opportunity and responsibility cannot and should
not be denied. Each individual belongs to the world and, before he or she even realizes it,
the world and its meaning has already asserted itself. All one can do is accept one’s place
in the world and respond accordingly. By engaging with others, with artworks and texts,
one is afforded the opportunity to confront one’s understanding and refine one’s
understanding. In this confrontation, one might discard falsehood and embrace truth. But
it is not a matter of conscious effort; it is a matter of attention and engagement; it is a
matter of letting what is to be. But the nature of the thing itself depends on the present
moment and situation; to interpret with clarity it is necessary to adapt, to consider all of
the contributing factors that determine the thing understood, to include one’s very
participation in the meaning of the world. This need to adapt, this emphasis on
movement, is reflective of the Modernist mindset. The Modernists recognized that the
world is different according to the individual, that this subjectivity is primary. Instead of
blindly accepting that the subject is master of his or her consciousness, the Modernists
stressed that this subjectivity is limited, that this limitation should be incorporated into
one’s approach to understanding. This subjectivity—in its inherent limitedness and its
capacity for change and expansion—directly refutes the impersonality of scientific
objectivity, an objectivity that elides the essential value and contribution of one’s fellow
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being. Furthermore, Woolf’s novels themselves are a refutation of this objectivity, as
their very subject matter destabilizes static notions of world, self, and reality. Many
critics have chosen to interpret Woolf through a philosophical lens, but they fail to fully
appreciate Woolf’s radical critique of objectivity, with these interpretations themselves
dependent on the stability and permanence of the subject and object.
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